



Multilateral Aid 2010

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2010



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Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2011), *Multilateral Aid 2010*, OECD Publishing,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264046993-en>

ISBN 978-92-64-02227-0 (print)

ISBN 978-92-64-04699-3 (PDF)

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Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda

Revised version, July 2011.

Details of revisions available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/39/48470355.pdf>

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Foreword

The multilateral aid architecture is a complex “ecosystem” with many different types of organisations delivering assistance in a variety of different forms. More than 200 multilateral donors receive or serve as a channel for 40% of all aid. The challenge is to ensure that this aid is delivered in the most effective way and that efforts among donors are as co-ordinated as possible, both with each other and with the priorities of the developing countries in which they work.

Multilateral Aid 2010 covers trends and total use (core and non-core) of the multilateral system, with a special focus on trust funds of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. It provides an overview of the response of multilaterals to the financial and economic crisis, and explores the development perspectives of the already complex climate change funding architecture. It also includes information on the multilateral strategies and assessment approaches of the 24 countries in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

While the OECD’s annual *Development Co-operation Report* serves as a key reference for statistics and analysis on the latest trends in international aid, the *Multilateral Aid* report – as the name implies – takes a specific look at trends in multilateral aid only.

Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by Emily Bosch, under the guidance of Andrew Rogerson. Fredrik Ericsson provided statistical support and analysis. The report also benefited from comments, inputs and suggestions from many other colleagues, notably Suzanne Steensen, Kimberly Smith, Simon Scott, and Julia Benn. The chapter on climate financing architecture benefited from inputs from, among others, Rémy Paris, Tamara Levine, Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, Richard Carey and the ENVIRONET Secretariat of DCD, as well as from Jan Corfee-Morlot and Helen Mountford of the Environment Directorate. Invaluable data support was provided by Cécile Sangaré, Olivier Bouret, Andrzej Suchodolski, Elena Bernaldo and Aimée Nichols. DAC Delegates and their colleagues at headquarters provided us with input throughout the process and offered detailed, thorough comments in the final months of the report's preparation. Stephanie Coïc designed the graphics and Stacey Bradbury and Claire Condon provided technical support. Colleagues at UNDP (Bruce Jenks, Jennifer Topping, Gerd Trogemann, Jennifer Moreau, Bibi Halima Khanam, Mohamed Yar, Henriette Keijzers, and Amar Bokhari) and at the World Bank (Rocio Castro, Kjell Nordlander, Christian Rey, Jane Kirby-Zaki, and Michael Koch) provided valuable information and kindly reviewed the relevant sections of the report throughout its preparation.

Table of contents

Acronyms and abbreviations	11
Executive summary	15
1. General trends in the multilateral system and their policy implications	27
Why multilateral ODA?	29
Main trends in multilateral aid	30
Sustained growth in aid to EU Institutions and the Global Fund	37
Total use of the multilateral system	41
Main findings	43
Questions for future policy discussions	43
2. Non-core funding of multilaterals	45
Overview of DAC members' non-core funding	46
Main issues relating to non-core funding of multilaterals	47
Level of non-core earmarking and country-level aid delivery	49
Main findings	52
Questions for future policy discussions	52
3. Non-core funding of UNDP and the World Bank	53
Methodological issues	54
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	55
The World Bank Group	60
UN and World Bank trust fund collaboration	66
Main findings	67
4. Development perspectives for a post-Copenhagen climate funding architecture	69
Copenhagen accord	70
Mitigation and adaptation	70
Sources of funding	71
Integration with country-level strategies	72
Current external public funding to address climate change	77
Future work	80
Main findings	80
Questions for future policy discussion	80
5. Developments in the multilateral system in 2009-10	83
Ongoing reforms	84
How have multilateral agencies responded to the global economic crisis?	90
Resource mobilisation: Capital increase and replenishments	96
Main findings	97

6. Multilateral strategies and evaluation in 2009-10	99
DAC members' multilateral strategies	100
Evaluation of multilateral organisations	103
Main findings	104
Questions for future policy discussions	104
Bibliography	106
Annex A	109
Annex B	119
Annex C	147
Annex D	155
Annex E	159
Figures	
Figure 1.1 DAC countries' multilateral ODA (core, excluding KOREA): Gross disbursements, outflows and reflows, 1999-2008	29
Figure 1.2 Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 1989-2008	30
Figure 1.3 Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries as share of total ODA, 1989-2008	31
Figure 1.4 2008 gross DAC bilateral ODA and gross multilateral outflows (not including Korea)*	32
Figure 1.5 Average multilateral ODA (excluding to EU) as percentage of gross ODA, 2006-08	32
Figure 1.6 Average aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals over five-year periods	38
Figure 1.7 Percent change in country programmable aid (CPA): Bilateral and multilateral outflows	39
Figure 1.8 Composition of global country programmable aid	39
Figure 1.9 Composition of gross multilateral outflows, 2007 and 2008	40
Figure 1.10 Country programmable aid to low-income countries according to their development status and MDG performance, 2009	42
Figure 1.11 Gross ODA disbursements, 2008	42
Figure 2.1 Gross non-core multilateral ODA disbursements in 2008 as shares (percentage) of reported total use of the multilateral system	47
Figure 2.2 Total use of the multilateral system, gross disbursements in 2008	49
Figure 2.3 Gross non-core multilateral aid disbursements and multilateral outflows in 2008	50
Figure 2.4 Share of aid flows going to fragile and conflict-affected states	51
Figure 3.1 Methods of providing earmarked ODA to the United Nations	58
Figure 3.2 Regional distribution of World Bank recipient-executed trust funds, 2008	62
Figure 3.3 Components of the World Bank Group's trust fund portfolio, fiscal year 2009	63
Figure 4.1 Institutional framework for climate change in Bangladesh	73
Figure 4.2 Existing multilateral climate change funds	76
Tables	
Table 1.1 Multilateral organisations receiving the top 82% of multilateral ODA	35
Table 1.2 DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five-year period 2004-08	36
Table 1.3 Concentration ratio of multilateral and bilateral donors in low-income countries, 2008	41
Table 2.1 Channels of country programmable aid in nine partner countries, 2008	51
Table 3.1 DAC contributions to UNDP, 2007-08	55
Table 3.2 World Bank trust fund typology	61

Table 3.3	DAC* non-core contributions to the World Bank, 2007-08	62
Table 4.1	Funds disbursed for climate change to 2010	77
Table 5.1	Debt sustainability framework for LICs	89
Table 5.2	DAC share of calls for recapitalisation and replenishment	97

Boxes

Box 1.1	Definition of multilateral ODA	28
Box 1.2	Multilateral agencies that submit reports on aid flows to the DAC	34
Box 2.1	Definitions of multilateral ODA and non-core or multi-bi ODA	46
Box 3.1	Methodological issues relating to non-core multilateral ODA	54
Box 3.2	UNEP's voluntary indicative scale of contributions	56
Box 3.3	Local resources that go to the UNDP	57
Box 3.4	Co-ordinated approaches: The MDG Achievement Fund	60
Box 3.5	World Bank trust funds in Indonesia	65
Box 3.6	The World Bank's State and Peacebuilding Fund	65
Box 3.7	UNDP and World Bank multi-donor trust funds	66
Box 4.1	Mitigation and adaptation	71
Box 5.1	Recommendations of the Zedillo Commission Report	85
Box 5.2	Recommendations of the Manuel Committee's Report	86
Box 5.3	Proposals for the further improvement of UN system-wide coherence related to operational activities for development	87
Box 5.4	Global food crisis initiatives	90
Box 5.5	The IMF's response to the crisis	91
Box 5.6	The World Bank Group's response to the crisis	92
Box 5.7	DFID core funding to the GAVI Alliance: Long-term funding mechanism	96
Box 6.1	Performance funding in the UN: The UK's approach	102
Box 6.2	MOPAN and the DAC's Evaluation Network	103

Acronyms and abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfDf	African Development Fund
AsDB	Asian Development Bank
AsDF	Asian Development Fund
BETF	Bank-Executed Trust Fund
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CarDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CIFs	Climate Investment Funds
COP	Conference of Parties
CPA	Country programmable aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System (OECD)
CTF	Clean Technology Fund (World Bank)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
EDF	European Development Fund
EFA-FTI	Education for All – Fast Track Initiative
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)
FIF	Financial Intermediary Fund
FIP	Forest Investment Program (World Bank)
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation

GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gases
GNI	Gross national income
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor country
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture Development
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF/"Fund"	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least developed country
LDCF	Least Developed Country Fund
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
LIC	Low-income country
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network
MTEF	Medium-term expenditure framework
NAPA	National Adaptation Plan of Action
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOF	Other official flows
PCCF	Public climate change financing
PPCR	Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (World Bank)
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
RETF	Recipient-Executed Trust Fund
SCCF	Strategic Climate Change Fund (UNFCCC)
SCF	Strategic Climate Fund (World Bank)
SDR	Special drawing rights
SPA	Strategic Priority on Adaptation (GEF)
SREP	Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (World Bank)

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIFEM	UN Development Fund for Women
UN-REDD	UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
WBG	World Bank Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

The first *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* was discussed in draft by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in December 2008, and then published in June 2009. This second report takes up and updates the 2009 publication. It covers recent trends in multilateral aid; total use (core and non-core) of the multilateral system – with a special focus on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank trust funds; development perspectives on climate change funding architecture; and finally an overview of the response of multilaterals to the financial and economic crisis. It provides an update on members' multilateral strategies and assessment approaches.


General trends in the multilateral system

Today, countries that are members of the DAC report contributions to over 200 multilateral agencies in DAC statistics. In turn, 23 of those agencies report their outflows to the DAC.

In the 20 years from 1989 to 2008, multilateral official development assistance (ODA) increased from USD 23 billion to USD 35 billion. The multilateral share of total ODA was relatively stable in that period, ranging from 27% to 33%, excluding debt relief. Not counting contributions to EU Institutions (which rose faster than other components), the share of multilateral ODA declined slightly – from 22% in 1989 to 20% in 2008.

Why provide multilateral ODA, and what might explain its flat or eroding share of growing official development assistance? Some well-known arguments in favour of providing multilateral aid were advanced by donors in the *2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*

Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 1989–2008



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.


(economies of scale, political neutrality and legitimacy, large scale of capital and knowledge resources, lower unit costs, and the provision of public goods). In addition to these, the current report considers the speed and flexibility of response from major multilaterals to the financial and economic crisis. It also looks at evidence that multilateral aid may be less geographically fragmented than bilateral aid and that it delivers a higher proportion of country programmable aid (CPA) than might be expected, given the proportion of overall aid that is multilateral in the first place.

Conversely, there are arguments typically advanced against providing multilateral aid. These include multilateral agencies' perceived institutional complexity, procedures which can be cumbersome or time-consuming, lack of transparency, higher absolute costs and salaries, remoteness and lack of accountability. Core multilateral aid which is pooled before being allocated to partner countries also reduces the visibility of a donor's assistance. More generally, DAC members (Chapter 6) continue to report insufficient evidence of the effectiveness of multilateral aid – particularly as regards development impact and value for money – despite agencies' high levels of investment in evaluation, assessment, disclosure, and communication systems.

The Big Six. In 2004-8, 82% of multilateral ODA was allocated to just six "clusters" of multilateral entities: EU Institutions (37%), the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group (21%), UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the Global Fund (6%), and African and Asian Development Banks (4% and 3%). Multilateral ODA to EU Institutions, the largest contribution at USD 13 billion, also makes up the majority of EU members' multilateral ODA (51%).

The longer-term drop in multilateral ODA to UN Funds and programmes, together with the increase in that allocated to EU Institutions and – more recently – to the Global Fund and the World Bank Group, appears to be a continuing trend. The DAC average share of multilateral ODA to UN Funds and Programmes fell from 15% to 10% between the periods 1999-2003 and 2004-8. Over these same two periods, the share of resources allocated to the Global Fund increased from 2% to 6%, to EU Institutions from 33% to 37%, and to the World Bank Group from 19% to 23%.

Aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals
(Five-year average)



* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR, and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated under the "Other UN" category.

Note: "Other Agencies" includes GEF, Montreal Protocol, the IMF and residual multilaterals.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

The “long tail”. Conversely, multilateral ODA to the remaining “long tail” of multilaterals – which number over 200 – accounts for the other 18%, a share that is slowly shrinking. The vast majority of these institutions do not report their outflows to developing countries to the DAC. However, many are known to have normative, standard-setting, technical mandates which are not best gauged in terms of their resource transfers alone. Such mandates may oblige them to maintain broad geographical representation. Moreover, from the perspective of the countries they advise, they may not generate transaction costs comparable to those of small additional donors.

The 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid examined the internal allocation processes of each DAC member, both in bilateral and multilateral aid and across multilaterals. In practice, these multilateral allocations are not determined simultaneously and often not within the same ministry. Political decisions at the margin, made under fiscal pressure and in consideration of geographic and thematic priorities and (often) the balance between loans and grants, are the rule not the exception. It is exceptional, however, though not unknown, for countries to zero-base their contributions to some multilaterals, rather than maintain them at extremely low levels with minimal staff capacity for oversight.


A portfolio view. DAC donors allocate strikingly different portions of their multilateral portfolios to the same major multilateral organisations. Luxembourg, for example, provides 13% of its non-EU multilateral aid portfolio to the IDA, compared to Germany’s 53%. The range for UN Funds and Programmes is from 5% (France) to 45% (Norway), and even the relative share of the EU covers wide variations among its members.

Such large portfolio variations are significant in global policy terms to the extent that contributions to each cluster are considered to be voluntary and fungible with contributions to other organisations. For IDA replenishments, participants negotiate contributions which are, in principle, discretionary, although they may be heavily influenced by historic shares. Contributions to UN Funds and Programmes, the Global Fund and the African and Asian Development Funds are similarly voluntary. EU institutional funding is a mix of multi-year replenishments of European Development Fund (EDF) assistance to Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (based on negotiations and unanimous decisions as to each member’s contributions); of annual EU budget allocations (in keeping with European Parliament’s and Council of Ministers’ decisions); and to those other components of EU external action which qualify for ODA. A smaller fraction of overall multilateral funding – of particular relevance to UN Specialised Agencies – is driven by assessed contributions, which can be considered conditions of membership.

Non-DAC providers of multilateral support. Nineteen non-DAC members, of which Saudi Arabia is the largest provider, report their aid flows to the DAC. They account for USD 8.8 billion of total non-DAC aid, estimated between USD 12 and 14 billion, or 9% to 10% of global ODA, according to recent OECD estimates. Their multilateral share is, on the whole, higher than the DAC’s, given that the majority are recent EU members without large bilateral programmes of their own. This, however, is unlikely to be true for the BRIC countries. They are members of many multilateral agencies and are increasingly becoming contributors to concessional funds, yet their bilateral programmes are growing even faster. Finally, mention should be made of large foundation grants – overwhelmingly from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – to some of the global health partnerships, most notably the Global Fund and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI).

Total use of the multilateral system

In addition to multilateral ODA, donors choose to give non-core funding, earmarked for specific sectors, themes, countries or regions and routed *through* multilateral agencies, as illustrated in the figure below. Core multilateral ODA combined with non-core multilateral ODA constitutes the *total use* of the multilateral system. This represented 40% of total ODA in 2008, similar to the 2006 share. This proportion may give a better indication of the role multilateral institutions play in the overall aid architecture today.



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010

Non-core or “multi-bi” aid

Australia, Norway, Spain, and the United States, have the highest non-core multilateral ODA as a share of the reported total use of the multilateral system, well above the DAC average of 29%. France, Greece and Germany have the lowest shares, though this may be partly due to under-reporting. The volume of non-core funding has been rising quickly from a relatively low base. But since this rise coincides with significantly better reporting, it is too early to tell if it forms a sustainable trend. Until recently, EU Institutions did not accept earmarked funds, which explains their very small share of non-core multilateral ODA. When contributions to the EU Institutions are excluded (both core and non-core), the DAC average rises to 39% and the same top four donors emerge.

There are inherent tensions and complementarities in providing both core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations. **From the donor’s point of view**, non-core funding of multilateral organisations makes it possible to target resources to specific sectors, regions or countries of interest with the kind of visibility that can help mobilise and maintain public resources for development.


From a multilateral organisation’s perspective, non-core funding can shift its overall balance of activities. Non-core resources may incur higher transaction costs for the receiving organisation, given the additional monitoring and reporting requirements that may be imposed. Governance arrangements of earmarked funds may also offer less say to partner countries in the decision-making process and/or limit institutional oversight. On the other

hand, non-core funds increase the overall envelope of resources available to multilateral entities, allowing them to engage in a wider range of activities while using existing institutional structures.

From an aid effectiveness perspective, multi-donor trust funds also have to be compared to the alternative, which might be a proliferation of parallel bilateral initiatives with their corresponding costs and overlaps. However, the more DAC members' multilateral portfolios are shaped by non-core resources with a limited time horizon, the less predictable the overall funding of multilaterals becomes.

As illustrated in the following figure, the World Bank is the second largest single recipient of non-core funding (USD 2.4 billion) after the World Food Programme (WFP) with USD 2.9 billion, which inherently depends on assistance earmarked for specific emergency operations and receives very little core funding. UNDP is the second largest non-core recipient in the UN system (USD 1.8 billion).

Total use of the multilateral system: Gross disbursements in 2008
(Excluding EU Institutions and Korea as donors)



Note: Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR, and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Non-core ODA earmarked for humanitarian purposes and routed through multilateral organisations is the single most important channel of humanitarian aid in volume. Non-core multilateral ODA also reaches a higher proportion of fragile states: 72% of non-core funds allocated to specific countries go to fragile states as opposed to 36% of core multilateral outflows and 34% of bilateral ODA.

Non-core funding of the World Bank and UNDP

Non-core funding of the UNDP

Regular or core resources to UNDP amounted to USD 1.1 billion in 2008 and non-core resources (from all sources) reached USD 3.6 billion, according to UNDP's own records. The top recipient of non-core DAC contributions to UNDP is Afghanistan (USD 383 million), followed by Sudan (USD 75 million), Bangladesh (USD 68 million) and Somalia (USD 63 million). Non-core resources align with UNDP's mandated practice areas, but they do not fall directly under the purview of the Executive Board in the way core resources do.

The UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office offers a one-stop shop for donors to establish a single agreement with one UN organisation serving as the administrative agent, instead of entering into separate agreements with each relevant UN agency. MDTF activities and programmes are actually implemented by over 40 UN agencies and some non-UN participating agencies. "One UN" and "Delivering as One" funds and other multi-donor trust funds may actually reduce transaction costs both for UN agencies and partner governments and streamline efforts to bridge the financing gap at country level.

Non-core funding of the World Bank

As a share of combined World Bank disbursements (IDA, IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and trust funds), trust fund disbursements grew from 8% in fiscal year 2004 to 14% in fiscal year 2008. (Trust fund disbursements exclude those of financial intermediary funds which, though administered by the Bank, do not fund its operations.) Trust funds have enabled the World Bank to provide additional or complementary financing to support fragile states and non-member countries (e.g. Kosovo, and the West Bank and Gaza), as well as countries facing emergencies or natural disasters. There are also thematic or sector-specific trust funds, such as the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI). There is some evidence from a recent evaluation of EFA-FTI that core IDA resources for education have been redirected to other country priorities within an overall performance-based country allocation because of additional grant-financed trust funds earmarked for the education sector.

In 2007, the Bank launched a series of reforms aimed at enhancing the strategic alignment, risk management, and efficiency of Bank-administered trust funds. As part of these reforms, the Bank increased the minimum threshold for all new trust funds from USD 200 000 to USD 1 million and introduced a new fee structure. Efforts are currently underway to enhance the alignment of trust funds with Bank strategies and processes.

Development perspectives for a post-Copenhagen climate funding architecture

The December 2009 Copenhagen Accord promises developing countries scaled up, predictable, and adequate funding to meet the challenges of climate change. Developed countries committed to providing new and additional resources approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-12 with allocation balanced between adaptation and mitigation. They also committed to a goal of mobilising USD 100 billion a year by 2020 to meet the needs of developing countries in this regard.

Key post-Copenhagen processes, including the next COP16¹ in Mexico, will need to mobilise further resources and find robust mechanisms to measure climate change flows. Currently, the DAC's "Rio marker" on climate change mitigation and the recently approved new marker for adaptation provide the only systematic way for reporters to identify public finance flows that serve clearly defined adaptation or mitigation objectives. However the markers are not by themselves a sufficient basis from which to pinpoint the volume of spending going to these objectives compared to other development activities. Nor are there agreed baselines against which additionality to ODA can be measured.

Despite a number of substantial commitments and much hard work implementing fiduciary and management structures, actual disbursements to address climate change have taken time. Today, total disbursements by existing global funds for climate change both inside and outside the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) have amounted to only USD 2.9 billion since their inception – about USD 246 million per year. In contrast, the World Bank estimates total resources (including, but not limited to, global funds) dedicated to climate change mitigation and adaptation at between USD 9 and 10 billion per year (between USD 8 and 9 billion for mitigation and USD 1 billion for adaptation).

It is an inadequate to argue that parallel new funds should be created because existing funds have not yet delivered sufficient resources or because the financial gaps for funding climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are already so large. Instead, it is important to draw lessons from global health funds, starting with an analysis of the functions and purposes of new ventures envisaged in order to determine whether existing institutions fit the bill. Other configurations, including a "networked" approach of separating out functions and institutional responsibilities, may be equally desirable and/or manageable.

When plans are prioritised and integrated into a country's planning process to allow for the active participation of central and line ministries, civil society, and the private sector, stakeholders can effectively lead and steer efforts to address the effects of climate change and mitigate them. The ideal climate fund model will provide flexible external resources to support intrinsically integrated interventions anchored in a country's climate or national development strategy. New proposal-based systems should be avoided as they usually require complex appraisal systems with high transaction costs for partner countries.

Developments in the multilateral system

All multilateral agencies covered in this report have established specific reform programs to attain one or more of the following objectives: (i) to become more effective and efficient, applicable to all agencies; (ii) to ensure greater policy coherence for development, as in the case of EU Institutions; (iii) to reduce fragmentation, particularly as it affects the UN system; (iv) to achieve governance and voting structures that are more closely aligned with their membership, a challenge faced by the Bretton Woods Institutions in particular.

Multilateral agencies reacted quickly to demands from partner countries for additional resources prompted by the economic and financial crisis in 2009. Partly as a result of this high crisis-related demand and subsequently large disbursements, the year 2010 requires donors to make simultaneous decisions on the replenishment and recapitalisation of several major concessional funds and multilateral development banks.

¹ The Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Multilateral strategies and evaluation 2009-10

Finland, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium have developed new multilateral strategies since the 2008 report. Of particular note has been Belgium's policy of shifting most of its contributions to multilateral agencies towards full core resources, thus decreasing its non-core multilateral ODA over time. As an alternative approach, some donors (e.g. the UK) are making additional voluntary core contributions to multilateral organisations, mostly linked to performance targets set by the institutions themselves.

For domestic accountability purposes, DAC members continue to report a need for better evidence of multilateral impact and effectiveness – a need made more pressing by post-crisis fiscal stringencies and the large number of major replenishment negotiations held at the same time. They see a growing need to justify multilateral contributions – over which they have less direct oversight – to a sceptical public, and may therefore require even more detailed reporting on the impact of multilateral organisations in developing countries than they possess for their own operations. How well multilateral organisations report this information back to donors, and how well DAC members in turn represent them domestically, may influence domestic constituents' perception of these organisations as much as the substantive evidence available.

As first discussed in the *2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, reporting by multilateral agencies should ideally be sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy bilateral donor information requirements, making separate donor-driven assessments unnecessary. Indeed, a shift towards self-reporting by multilaterals would be a way to apply the Paris Declaration principles of "ownership" and "alignment" to the funding of these organisations. Until such reporting is deemed adequate, however, collective assessments intended to bring about the full harmonisation of monitoring instruments for multilaterals are at least an improvement over a proliferation of single-donor assessment efforts.

Such harmonised efforts include the Multilateral Organisations' Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), and the work of the DAC's Evaluation Network. The latter is involved in peer reviewing the evaluation capacities of multilateral organisations. It is also developing an approach to joint assessments of the development effectiveness of multilaterals, by combining elements of MOPAN assessments with reviews of organisations' own evaluations of their development results.

The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* will examine the processes and evidence bases that DAC members use to establish their bilateral and multilateral aid allocations and, in turn, their contributions to the larger multilateral organisations. It will look at whether such choices are made deliberately and coherently or can only be inferred from multiple separate decision points within and across agencies and government departments.

Questions for further discussion on multilateral aid: Issues being reviewed by the DAC

- What explains the flat historical multilateral share of ODA? Which arguments for and against greater pooling have the most traction in the current context?
- Should future work focus on the 15 multilaterals (6 clusters) which claim 82% of multilateral ODA volume, or should it also attempt to rationalise the 18% “long tail”?
- What are the main determinants of large variations in the multilateral portfolio choices across DAC members? Are any likely to be amenable to improved information sharing?
- Are new non DAC and non EU funding sources less focused on multilaterals? If so, why, and how might this change?
- Is the EU a special case that requires a different analytical approach? If so, in what way?
- Is there a growing trend towards non-core funding? What might the implications be for development effectiveness?
- How might monitoring “new and additional” funding for climate change be envisaged?
- Future efforts by the DAC’s Evaluation Network and MOPAN aim to combine surveys of multilateral effectiveness with better impact reporting by the multilaterals themselves. Is this the right mix?
- Bilateral donors have reported an inability to demonstrate multilateral effectiveness. Is this primarily due to underlying multilateral performance problems, lack of robust data, or communication gaps?

Checklist of main findings

General trends in the multilateral system

- As overall levels of ODA increase, the multilateral share of ODA is either flat or shrinking, when contributions to EU Institutions are excluded.
- In many cases, donors allocate very different shares of their multilateral portfolio to the same multilateral agencies.
- Multilateral aid accounts for a high share of the aid granted by non-DAC EU members reporting to the DAC, although it is unlikely to be as high among the BRICs (who do not report to the DAC).
- In 2004-8, an average 82% of DAC members’ multilateral ODA went to six clusters of organisations: EU Institutions, the IDA, UN Funds and Programmes, the Global Fund, and the African and Asian Regional Development Banks (15 institutions in all). Conversely, multilateral ODA to the remaining 200-plus multilateral organisations accounted for only 18%.
- Recent trends indicate a decrease in the core multilateral funding of UN Funds and Programmes and an increase in funding to EU Institutions and the Global Fund.
- Multilateral outflows are, on balance, more flexible in the short term, as demonstrated by their response to the crisis.
- Multilateral outflows are also more geographically concentrated than bilateral flows and deliver 37% of country programmable aid. These figures are, however, subject to qualification.

- The *total use* of the multilateral system by DAC donors (core multilateral ODA plus bilateral earmarked ODA channelled through multilateral organisations) was 40% of total ODA in 2008. Indeed, this proportion may give a better indication of the role multilateral institutions play in the overall aid architecture today.

Non-core funding of multilateral organisations

- In 2008, 29% of DAC countries' total aid transiting through the multilateral system was earmarked (non-core). This rose to 39% when all contributions to EU Institutions were excluded.
- Donors earmark funds for specific countries and sectors and to gain greater visibility and influence in the multilateral system.
- From a multilateral organisation's perspective, excessive earmarking risks weakening its governance and complicates accountability. However, such risks may be preferable to the alternative of multiple, single-donor, parallel initiatives.
- Non-core, or earmarked, multilateral ODA is the single most important channel for humanitarian aid. It also targets a higher proportion of fragile states than multilateral outflows or bilateral ODA.

Non-core funding of UNDP and the World Bank

- UNDP non-core funding is used for the same thematic areas as its core funding. Funding to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office helps align donors and UN agencies at country level, *e.g.* through the One UN funds.
- World Bank non-core flows help diversify its portfolio to countries where loan instruments are unavailable, *e.g.* due to arrears or because recipient countries are non-members.

Development perspectives for a post-Copenhagen climate funding architecture

- The ideal climate fund model will provide flexible external resources to support intrinsically integrated interventions anchored in a country's climate or national development strategy.
- New, complex, proposal-based systems should be avoided as they usually require complex appraisal systems with high transaction costs for partner countries.
- Instead of creating new funding mechanisms, it may be equally desirable for donors to examine existing functions and determine whether existing institutions can perform them through a "networked" approach in which each institution fulfils an institutional responsibility.
- Total public resources currently dedicated to climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries are estimated at roughly USD 10 billion per year. To date, existing climate change funds have disbursed a yearly average of only USD 246 million per year.
- As the parties to the UNFCCC discuss the additionality question, it will be important to apply and improve OECD members' reporting by using the markers for climate change mitigation and adaptation as rapidly as possible.

Developments in the multilateral system and evaluation

- Multilateral development banks are moving forward with reforms towards a more representative governance structure. Internal reforms also aim to provide more flexible and better adapted instruments for their clients.
- The year 2010 requires donors to make simultaneous decisions on the replenishment and recapitalisation of major concessional funds and multilateral development banks.
- In the longer-term, self-assessments by multilateral agencies should be sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy bilateral donor information requirements and to make separate bilateral evaluations and/or assessments unnecessary.
- Until self-reporting is deemed adequate, collective assessments designed to achieve the full harmonisation of monitoring instruments for multilaterals are encouraged as an improvement over multiple single-donor assessment efforts.

Chapter 1

General trends in the multilateral system and their policy implications

This chapter presents a picture of evolving multilateral aid that updates the overall trends from the 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. It sets out this picture by looking at historical and main trends in multilateral aid, including the composition of multilateral ODA and members' multilateral portfolio choices. It also includes an introduction to the next chapter on non-core multilateral aid.

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Throughout the report we distinguish between (a) multilateral ODA (Box 1.1), measured as the funding (*i.e. inflows*) to multilateral organisations; and (b) multilateral *outflows* from those agencies to partner countries. Today, members report contributions to over 200 multilateral agencies in DAC statistics. In turn, 23 of these multilateral agencies report their core outflows to the DAC (Box 1.2). References to multilateral outflows in this report refer to concessional outflows only. Korea became a DAC member in December 2009. For data purposes, it will therefore be included in the group of DAC members that started 2010. However, it is also included as a separate line in tables and is included in Annex B of this report.

Box 1.1. Definition of multilateral ODA

Multilateral ODA is a contribution made to a recipient institution that

- conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development,
- is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency;
- pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets


Multilateral ODA includes both assessed and voluntary un earmarked contributions

Source: OECD DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, 2010

Figure 1.1 illustrates inflows, outflows, and reflows of the multilateral system. DAC countries' multilateral ODA, or *inflows* to agencies, is represented by the top grey arrows. The blue arrows in the bottom half of the figure are the corresponding *outflows* from these agencies, and the dotted green arrows pointing upwards represent the *reflows*, or loan repayments, back to these agencies from partner countries. For IDA, for example, the volume shown at the top, under the grey arrow, is significantly less than the volume of the outflow next to the blue arrow. This is because they are able to leverage reflows from earlier concessional loans and transfers from other windows of the WBG in addition to fresh resources (inflows) provided by contributors to replenishments.

Figure 1.1 **DAC countries' multilateral ODA (core, excluding KOREA): Gross disbursements, outflows and reflows, 1999-2008**

(Cumulative total, excluding debt relief, in USD billion at 2008 constant prices)



1 Reflows to IFAD

2 Corresponding outflows do not exactly match inflows since not all multilaterals listed above report their outflows to the DAC. This figure represents outflows from only those agencies reporting to the DAC. The corresponding inflows to the agencies that report outflows are USD 39 billion for "UN Agencies", USD 25 billion for "Regional Banks", and USD 20 billion for "Other Multi"

Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. "UN Agencies" include contributions to UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR, UNFPA, IFAD, WHO, WIPO, ILO, UPU, ITU, UNESCO, UNO, UNDPKO and other UN agencies and funds. "Regional Development Banks" include contributions to the Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Special Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Caribbean Development Bank, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, African Solidarity Fund, and other regional banks and funds. "Other Multi" include contributions to the IMF, Global Fund, GEF, Montreal Protocol, GAVI, and other multilaterals

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Why multilateral ODA?

The *2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*¹ lists the main reasons provided by DAC members as to why they choose to provide multilateral ODA (OECD, 2009a). These include economies of scale; political neutrality and legitimacy; scale of resources (capital and knowledge); low unit costs; and provision of public goods.

There are also well-known arguments against providing multilateral ODA, such as perceived institutional complexity and/or lack of transparency in processes; higher absolute costs and salaries; remoteness, and perceived lack of accountability from the perspective of domestic audiences. More generally, DAC members continue to report insufficient evidence of multilateral effectiveness, particularly as regards the impact on development impact and value for money, despite major ongoing investment in evaluation, assessment, disclosure, and communication (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, advantages and disadvantages need to be contextualised by donor country situations – e.g. a bilateral organisation


that is sharply focused on one region may prefer to act directly there, while using multilaterals as cost-effective extensions elsewhere. The transactions cost case is neither straightforward, nor comparable across institutions.

Even so, the 2010 report raises three more considerations as to why multilateral ODA might be an attractive channel. First, a large portion of multilateral donors have, on the whole, more concentrated outflows than bilateral donors. The DAC Secretariat's recent definition of concentration (OECD, 2009b) recognises the higher proportion of countries in which multilateral donors operate at or above their global share of aid. Concentrated outflows are explained mainly by the fact that multilaterals are mostly mandated to apply rules-based allocation mechanisms designed to ensure a smoother geographical spread, relative to country income and population. Second, multilaterals deliver a higher proportion of country programmable aid (CPA) than might be expected given the proportion of overall aid that is multilateral in the first place. (Both concentration levels and CPA are discussed further in this chapter.) Third, multilaterals demonstrated flexibility and were able to react quickly to increase their outflows in response to the recent economic and financial crisis.

Main trends in multilateral aid

More aid, but an eroding multilateral share


Figure 1.2 Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 1989–2008
(USD billion at 2008 constant prices)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Figure 1.2 shows gross² ODA provided by DAC member countries in the past two decades. In the 20 years from 1989 to 2008, multilateral ODA increased by half – from USD 23 billion to USD 35 billion (at 2008 prices and exchange rates). The share of multilateral ODA was relatively stable in that period, ranging from 27% to 33% of overall ODA, excluding debt relief. This relatively stable 30% share, or “ceiling”, is shrinking, however, if contributions to EU Institutions (blue line in Figure 1.2) are excluded. This decline is illustrated by the blue curve in the line graph below (Figure 1.3), which dropped to 20% in 2008. From 2002, the gap between the two lines widened, indicating a declining share of non-EU multilateral ODA.

Figure 1.3. **Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries as share of total ODA, 1989-2008**
(USD billion at 2008 constant rates)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010


The flat trend in multilateral ODA is not expected to change significantly over the medium term. The recent DAC survey on donors' forward spending plans (OECD, 2010a) recorded a slight projected growth rate in multilateral ODA of 1% per year in real terms over the next three years.

EU Institutions are unique because they play a dual role in the international aid architecture. They both receive development funds from EU member states and channel funds through other multilateral organisations (and are a DAC member). This report attempts to reflect both roles. Reporting EU Institutions as a group of multilateral organisations receiving contributions is consistent with longstanding statistical practices and treatment in other DAC publications. In addition, EU Institutions are treated as a single donor to other multilaterals when analysing the "total use" of the multilateral system in Annex B. For the purposes of comparing shares of multilateral ODA and multilateral portfolios across DAC members, ODA to EU Institutions is usually excluded.

Geographical focus of multilateral aid

Figure 1.4 shows the geographical distribution of both bilateral ODA and of multilateral outflows. The 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid highlighted the fact that the share of multilateral outflows to sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia was greater than the shares allocated by bilateral donors to these same regions. Data from 2008 confirmed this trend. However, it is important to note that over one-fifth of bilateral ODA was "unspecified" by region because at the time it was allocated to global thematic programmes, even if later directed to specific regions. Figure A.4 of Annex A disaggregates bilateral ODA and multilateral outflows by recipient country income. Thirty-three percent of bilateral ODA was allocated to low-income countries (including LDCs), in comparison to 55% of multilateral outflows. The figure below shows that bilateral ODA had a much larger share of "unspecified" or "unallocated" ODA, making it more difficult to draw conclusions as to which provided a larger share to low-income countries.

Figure 1.4 2008 gross DAC bilateral ODA and gross multilateral outflows (not including Korea)*
(Excluding debt relief)




* Korea's ODA is not included in total bilateral ODA. EU Institutions are included in multilateral outflows. Regional ODA to "Africa" is included in the "Sub-Saharan Africa" category. Data on multilateral outflows are incomplete. Approximately 23 major multilateral organisations report their outflows to the DAC.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Multilateral ODA share varies across donors

The three-year DAC country average share of multilateral ODA – which excludes contributions to EU Institutions in order to compare across DAC countries – is illustrated in the bar graph below (Figure 1.5). The average share is slightly above 20%, with two major outliers at each end: Italy (49%) and the United States (11%). Multilateral aid showing both EU and non-EU contributions is illustrated in Figure A.1 of Annex A, while multilateral aid to EU Institutions alone is expressed as a percentage of overall ODA in Figure A.2 of Annex A.

Figure 1.5 Average multilateral ODA (excluding to EU) as percentage of gross ODA, 2006-08
(Excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Caps on aid flows to multilaterals among DAC members

Two DAC members have decided to limit their share of multilateral ODA through legislative means. Germany's multilateral ceiling is one-third of the budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. This does not include humanitarian aid or ODA to the EU budget from the Ministry of Finance (but does include EDF contributions). In December 2008, the Swiss Parliament decided on a ceiling of 40% for multilateral development assistance through the end of 2012. This cap does not apply to multilateral aid for humanitarian assistance or to aid for Eastern Europe (both of which come under different legislation).

Aid flow reporting among non-DAC donors

Twenty non-DAC donors reported their aid flows to the Secretariat in the period from 2006-8 (see Table A.1), while some larger players (Brazil, China, and India) did not. Non-DAC EU members provided a higher proportion of multilateral aid than DAC members (including to EU Institutions), ranging from a low of 42% (Cyprus) to a high of 87% (Latvia) in the three years from 2006 to 2008. It is unlikely that the BRICs (who do not currently report their aid flows to the DAC) provided such a high share of multilateral aid. They belong to multilateral organisations, and contribute increasingly to concessional funds, but also have strong and growing bilateral programmes. Non-DAC donors reporting to the DAC accounted for USD 8.8 billion of total non-DAC ODA estimated at between USD 12 and 14 billion, or between 9% and 10% of global ODA (OECD, 2010b). The average multilateral ODA of non-DAC donors was 32% in 2006-8, excluding Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE since the data reported by these donors related primarily to bilateral aid.

Twenty-two non-DAC donors³ contributed to the Fifteenth Replenishment of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA15). Of these, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the most recent IDA donors. Together non-DAC donors represent 3% of total IDA15 contributions (World Bank, 2008a). Current negotiations for the Sixteenth Replenishment of IDA (IDA16) aim to include additional non-DAC donors.

A number of multilateral organisations also report to the DAC, as described in Box 1.2. In addition, mention should be made of large foundation grants – overwhelmingly from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – to some of the global health partnerships, most notably the Global Fund and GAVI.

High concentration of DAC support for 15 multilaterals

Between 2004 and 2008, six multilateral clusters (15 agencies) together received and accounted for 82% of multilateral ODA. They were the EU Institutions (37%), IDA (21%), the UN Funds and Programmes (10%), the Global Fund (6%), and the African and Asian Development Banks (4% and 3%). The consequence of such concentration was that about 200 other multilateral agencies accounted for the remaining 18% of multilateral ODA volumes. The scattering or “long tail” of agencies receiving the least amount of multilateral ODA may be worth examining more closely. However, it is important to acknowledge that the transfer of resources is not the primary mandate of most of these institutions, many of which provide technical assistance or serve a standard-setting purpose. A full list of ODA-eligible multilateral organisations is included in Annex E.

Box 1.2. Multilateral agencies that submit reports on aid flows to the DAC

The DAC collects data from multilateral agencies covering their operations in developing countries, including support costs directly linked to delivering these activities. Data are limited to regular (core) budget expenditures to avoid double counting. Contributions to multilateral organisations that are earmarked at any level – whether to a specific partner country, region, sector or theme – are reported as part of bilateral aid and identified through the channel of delivery classification.

Although there are no formal requirements for multilateral agencies (other than EU Institutions which are a DAC member) to report to the DAC, many agencies do so voluntarily. The DAC encourages all agencies with significant operational programmes in developing countries to begin reporting and has developed guidelines for multilateral reporting to the DAC. The table below shows all multilateral agencies that reported their 2008 data to the DAC.

Global Funds	International Financial Institutions	Regional Development Banks	United Nations Funds, Programmes and Specialised Agencies	
The GAVI Alliance	International Monetary Fund	African Development Bank	IAEA	UNHCR
The Global Fund	World Bank Group (IDA, IBRD, IFC)	Asian Development Bank	IFAD	UNICEF
Global Environmental Facility*	Nordic Development Fund	Caribbean Development Bank	UNAIDS	UNRWA
The Montreal Protocol (Multilateral Fund)		European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	UNDP	UNTA
		Inter-American Development Bank	UNECE	WFP
			UNFPA	

* Reporting obtained from GEF Secretariat presents a complete picture of total commitments. At present, however, disbursement data are reported for the World Bank and UNDP implemented activities only.

The past year has seen an increase in the quality and quantity of DAC statistical reporting from multilateral organisations. Major improvements include detailed activity-level reporting in CRS++ by the World Bank (all IDA and IBRD flows from 1999 through 2008) and by GAVI (for flows in 2007 and 2008).

Efforts in 2010 will focus on:

- Improving the sector identification of UNDP activities in DAC statistical databases. DAC and UNDP staffs are currently collaborating on this issue and hope to advance in coming months.
- Pursuing improved activity-level reporting from the Regional Development Banks. Although the DAC does receive some data at the activity level, they arrive in a non-standard format or are downloaded from the Internet. Sector codes are often assigned manually and the data are incomplete in many aspects. In an effort to improve data quality and coverage, full reporting in the CRS++ format is encouraged.
- Obtaining statistics on WHO expenditures at the country level. The DAC and the WHO have been collaborating on this issue and hope that reporting – at least at regional level – will commence this year, if only for core flexible funding. The information will greatly improve the coverage of aid data, especially in the health sector.

Obtaining accurate, detailed data on the expenditure of multilateral agencies is essential to developing a complete picture of global aid flows and properly reflecting the very substantial role of multilateral agencies in development co-operation. Detailed data on aid at the partner country level are also necessary for accurate statistical analyses and discussions on aid fragmentation, division of labour, and donor harmonisation.

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat, 2010.

Table 1.1 **Multilateral organisations receiving the top 82% of multilateral ODA**

EU Institutions	World Bank – IDA	UN Funds & Programmes*	Global Fund	African Development Bank	Asian Development Bank
• EU Budget • European Development Fund (EDF) • European Investment Bank (EIB)	• International Development Association (IDA)	• UNICEF • UNDP • UNFPA • UNHCR • WFP • UNRWA	• Global Fund	• African Development Fund • African Development Bank	• Asian Development Fund • Asian Development Bank

* Data are separately identifiable for these six UN Funds & Programmes only

DAC member multilateral portfolio shares

The 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid examined the internal allocation processes of each DAC member, both between bilateral and multilateral aid and across multilaterals. In practice, these are not determined simultaneously, and often not within the same ministry. Political decisions at the margin, made under fiscal pressure and in consideration of geographic and thematic priorities and (often) the balance between loans and grants, are the rule not the exception. It is exceptional, however, though not unknown, for countries to zero-base their contributions to a multilateral agency rather than maintain it at very low levels, which can make the staffing costs of oversight increasingly unsustainable.

DAC donors differ widely in their distribution of multilateral ODA. Such portfolio variations are significant to the extent that contributions to each cluster are considered voluntary and fungible with contributions to other organisations. For IDA replenishments, participants negotiate contributions which are in principle discretionary, even though they might well be heavily influenced by historic shares. Contributions to UN Funds and Programmes, the Global Fund, and African and Asian Development Funds are similarly voluntary. EU institutional funding is a mix of:

- multi-year replenishments of European Development Fund (EDF) assistance to Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (based on negotiations and unanimous decisions as to each member's contributions);
- annual EU budget allocations (in keeping with European Parliament and Council of Ministers decisions) to those other components of EU external action which qualify for ODA.

A smaller fraction of overall multilateral ODA – of particular relevance to UN Specialised Agencies – is driven by assessed contributions, which can be considered conditions of membership. These “portfolio” comparisons are useful from the perspective of system-wide coherence.

EU Institutions as a cluster are the largest recipients of DAC countries' multilateral aid. In 2008, this amounted to USD 13 billion or 37% of DAC multilateral aid. On average, EU Institutions account for roughly 50% of EU members' multilateral ODA. There are, however, variations: contributions to EU Institutions account for as much as 77% of Greece's multilateral aid, while Sweden's share is only 23%. (The data in Table A.5 replicates Table 1.2, but including contributions to EU Institutions.)

A comparison of multilateral shares across DAC membership needs to take into account the fact that seven DAC countries are not EU members. For this reason, the next section and Table 1.2 look at how these allocations change when contributions to the EU

Institutions are not included. This allows for more accurate cross-country comparisons of multilateral portfolio allocations.

Table 1.2 **DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five-year period 2004-08**
(Constant 2008 USD million)

	"Total multilateral ODA (excluding to EU institutions) 2004-2008"	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA, excluding to the EC	IDA	"UN Funds and Programmes"	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	% allocated to largest five multilateral clusters
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			23	23	21	18	22	
Non-EU members	44 962	44%	34%	15%	9%	6%	7%	72%
Australia	1 772	2%	42%	7%	5%	n.a.	20%	74%
Canada	5 673	6%	32%	13%	9%	9%	6%	69%
Japan	15 057	15%	36%	12%	3%	5%	12%	67%
New Zealand	322	0%	16%	26%	1%	n.a.	11%	52%
Norway	4 932	5%	16%	45%	4%	9%	1%	75%
Switzerland	2 309	2%	40%	23%	1%	10%	3%	77%
United States	14 899	15%	38%	8%	19%	5%	5%	75%
EU members	56 243	55%	33%	17%	9%	8%	3%	71%
Austria	939	1%	51%	9%	n.a.	13%	6%	78%
Belgium	1 652	2%	52%	10%	5%	9%	2%	79%
Denmark	3 662	4%	14%	37%	4%	5%	2%	61%
Finland	1 163	1%	20%	39%	0%	9%	2%	70%
France	8 727	9%	29%	5%	19%	11%	3%	67%
Germany	8 369	8%	53%	6%	8%	9%	4%	79%
Greece	323	0%	47%	4%	0%	n.a.	n.a.	52%
Ireland	1 075	1%	26%	35%	5%	n.a.	4%	71%
Italy	5 677	8%	26%	8%	15%	8%	5%	62%
Luxembourg	398	0%	13%	21%	3%	n.a.	14%	51%
Netherlands	5 829	6%	20%	35%	6%	5%	3%	69%
Portugal	322	0%	33%	7%	4%	21%	12%	76%
Spain	4 047	4%	31%	12%	9%	10%	5%	66%
Sweden	4 971	5%	22%	41%	8%	7%	2%	79%
United Kingdom	9 091	9%	43%	15%	7%	8%	3%	76%
DAC total excl. Korea	101 206	99%	33%	16%	9%	7%	5%	71%
Korea	938	1%	32%	4%	n.a.	7%	17%	61%

* Includes UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP and UNRWA. Excludes Specialised Agencies and UNCTAD, UNDCP, UNEP, UNIFEM, UNV, UNCDF and UN-Habitat for which core contributions are not disaggregated in the DAC database.

Note: Totals may not add up exactly due to rounding-off.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

The top five clusters receiving multilateral aid, excluding EU Institutions

As Table I.2 shows, donors allocate strikingly different portions of their multilateral portfolios to the same multilateral organisations. Luxembourg, for example, provides 13% of its non-EU multilateral aid portfolio to IDA, compared to Germany's 53%. The range for UN Funds and Programmes is from 4% (Greece) to 45% (Norway).

Nordic countries (both in the EU and non-EU member categories) allocate approximately 40% of multilateral aid to UN Funds and Programmes.⁴ This percentage should be compared to less than 10% for several DAC donors including Greece (4%), France (5%), Portugal and Germany (6%), Australia (7%), Italy and the United States (8%). In contrast, their shares of multilateral ODA to IDA paint the opposite picture, with Nordic countries allocating on average less than 20%, significantly lower than Germany (53%) and the United States (38%), or even the DAC average of 34%.

EU and non-EU member groupings show roughly the same average allocations to IDA and the Global Fund. Five EU members (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, and United Kingdom) allocate an even higher share of ODA to IDA than Australia's 42%. Moreover, France allocates the same share of its multilateral portfolio to the Global Fund as the United States (19%).

Most large multilaterals funded by a handful of donors

Four to five donors account for more than half of all core contributions to the top six multilateral clusters. The four largest donors (Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States) accounted for nearly 60% of all core contribution to IDA in 2004-8. Donors to EU Institutions and the Global Fund are at least as concentrated, with three accounting for more than 50% of contributions: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom fund EU Institutions, while France, Italy, and the United States finance the Global Fund. Table A.2 shows donors' funding share of multilateral organisations.

Australia, Canada, Japan, and United States together account for nearly 60% of all core funding to the Asian Development Bank, with Japan alone providing one-third of all resources in 2004-8. Over the same period, contributions from France and the United States accounted for nearly 50% of all core funding to the Global Fund. The United States alone provides 31% of all core contributions to the Global Fund. The Nordic states provide 36% of all core support to the UN Funds and Programmes.

There is no clear pattern in the allocation of resources to the multilateral system among donors with or without a published multilateral strategy (see Chapter 6 for more information on multilateral strategies).


Sustained growth in aid to EU Institutions and the Global Fund

Evidence suggests that the long-term decline in core multilateral aid to UN Funds and Programmes together with the increase in core multilateral aid allocated to EU Institutions and – more recently – to the Global Fund and the World Bank Group are continuing (Figure I.6 and Figure A.6). The DAC average share of multilateral ODA to UN Funds and Programmes fell from 15% (USD 4 billion) to 10% (USD 3 billion) between 1999-2003 and 2004-8. Over these same two periods, the share of resources to the Global Fund rose from 2% of multilateral ODA (USD 1 billion) in 1999-2003 to 6% (USD 2 billion) in 2004-08. Multilateral ODA to EU Institutions was USD 12 billion, or 37% of multilateral ODA, in

2004-8, compared to USD 9 billion, or 33%, in 1999-2003 and multilateral ODA to the World Bank Group was 23% (USD 7 billion) in 2004-08 compared to 19% (USD 5 billion) in 1999-2003.

Several factors are at work behind the observed trends. Contributions to “Other agencies” peaked in 1998 and 1999 when DAC contributions to the IMF reached almost USD 1 billion. Equally, there was a fall in core funding to UN agencies, which may reflect a shift to non-core contributions as donors try to target more specific objectives within the agencies’ mandates. The same trend towards closer targeting is reflected in the creation of new specific-purpose agencies or funding mechanisms such as the Global Fund. The more recent rise in World Bank Group funding includes some large contributions to cover debt relief to the HIPC’s. The rise in EU aid is steady and sustained, reflecting growth in the EC budget, and successively higher replenishments of the European Development Fund (EDF).

Figure 1.6 Average aid provided by DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals over five-year periods



* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members’ reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR, and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the “Other UN” category.

Note: “Other Agencies” includes GEF, Montreal Protocol, the IMF and residual multilaterals.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Programmable multilateral outflows

Country programmable aid

In 2007, building on earlier analyses of core development aid, the DAC introduced a new concept to provide a better estimate of the volume of resources transferred to developing countries. The concept is referred to as “country programmable aid” (CPA). CPA tracks the portion of aid on which recipient countries have, or could have, a significant say and which donors (bilateral or multilateral) can programme for each recipient country.⁵ It is calculated from data on gross ODA disbursements, from which it excludes spending that:


- is inherently unpredictable (such as humanitarian aid and debt relief);
- entails no flows to the recipient country (administration, imputed student costs, development awareness and research and refugee spending in donor countries);

- is not usually discussed between the main donor agency and recipient governments (food aid, aid from local governments, core funding to international NGOs, aid through secondary agencies, ODA equity investments and aid which is not allocable by country).

Finally, CPA does not net out loan repayments, as these are not usually factored into aid allocation decisions.


Recent large increases in levels of multilateral outflows reflect the response from international financial institutions to country demand for crisis-related finance in 2009. As can be seen in Figure 1.7, multilateral outflows increased by 18% in 2009 from the previous year, while at the same time bilateral ODA was flat. More generally, annual increments of bilateral and multilateral CPA appear negatively correlated, which may reduce risks for partner countries.⁶

Figure 1.7 Percent change in country programmable aid (CPA): Bilateral and multilateral outflows



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010, and OECD, 2010a.

Figure 1.8. Composition of global country programmable aid




Note: EU Institutions are included in the "multilateral" category.

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat estimates, 2010.

In 2008, the multilateral share of global CPA (outflows to partner countries) was 37% despite the flat and eroding share of multilateral ODA (inflows to multilateral agencies), which amounted to 28% of gross ODA, excluding debt relief. Multilaterals are responsible for a higher share of global CPA outflows than might be expected given multilateral inflows. Of course, it should also be taken into consideration that non-DAC members – other countries, recipients repaying earlier loans, and other organisations (including private foundations) – and the agencies themselves also inject resources into multilateral organisations and do not report them to the DAC.

On average, 63% of multilateral outflows were reported as country programmable aid from 2004 to 2008. Figure 1.9 illustrates the CPA share of multilateral outflows, which increased from USD 30 billion in 2007 to USD 31 billion in 2008. The increase in the share of CPA from 2007 to 2008 can be attributed mainly to the substantial multilateral debt relief (USD 3.9 billion) granted by the Special Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guyana and by the IDA (USD 1.5 billion) to Malawi and Sierra Leone in 2007.

Figure 1.9. **Composition of gross multilateral outflows, 2007 and 2008**
(Constant 2008 USD billion)



Note: The data cover CPA in partner countries, regional programmes and multi-country allocations

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat estimates, 2010

The multilateral agencies that report outflows to the DAC (see Box 1.2) do not, with two exceptions, report their administrative costs, development awareness, research expenditures, or other non-CPA eligible expenditures. The true CPA share of multilateral outflows is, therefore, likely to be slightly lower than Figure 1.9 suggests.

A large share of “significant” donor-partner relationships

The 2009 OECD Report on *Division of Labour* proposed measures for donor (bilateral or multilateral) concentration and fragmentation. The concentration ratio measures the size of aid flows a partner country receives from a donor compared to aid from other donors and, in turn, the proportion of aid the donor in question allocates to the partner country.⁷ Table 1.3 presents the total number of significant relationships which multilateral agencies and bilateral donors (DAC countries) have in low-income countries. From a partner-country perspective, having less “non-significant” donor relationships allows ministries of finance and/or planning to devote more time and effort to managing more “significant” partnerships.

According to the 2008 data in Table 1.3, aid from multilaterals was rather more geographically concentrated (75%) than that from bilateral donors (57%). This is, in part, due to the fact that some large multilateral organisations have a regional, rather than global, mandate. Regional mandates alone cannot, however, explain the 18-point disparity. For large multilaterals disbursing larger volumes than other donors and allocating need-specific and performance-based aid, such concentration is not surprising. Likewise, it is not too difficult for a small donor to appear “concentrated” if its global share of CPA is minimal⁸ (see Table A.4 in the Annex for disaggregated bilateral and multilateral concentration ratios). Many multilateral agencies with low concentration ratios have normative, standard-setting, technical mandates that are not best measured in terms of resource transfers alone.

Table 1.3 **Concentration ratio of multilateral and bilateral donors in low-income countries, 2008**

DAC donors and major multilateral agencies	Number of “significant” relationships	Number of “non-significant” relationships	Total relationships (number of partner countries)	Concentration ratio
	A	B	(A+B)	(A) / (A+B)
Multilateral	524	175	699	75%
Bilateral	438	335	773	57%
Total	962	510	1472	65%

Source: OECD, 2009b.

MDG performance and aid allocations in the context of donors’ forward spending plans


To examine Millennium Development Goal (MDG) performance and aid allocations in the context of donors’ forward spending plans, the DAC Secretariat identified six clusters of low-income countries (LICs) on the basis of their MDG status and their progress towards the MDGs. The status was evaluated with composite scores from 12 MDG indicators used for MDGs 1 to 7. Progress made towards reaching the MDGs was determined by a composite trend score for each country. Figure 1.10 shows the six broad categories of LICs and the amount of country programmable aid that each group of countries receives from both bilateral and multilateral partners. The volume of bilateral ODA was greater than multilateral outflows in the clusters with “very low” or “low” development status and no progress. However, in the third cluster of LICs with “low” development status and some progress in meeting the MDGs, multilateral outflows exceeded bilateral ODA (OECD, 2010a).

Total use of the multilateral system

In addition to multilateral ODA, donors choose to give non-core funding earmarked for specific sectors, themes, countries or regions, and routed *through* multilateral agencies (Figure 1.11). Core multilateral ODA plus non-core multilateral ODA constitute total use of the multilateral system.


DAC members report such funding as bilateral ODA and refer to them as “non-core multilateral ODA” or “multi-bi”. The quality of data on multi-bi ODA reported by DAC members is improving, with 21 members reporting channel codes consistently. For this report, an effort was made to examine information reported in the “channel of delivery” field more closely.

Figure 1.10 Country programmable aid to low-income countries according to their development status and MDG performance, 2009



Source: OECD DAC Forward Spending Survey, 2010

Figure 1.11 Gross ODA disbursements, 2008
(Excluding debt relief, contributions from EU Institutions and Korea)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

In 2008, non-core funds amounted to USD 14 billion (or USD 16 billion if EU Institutions are included as a donor) – an 18% increase over 2006 when the figure was USD 12 billion (in 2008 prices). Part of the increase was attributable to better channel reporting. “Total use” of the multilateral system represented 40% of total ODA in 2008, similar to the 2006 level. In other words, when both core funding to multilaterals and non-core funding through multilaterals are included, multilateral aid agencies play a more important role in the overall international aid architecture than core contributions might otherwise indicate.

Although it is too early to establish whether total use is increasing, Chapter 2 explores the patterns of use of non-core multilateral ODA, while Chapter 3 looks specifically at non-core funding of UNDP and World Bank.

Main findings

- As overall levels of ODA increase, the multilateral share of ODA is flat or shrinking, when contributions to EU Institutions are excluded, shrinking.
- In many cases, donors allocate very different shares of their multilateral portfolio to the same multilateral agencies.
- Multilateral aid accounts for a high share of the aid granted by non-DAC EU members reporting to the DAC, although it is unlikely to be as high among the BRICs (who do not report to the DAC).
- In 2004-8, an average 82% of DAC members' multilateral ODA went to six clusters of organisations: EU Institutions, the IDA, UN Funds and Programmes, the Global Fund, and the African and Asian Regional Development Banks (15 institutions in all). Conversely, multilateral ODA to the remaining 200-plus multilateral organisations accounted for only 18%.
- Recent trends indicate a decrease in the core multilateral funding of UN Funds and Programmes and an increase in funding to EU Institutions and the Global Fund.
- Multilateral outflows are, on balance, more flexible in the short term as demonstrated by their response to the crisis.
- Multilateral outflows are also more geographically concentrated than bilateral flows and deliver 37% of country programmable aid. These figures are, however, subject to qualification.
- The *total use* of the multilateral system by DAC donors (core multilateral ODA plus bilateral earmarked ODA channelled through multilateral organisations) was 40% of total ODA in 2008. Indeed, this proportion may give a better indication of the role multilateral institutions play in the overall aid architecture today.

Questions for future policy discussions

- What explains the flat historical multilateral share of ODA? Which arguments for and against greater pooling have the most traction in the current context?
- Should future work focus on the 15 multilaterals (6 clusters) which claim 82% of multilateral ODA volume, or should it also attempt to rationalise the 18% "long tail"?
- What are the main determinants of large variations in the multilateral portfolio choices across DAC members? Are any likely to be amenable to improved information sharing?
- Are new non-DAC and non-EU funding sources less focused on multilaterals? If so, why, and how might this change?
- Is the EU a special case that requires a different analytical approach? If so, in what way?

Notes

1. See page 34.
2. For the DAC Reports on Multilateral Aid, the gross ODA figure is used to show what proportion of outflows goes to multilateral organisations from each DAC member. A net ODA figure that takes into account return flows to donors (for those with bilateral loan programmes) would overstate the multilateral share of some members.
3. These include Barbados, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, and Turkey.
4. United Nations Funds and Programmes for which disaggregated data are available include UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNRWA, UNHCR, and WFP.
5. See also OECD Development Brief “Getting Closer to the Core – Measuring Country Programmable Aid”.
6. Note that data from 2009 to 2012 in Figure 1.2 are estimates based on donors’ responses to the 2010 Forward Spending Survey.
7. The number of “significant” relationships is determined in one or both the following ways:
 - A donor (bilateral or multilateral) contributes a higher percentage of a recipient’s country programmable aid (CPA) than of its global share of total CPA. The donor is then deemed to be “concentrated” in this country.
 - A donor (bilateral or multilateral) accounts for among the top 90% of aid in the partner country. The “non-significant” category refers to a donor-partner country relationship that does not fit either of the two criteria. For more details see the DAC Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans 2010-2012.
8. The higher share of smaller multilateral donors than of smaller DAC bilateral donors works in the favour of multilaterals. For example, for those donors reporting to the DAC, the median global CPA share of multilateral organisations is 0.6%, whereas the median bilateral share of global CPA is 1.4%.

Chapter 2

Non-core funding of multilaterals

This chapter concludes that non-core funding can contribute to a wide range of complementary activities, although they also discuss some of its less positive aspects. The existence of a large number of multi-donor trust funds is a testament to the growing use of non-core funding. Since non-core funding is likely to continue its upward trend, donors should ensure that it complements a minimum number of core contributions and does not undermine the multilateral organisation's core objectives. To date, few evaluations of multi-donor trust funds have been conducted.

The previous chapter discussed trends in multilateral aid, and explained both core and non-core multilateral ODA. Box 2.1 provides definitions of core and non-core funding, according to DAC directives.

Box 2.1. Definitions of multilateral ODA and non-core or multi-bi ODA

- 1 Multilateral ODA is a contribution made to a recipient institution that
 - conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development,
 - is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency,
 - pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets

Multilateral ODA includes both assessed and voluntary un earmarked contributions

- 2 If a donor channels ODA earmarked for a sector, theme, country, or region through a multilateral institution, such ODA is reported as bilateral ODA. It is also referred to as non core multilateral ODA or multi bi ODA


Source OECD DAC Reporting Directives and OECD DAC Secretariat, 2010

This chapter and the next (Chapter 3) conclude that non-core funding can contribute to a wide range of complementary activities, although they also discuss some of its less positive aspects. The existence of a large number of multi-donor trust funds is a testament to the growing use of non-core funding. Since non-core funding is likely to continue its upward trend, donors should ensure that it complements a minimum number of core contributions and does not undermine the multilateral organisation's core objectives. To date, few evaluations of multi-donor trust funds have been conducted.

Overview of DAC members' non-core funding

Australia, Norway, Spain, and the United States have the highest non-core multilateral ODA as a share of the reported "total use" of the multilateral system (core plus non-core multilateral aid). Their shares are well above the DAC average of 29%. When contributions to EU Institutions are excluded, the DAC average rises to 39% (see Figure 2.1) and the same top four donors emerge. Until recently, contributions to EU Institutions were only un-earmarked (core), meaning that EU members' multilateral ODA included, by implication, a larger portion of core multilateral ODA. Denmark, France, Germany, and Greece have the lowest shares, though this may partially be due to the under-reporting of non-core multilateral aid. More detailed information, which also encompasses each donor's specific non-core allocations, can be found in Annex B.

Figure 2.1 **Gross non-core multilateral ODA disbursements in 2008 as shares (percentage) of reported total use of the multilateral system**
(Excluding disbursements to the EU)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010

Main issues relating to non-core funding of multilaterals

There are inherent tensions and complementarities in providing both core and non-core contributions to multilateral entities. Non-core funding may undermine institutions' core governance mechanisms. At the same time, it creates opportunities by augmenting targeted resources through these same institutions.

Non-core funding from a donor's perspective

From the point of view of the donor, non-core funding through multilaterals allows it to direct its resources to specific sectors or to regions and countries of interest. A donor can thus direct targeted funding to an organisation it may not otherwise fund because, for example, it believes that the organisation's board does not allocate the core funding it receives in accordance with key international development needs and priorities (from the donor's point of view at least). Donors may also use non-core funding to exert influence on the activities financed by a multilateral organisation in a possibly less cumbersome and bureaucratic way than through its board or equivalent decision-making body.

Non-core funding also provides donors with the kind of visibility in the eyes of its stakeholders that may be important for mobilising and maintaining public resources for development. For example, contributing to the World Bank's East Asia Infrastructure Fund may be a more high-profile investment than allocating the same amount of money in core resources to the IDA or IBRD, even though these un earmarked resources may in fact be partly spent on infrastructure programmes in East Asia. Increased non-core funding by some donors could make core funding less appealing for all donors if core funds are perceived as subsidising non-core funds in cases when administrative costs are not fully covered by trust fund overheads. For this reason, it is important for multilateral organisations to maintain a strategic vision and framework that demonstrate the results of core activities in order to attract core funding at the same time as they accept non-core funds.

Similar to the rationale for providing core multilateral funding, donor governments may wish to fund specific programmes or specific partner countries where they either do not have the ability to implement a programme, or where they do not have a bilateral presence. In this way, donors may provide non-core funding as a way to reduce their own transaction costs, although they are not likely to eliminate such costs entirely. The multilateral agency in question may shoulder the transaction costs, incorporating them into administrative fees or charges, which are ultimately financed by donors.

Non-core funding from the perspective of the first receiver (multilateral organisation)

The supply of non-core funds can shift a multilateral organisation's overall balance of activities, potentially carrying the risk of weakening its core policies. The day-to-day governance of non-core funds is not usually under the purview of the board of the organisation in question. The governance arrangement for earmarked funds may also offer less voice to partner countries in the decision-making process. Even in cases where trust funds are multi-donor and sources of funding are pooled, the scope of governance oversight over those resources may not be as representative as the formal governance arrangements in place. In some cases, partner countries have a little more voice in the management of the relevant trust fund, although this is not consistently the case. Managing non-core resources can also incur higher transaction costs for the organisation (relative to core contributions), given the time required to negotiate and implement donor-specific monitoring and reporting requirements.


On the other hand, non-core funds increase the overall envelope of resources available to multilateral entities, allowing them to engage in a wider range of activities through existing institutional structures. The use of an existing multilateral organisation as a vehicle for specific, critical, time-bound purposes may be preferable to creating a new multilateral institution and even more desirable than the alternative of establishing multiple bilateral initiatives in parallel. In certain situations, non-core funding can also contribute to enhanced harmonisation and alignment among donors, as in the case of the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office.

Aid effectiveness principles applied to the funding of the multilateral system

Aid effectiveness principles can be applied to the funding of multilateral entities and to the mix of core and non-core funding provided. The more that DAC members' multilateral portfolios are shaped by non-core resources, the less predictable the funding of multilaterals becomes, especially to the extent that non-core resources squeeze out core contributions. For example, where a donor's contributions are more likely to be determined by specific themes that are time-bound, rather than by an organisation's fundamental objective or existing mandate, future funding may become unpredictable. For this reason it seems plausible, on the grounds of predictability, to couple non-core funds with a minimum of core funding.

Core funding helps to support the basic institutional infrastructure that underpins both core and non-core funding. Nevertheless, some multilateral organisations increasingly see non-core funding as a separate business line that includes all associated costs, and some, such as the World Food Programme, rely very little on core funding for any of their operations. In fact, the aid effectiveness principles relating to non-core funding do not apply to humanitarian aid which is, by nature, unpredictable.

Figure 2.2 **Total use of the multilateral system, gross disbursements in 2008**
(Excluding EU Institutions and Korea as donors)



* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR, and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Chapter 3 looks more closely at the non-core funding of UNDP and the World Bank. As illustrated in Figure 2.2 and according to data reported to the DAC, the World Bank is the largest single recipient of non-core funding with USD 2.4 billion. UNDP is the second largest UN non-core recipient (USD 1.8 billion), after the World Food Programme (USD 2.9 billion) which depends, by nature, on assistance earmarked for specific emergency operations and receives very little core funding. Until recently, EU Institutions did not accept earmarked funds, which explains their very small share of non-core multilateral ODA.


Level of non-core earmarking and country-level aid delivery

Over 80% of non-core funds are earmarked for a specific country or region. The remaining one-fifth are not country- or region-specific at the outset, but earmarked by sector.

Sectors and recipients of non-core support compared to other channels

Multilateral outflows reported to the DAC relate only to disbursements from core un-earmarked contributions. Humanitarian activities account for a much higher share of non-core multilateral aid (39% or USD 5.5 billion) than of core multilateral outflows (7% or USD 2.1 billion), as illustrated in Figure 2.3. In fact, non-core ODA earmarked for humanitarian purposes and routed through multilateral organisations is the single most important channel of humanitarian aid in volume, as bilateral humanitarian aid directly to partner countries represents USD 3.5 billion. Non-core humanitarian aid to the WFP represents nearly half of total non-core multilateral humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid encompasses emergency response; reconstruction, relief, and rehabilitation; and disaster prevention and preparedness.


Figure 2.3. **Gross non-core multilateral aid disbursements and multilateral outflows in 2008**
(In USD, excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Non-core activities focus less on “economic infrastructure and activities” (which embraces transport, communications, energy generation, banking and financial services, and business development) than core multilateral outflows. Non-core and core multilateral aid account for similar proportions of aid towards “social infrastructure and services”, a category that includes education, health, and economic policy and planning. Non-core multilateral aid and multilateral outflows follow similar patterns of geographical allocation, with sub-Saharan Africa as the top recipient. However, non-core multilateral ODA reaches a higher proportion of fragile states: 72% of non-core funds allocated to specific countries go to fragile states as opposed to 36% of core multilateral outflows and 34% of bilateral ODA (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4 Share of aid flows going to fragile and conflict-affected states



* This excludes multi-bilateral ODA

Note: Total bilateral ODA (allocated to specific countries): USD 69 billion. Total multilateral outflows (allocated to specific countries): USD 29 billion. Total multi-bilateral ODA (allocated to specific countries): USD 9 billion.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Channels of aid delivery in different partner countries

In addition to core multilateral outflows, an average of 19% of CPA is channelled through multilateral organisations¹ to fragile and conflict states compared to 9% in other countries. This small difference may be due to the fact that multilateral entities have a greater presence in fragile and conflict-affected states than bilateral agencies and are entrusted with resources from bilateral partners not active in those countries. In some ways it is surprising that there is not a greater difference between the two, but this is probably due to large volumes of ODA from large bilateral donors in some fragile and conflict states.

Further work could analyse these funding channels in more detail from the point of view of partner countries. Table 2.1 shows information on the shares of concessional official development finance that was delivered to nine countries as bilateral, multi-bi (non-core), and core multilateral outflows in 2008. Sudan and Afghanistan rely more on channels of non-core multilateral ODA, as evidenced by the large volume of resources managed by specific trust funds to these countries. Bolivia, Indonesia, and Zambia rely heavily on bilateral ODA (more than 72%), whereas Haiti, Mongolia and Uzbekistan depend more on core multilateral outflows than the other countries in the table.

Table 2.1 Channels of country programmable aid in nine partner countries, 2008

	Bilateral ODA		Multilateral Outflows
	Bilateral	Non-core multilateral	
Afghanistan	65%	27%	8%
Bolivia	76%	6%	17%
Haiti	52%	17%	31%
Indonesia	74%	7%	19%
Mongolia	65%	7%	28%
Sudan	33%	58%	9%
Uzbekistan	69%	4%	27%
Viet Nam	60%	6%	34%
Zambia	72%	2%	25%

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

1 Secretariat estimate, based on country programmable aid plus humanitarian assistance

Main findings

- In 2008, 29% of DAC countries' total aid transiting through the multilateral system was earmarked (non-core). This rose to 39% when all contributions to EU Institutions were excluded.
- Donors earmark funds for specific countries and sectors to gain greater visibility and influence in the multilateral system.
- From a multilateral organisation's perspective, excessive earmarking risks weakening its governance and complicates accountability. However, such risks may be better than the alternative of multiple, single-donor, parallel initiatives.
- Non-core, or earmarked, multilateral ODA is the single-most important channel for humanitarian aid. It also targets a higher proportion of fragile states than multilateral outflows or bilateral ODA.

Questions for future policy discussions

- Is there a growing trend towards non-core funding? What might the implications be for development effectiveness?

Chapter 3

Non-core funding of UNDP and the World Bank

This chapter provides an overview of the role of non-core funding in the functioning of UNDP and the World Bank, primarily as it relates to trust funds. The World Bank Group is the largest single recipient of non-core funding (USD 2.7 billion in 2008) and UNDP is the second largest UN agency recipient (USD 1.8 billion in 2008). Non-core funding – often in the form of multi-donor trust funds – to UNDP and the World Bank accounts for 30% of total DAC non-core aid to the multilateral system and constitutes an important share of total resources entrusted to these agencies

This chapter provides an overview of the role of non-core funding in the functioning of UNDP and the World Bank, primarily as it relates to trust funds. The World Bank Group is the largest single recipient of non-core funding (USD 2.7 billion in 2008)¹ and UNDP is the second largest UN agency recipient (USD 1.8 billion in 2008). Non-core funding – often in the form of multi-donor trust funds – to UNDP and the World Bank accounts for 30% of total DAC non-core aid to the multilateral system and constitutes an important share of total resources entrusted to these agencies.

Methodological issues

The data used for this chapter comes both from DAC members' reports to the DAC Secretariat and from the multilateral organisations themselves. Box 3.1 explains some of the reasons why there may be data discrepancies between these two sources.

Box 3.1. Methodological issues relating to non-core multilateral ODA

The amount of core and non-core contributions reported to the DAC and the amount recorded by multilateral agencies themselves may vary. There are some practical reasons for these differences, including

- difference in USD exchange rates used
- multi-year contributions reported in a single year
- end-of-year contributions reported in the following calendar year
- misidentification of non-core funds as "core" or vice-versa

There are also some explanations that relate specifically to UNDP and the World Bank.

UNDP considers its non-core contributions to be those resources earmarked to specific themes, programmes and activities. It does not include contributions to the 29 trust funds administered by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office of UNDP on behalf of the UN System in this figure. However, DAC members report contributions to the MDTF Office as part of their non-core ODA² channelled through UNDP, since it is the Administrative Agent.

The World Bank considers the following global funds and programmes to be among its non-core contributions: the Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, GAVI, the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm); the Global Environment Facility, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI); and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s. However, DAC members report un-earmarked contributions to these global funds and programs as multilateral ODA, since they are included in the list of international organisations to which official contributions may be reported as ODA (Annex E).

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat, 2010.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

This section describes the core and non-core funding of UNDP, the use of multi-donor trust funds, and the effect that this mix of funding has on the organisation.

Funding of UNDP

UNDP, like all UN Funds and Programmes, is entirely funded by voluntary contributions, earmarked or not. Un-earmarked regular or core resources amounted to USD 1.1 billion in 2008 and non-core resources (from all sources) reached USD 3.6 billion, according to UNDP's own records (see Table 3.1). This means that the non-core "dependency rate" is about 77%. Regular resources represent contributions to the UNDP core budget, which complies with the criteria and appropriations established by the UNDP Executive Board in support of the organisation's multilateral mandate (including policy advisory services). Other, or non-core, resources are comprised of contributions earmarked for themes, countries, regions, and/or specific projects.

Table 3.1. **DAC contributions to UNDP, 2007-08**

DAC* contributions to UNDP, 2007-08 (Nominal USD billion)		
DAC statistics	2007	2008
Core resources	1.2	1.1
Non-core resources	2.0	1.8
UNDP records		
Core resources	1.1	1.1
Non-core resources, of which:	3.6	3.6
• OECD DAC bilateral donors	1.1	1.4
• Multilateral donors (incl. EC)	1.2	1.2
• Local resources	1.3	1.0

* OECD DAC bilateral donors, excluding Korea and the EC

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System and UNDP data, 2010.

UNDP core resources

Core resources are un-earmarked, voluntary contributions to UNDP's regular budget. Between 50 and 60 governments contribute to UNDP's core resources in a given year. Ten partner governments accounted for around 80% of core contributions in 2008.³ Overdependence on a limited number of major donors and the voluntary, often residual, nature of core contributions make UNDP highly vulnerable to any shifts in contributions, even from a small number of donors (UN Secretariat, 2009).

Multi-year commitments made by a number of DAC donors have helped to enhance the predictability of UNDP's core resources, but the majority of donors still pledge on an annual basis, even though UNDP adopted the multi-year funding framework (MYFF) in 1999 as an instrument to enhance the predictability of voluntary core resource flows and to ensure policy coherence. Some UN agencies have taken steps to decrease donor concentration and spread the burden among donor governments (see Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. UNEP's voluntary indicative scale of contributions

Apart from a small contribution from the United Nations Regular Budget, which is less than 4% of the United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) total budget, UNEP depends entirely on voluntary contributions. In 2002, UNEP approved the application of the voluntary indicative scale of contributions (VISC) to its Environment Fund. The purpose of the VISC was to broaden the base of voluntary contributions, enhance predictability, improve financial stability and attract higher voluntary payments.

The VISC is based, in part, on the UN scale of assessments and includes a few additional guidelines that provide limits on the proportion of funding for the Environment Fund:

- minimum indicative rate of 0.0001%
- maximum indicative rate of 22%
- maximum indicative rate for LDCs of 0.01%

An assessment of the VISC in December 2008 found that the donor base had broadened from 76 member states in the period 1973-2002 to 117 member states in 2003-7. In addition, there the concentration of the top ten donors decreased: in 2008-9 and the top 10 donors⁴ were expected to contribute 71% of total funds. While short-term predictability improved in 2002, since then predictability has not improved as donors continue to make single-year commitments. Stability has improved and volumes have also increased, although it is probably too early to tell if these results are directly linked to the implementation of the VISC.

Source: UNEP, 2008.

UNDP non-core resources

UNDP non-core resources are earmarked for specific themes, programmes and activities, and represent a critical complement to the regular resources base of UNDP. The overall level of non-core resources made available to UNDP as the result of numerous individual donor decisions to allocate resources to specific themes and countries was USD 3.6 billion in 2008. For the most part, non-core resources are mobilised at the country-level to meet distinct project engagements under the umbrella of UNDP's country programmes. Consequently, non-core resources are difficult to forecast in aggregate terms and tend to be highly concentrated in a subset of partner countries. More than 60% of non-core contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors in 2008 (USD 2.7 billion) target around 20 programme countries.

The composition of non-core resources as recorded by both the DAC and UNDP is further detailed in Table 3.1 above. UNDP considers three sources of non-core funding: (i) OECD/DAC donors; (ii) multilateral partners; and (iii) local resources. In 2008, almost 40% or USD 1.4 billion of UNDP's non-core contributions was from OECD/DAC donors. In addition, multilateral partners including the European Commission, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Global Environment Fund entrusted USD 1.2 billion in non-core resources to UNDP in 2008. Finally, local resources annually account for some USD 1 billion of UNDP's non-core resources (see Box 3.3).

According to UNDP, the top recipient of DAC members' non-core contributions channelled through UNDP (not including those transiting through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office referred to below) is Afghanistan (USD 383 million), followed by Sudan (USD 75 million), Bangladesh (USD 68 million) and Somalia (USD 63 million).

Box 3.3. Local resources that go to the UNDP

Programme country governments work with and through UNDP to implement their domestic development priorities. These "local resources" are not considered flows as such because they stay within the partner country and are not therefore included in ODA. Local resources are frequently provided to UNDP by low- and middle-income countries, mostly from the Latin and Central American region, but also from countries in other regions in recent years.

Local resources are a way for UNDP to effectively support a country's capacity to mobilise and manage internal and external resources and to ultimately contribute to its ability to articulate and implement the MDGs. Like core and other non-core resources, local resources form part of the multi-year country programme agreed between partner governments and UNDP. They are governed and reported on in the same way as all UNDP resources at country-level.

Source: UNDP Partnerships Bureau, 2010.

Relationship of core and non-core funding

There are both inherent tensions and opportunities resulting from the mix of core and non-core funding to UNDP. In general, non-core resources tend to incur higher transaction costs for the receiving organisation, considering the time required to negotiate individual funding agreements and to comply with donor-specific monitoring and reporting requirements. All of these add significant costs to UNDP's general operations (UN Secretariat, 2009). On the other hand, the channelling of programme funds from a wide range of sources through UNDP mirrors the international funding environment and attests to the fact that it is considered sufficiently accountable for targeted activities and interventions.

The UN General Assembly has frequently stressed the importance of core resources, doing so most recently in Resolution 62/208:

"[C]ore resources, because of their untied nature continue to be the bedrock of the operational activities for development of the United Nations System and, in this regard, [the General Assembly] notes with concern that the share of core contributions to United Nations Funds and Programmes has declined in recent years."

Indeed, while core funding from DAC donors to UNDP have been relatively stagnant, non-core resources have grown considerably, exceeding core contributions in recent years.

Non-core resources are aligned with UNDP's mandated practice areas (poverty reduction/MDGs; democratic governance; crisis prevention and recovery; and sustainable energy and environment) and form part of UNDP's country programmes, which are agreed with national partners and endorsed by UNDP's Executive Board. They do not, however, fall directly under the purview of the Executive Board in the same way as core resources. Partner countries hold 24 of the 36 seats on the Executive Board, which gives them 2/3 voting power. Executive Board governance, however, is effectively bypassed in the day-to-day management of non-core resources, depending on the volume and type of funding.

Perhaps because UNDP is an organisation dependent on voluntary contributions, the top six contributors to its regular resources match almost exactly the top six non-core contributors (based on OECD DAC Secretariat analysis). This indicates that donors are not necessarily using non-core funding as a substitute to core funding. In the 2008-13 Strategic Plan endorsed by the Executive Board, UNDP aims to rebalance the ratio of core to

non-core resources as far as is possible in the current international funding environment. In a July 2010 Resolution on System Wide Coherence (General Assembly Resolution 64/289), member states agreed to introduce a new approach in order to determine the “critical mass” of core funding for funds and programmes, according to their individual mandates.


The Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office

The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office offers a one-stop shop for donors to establish a single agreement with a single UN organisation serving as the administrative agent, instead of entering into separate agreements with each UN agency. This reduces costs and may save time both for donors and UN agencies, at least in the first instance. The first UN multi-agency MDTF was the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund, established in December 2003 with funds from UN entities and the World Bank. Today, 29 trust funds are managed by the UNDP MDTF Office (see Figure 3.1). The MDTF Office has taken specific, concrete steps to ensure that contributions made by donors to the various UN MDTFs it administers are kept separate and distinct from UNDP’s own accounts and operations. The MDTF Office’s deposits totalled over USD 4 billion at the end of 2009 and it has, to date, transferred just over USD 3 billion to participating organisations for implementation.

Donor perspectives on trust funds of the MDTF Office

Some donors (primarily small ones) appreciate the visibility that funding through the MDTF Office brings them. Romania’s participation in the Lebanon Recovery Fund, for example, might have gone unnoticed if it had given the same amount directly to a UN

Figure 3.1. Methods of providing earmarked ODA to the United Nations



Source: OECD DAC Secretariat, 2010, based on information from the UN MDTF Office and UNDP

entity for implementation. As a contributor to a multi-donor trust fund it has attained greater visibility. This MDTF conduit provides a streamlined process and incentives for UN entities and donors to adhere to and to promote UN reform. MDTF activities and programmes are actually implemented by over 40 UN agencies and some non-UN participating agencies. For example, in 2008 the MDTF Office transferred 21% (USD 129 million) of its funds to UNDP and 17% (USD 82 million) to UNICEF for the implementation of trust fund activities, according to the UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office.

Donor involvement in the management of MDTFs varies. While some donors request weekly updates of MDTF activities at country level or the inclusion of separate clauses in their agreements, others are satisfied just with regular reporting. Although earmarking by sector or theme (but not by specific projects) within a particular trust fund can take place at country level, a specific UN agency cannot be singled out for implementation. It may be because some bilateral donors have regulations that are not conducive to the flexible allocation of resources to UN agencies at the country level that bilateral donors continue to provide funding in parallel to One UN funds. (One UN funds were initially intended for eight countries: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam. They were recently expanded to cater to 11 more countries through "Delivering as One" funds in 2009-10, [UNDP, 2009].) DAC members encourage the use of One UN and Delivering as One Funds in eligible countries to avoid multiple transactions, but evidence suggests that their use is not yet common practice.

MDTF policies and future work

Unlike the World Bank, which set a USD 1 million minimum threshold (up from USD 200 000) for establishing new trust funds in 2007 (World Bank, 2007a), the UNDP MDTF Office has set no such floor. This is a key concern since the costs of setting up, implementing, and monitoring a very small fund may outweigh its benefits, especially if there is no guarantee of increased funding in the future (UNDP, 2010). The MDTF Office also acknowledges a need for more experienced staff to participate in national steering committees in the implementation of MDTFs at country level. In the course of 2010, the undg is developing guidelines for establishing MDTFs that will address governance, evaluation and audit issues. The phasing-out of MDTFs, where relevant, is seen as an area where World Bank expertise could be relevant. Future work could look at the additionality of MDTF funding and UN agencies' incentives for collaborating in MDTFs.

UN Country Team Perspectives: More Co-ordinated Approaches Align with UN Reform

Aggregate country-level funding comes from three sources, although not all countries have access to all three. These are (i) regular resources; (ii) non-core resources; and (iii) One UN country funds or other multi-donor trust funds. One UN country funds are available to the eight One UN pilot countries mentioned above, while the Expanded Delivering as One (DAO) Funding Window for Achievement of MDGs was launched in September 2008 to provide non-earmarked gap funding to additional partner countries in a fashion similar to the One UN initiative.⁵ In effect, these and other multi-donor trust funds may actually reduce transaction costs both for UN agencies and partner governments.

Two scenarios can illustrate how funding works at a country-level. The UN country teams (UNCT) sits down to look at a country's priorities, allocate regular resources across priorities and arrive at the conclusion that there is a 20-40% funding gap. In the first scenario,

Box 3.4. Co-ordinated approaches: The MDG Achievement Fund

UN co-ordination was a major motivation in Spain's large non-core contribution (USD 239.9 million in 2008 alone) to the creation of the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F). This single-donor trust fund generates many large joint programmes (200 in 59 partner countries), encouraging partnerships and serving as a framework that aligns with the implementation of UN reform. It has also generated the multi-donor Expanded Delivering as One Window, which has attracted three additional donors: the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK.

The MDG-F is not a permanent source of funding. Most joint programmes that start today have a lifespan of three years. Evidence thus far demonstrates that the Steering Committee of the MDG-F and the Ministries of Planning at country level reinforce each other's role, strengthening country ownership in reaching consensus. A mid-term evaluation of the MDG-F windows will take place in 2010. This may be a good example of an initiative with a natural sunset clause that has found a relevant home in UNDP rather than functioning as a parallel organisation.

Source: UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office and OECD DAC Statistics, 2010.

countries where multi-donor trust fund resources are not available, each UN agency is mobilised at country- and headquarter-levels to bridge the gap with existing country-level, non-core resources. This creates competition between agencies as each programme officer responsible for unfunded priorities goes to the same donors to request additional funds.

In the second scenario, partner countries are eligible for either One UN or Delivering as one funding and the process to address a funding gap unfolds differently. The reason is that the process of bridging the gap with available trust fund resources is much more streamlined, since it is able to draw on already assembled resources thereby reducing the transaction costs of agencies, bilateral donors, and probably partner countries as well. In this instance, the Resident Co-ordinator dialogue with donors at country level and partner countries becomes the *modus operandi* of the UN in the field (and further enhanced when reinforced by good leadership and a common vision).

The World Bank Group

Trust funds, or non-core contributions, have been an important instrument for channeling donor funding to the World Bank. This section provides an overview of the types of Bank trust funds, the Bank's recent policies relating to trust funds, and the effect that the mix of core and non-core funding can have on the way the organisation functions.

World Bank trust funds

In recent years, the Bank's trust fund portfolio has grown rapidly in size and complexity. Total trust fund disbursements in fiscal year 2008 continued to increase, reaching USD 6.72 billion. As a share of combined Bank disbursements (IDA, IBRD, and trust funds), trust fund disbursements grew from 16% in fiscal year 2004 to 25% in fiscal year 2008. Excluding Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) – arrangements for which the Bank provides specific administrative or financial services with a limited fiduciary or operational role⁶ – the share of trust fund disbursements grew even more rapidly, from 8% of combined disbursements in fiscal year 2004 to 14% in fiscal year 2008 (World Bank, 2009a).

The Bank currently manages 1 045 donor contribution accounts. At the contribution level the Bank has three types of trust funds: FIFs; IFC Trust Funds; and IBRD/IDA/MIGA Trust Funds. The latter, as Table 3.2 shows, are used to finance the activities of Bank Executed and Recipient Executed Trust Funds (BETF and RETF).

Table 3.2. **World Bank trust fund typology**

	IBRD/IDA/MIGA TFs	Financial Intermediary Funds	IFC TFs
Policy framework	BETFs: Funds that support the Bank's work program. RETFs: Funds that the Bank passes on to a third party and for which the Bank plays an operational role – i.e. the Bank normally appraises and supervises activities financed by these funds	FIFs: Funds that involve financial engineering or complex finance schemes, or where the Bank provides a specified set of administrative, financial, or operational services.	IFC Policy (Management Directive) effective 1 January 2009
Operational practice	Arrangements where the Bank is responsible for or supervises the activities financed by the trust fund. BETFs: TFs financing a set of activities following administrative policies and procedures for Bank budget execution. Bank implements activities. RETFs: TFs financing a set of activities following IBRD/IDA operational policies and procedures. Activities are implemented by recipient and supervised by the Bank.	• Arrangements where the Bank is not responsible for supervising the activities financed from the trust fund • Bank as trustee is responsible for the funds until such time as it transfers the funds to third parties (which may include IBRD/IDA) who are responsible to donors or a governance entity for the use of funds.	Arrangements where IFC is responsible for or supervises the activities financed by the trust fund

Source: The World Bank, 2010.

Non-core contributions to the World Bank

Differences in what DAC members report as non-core funding to the World Bank and what the Bank itself records vary. This is due, in large part, to the fact that the Bank includes those large multilateral funds (often FIFs) for which it is a trustee in its own records. Such funds include the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) fund. Even allowing for the difference in what the WBG and DAC donors consider as non-core funding (Box 3.1), there remain significant discrepancies (see Table 3.3). These are probably due to methodological issues raised at the outset of this chapter, including under-reporting by DAC members.

Table 3.3 **DAC* non-core contributions to the World Bank, 2007-08**

	2007	2008
DAC Statistics	2.2	2.4
World Bank	3.3	3.1
of which:		
IBRD/IDA Trust Funds	3.2	3.2
IFC/MIGA Trust Funds	0.2	0.3

* OECD/DAC members, excluding Korea and EU Institutions


Note: Financial Intermediary Funds accounted for USD 4.5 billion in cash contributions in 2008.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010, and World Bank data

Regional allocation of World Bank trust funds

The World Bank's RETFs are those funds that are passed on to a third-party recipient and for which the Bank plays an operational role, including the appraisal and supervision of funded activities. The regional allocation of RETFs in 2008 is illustrated in the pie chart below (Figure 3.2). Sub-Saharan Africa is the first recipient (34%), followed by South Asia (26%), Middle East and North Africa (19%), East Asia and the Pacific (13%), Europe and Central Asia (5%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (3%).

- In sub-Saharan Africa, disbursements included the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (USD 183.2 million) and the Global Food Crisis Response Program (USD 65.5 million).
- In the South Asian region, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund accounted for 80% of disbursements (USD 549.1 million).
- Middle East and North Africa trust fund disbursements included the Iraq Reconstruction Trust Fund (USD 92.7 million), and the two West Bank and Gaza trust funds (USD 109.3 million).

Figure 3.2 **Regional distribution of World Bank recipient-executed trust funds, 2008**

Source: The World Bank, 2010


- Top disbursements in the East Asia and Pacific region include the Ozone Phase Out Fund (USD 59 million), and the Aceh, Indonesia Multi-Donor Trust Fund Program (USD 30.4 million).

World Bank multilateral outflows follow a similar geographical distribution to trust funds. For example, the majority of IDA commitments in fiscal year 2009 went to sub-Saharan Africa (56%), followed by South Asia (29%), East Asia (9%), Europe and Central Asia (3%) and, finally, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa with 1% (World Bank, 2009b). In non-member countries such as Kosovo and the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in fragile and conflict-affected states, trust funds are the main source of World Bank financing (Box 3.6).

World Bank trust fund policy

In 2007, the Bank launched a series of reforms under the Trust Fund Management Framework aimed at enhancing the strategic alignment, risk management, and efficiency of Bank-administered trust funds (World Bank, 2007). As part of these reforms, the Bank increased its minimum threshold for all new trust funds from USD 200 000 to USD 1 million, knowing from experience that smaller funds are disproportionately costly to mobilise and administer since they follow the same procedures required of much larger funds. In addition, a one-time start-up fee of USD 35 000 was endorsed to cover the initial establishment costs of all new standard fee-based trust funds. Efforts are currently underway to enhance the alignment of trust funds with Bank strategies and processes.

Figure 3.3. Components of the World Bank Group's trust fund portfolio, fiscal year 2009



Note: Data for FIF projects are based on country-level data from the Global Fund, Global Environment Facility, Least Developed Countries' Fund, and Special Climate Change Fund, which account for about 80 percent of commitments to CFPMI-managed funds over the last two years

Source: World Bank, 2010c.

Headquarter perspectives

Bank-Executed Trust Funds allow the Bank to scale up its analytical and advisory services, and as such can be viewed more in the context of the Bank's overall administrative budget and other external contributions to its income (World Bank, 2007). The Sustainable Development Network of the Bank, for example, depends to a large extent on trust fund disbursements for sector or thematic work at country level. They also finance the bulk of the work leading to the preparation and supervision of stand-alone RETFs. As seen above, RETFs broadly reinforce IBRD/IDA lending patterns across sectors and thematic areas, paving the way for deeper engagement. They are also increasingly designed to act as "stand-alone" funds, e.g. for fragile states.

Donor perspectives

Bilateral donors tend to appreciate the visibility gained by contributing non-core resources to the World Bank, especially with regards to the larger trust funds and trust funds for fragile and conflict states. In fact, country-specific trust funds are generally directed at fragile states or for emergencies caused by natural disasters. For example, donors to these funds perceive them as additional to other "core" Bank financing. This may not be the case for some thematic or sector-specific trust funds, which may substitute rather than complement "core" Bank financing. Donors use different channels and/or instruments to fund the education sector (e.g. IDA and the Education For All Fast Track Initiative [EFA-FTI]) in LICs. Given the scale of FTI, there is a real risk that it might crowd out IDA education funding (Cambridge Education *et al.*, 2009). World Bank data presented in a recent mid-term evaluation found that the share of primary education in total IDA education disbursements had fallen steeply from 57% in 1995-99 to 30% in 2005-9.⁷

As a result, it is to be expected that the Bank's core resources are realigned towards specific sectors neglected by trust funds. In Malawi and Rwanda, for example, IDA resources appear to target growth sectors rather than the education and health sectors that are more likely to benefit from grant-financed trust funds. While these examples illustrate how core resources can be redirected by the creation of trust funds, there is no evidence that this detracts from the Bank's core activities, which cover a wide range of sectors.

Country-level perspectives

IBRD/IDA trust funds finance over 1 500 recipient-executed activities. In addition, over 600 country-level projects are financed by FIFs (and implemented by other organisations). Such funding can become complicated in countries with a high number of trust funds, since government officials are less likely to have a good overview of the multiple trust fund accounts. In these instances, the Paris Declaration Principles of country ownership and the Accra Agenda for Action's goals of alignment, transparency and predictability risk not being applied.

In countries which may have small IDA allocations, due either to their populations (e.g. small island Pacific states) or their modest levels of performance (e.g. post-conflict countries), allocations may be supplemented through the use of country-specific trust funds for additional financing. For fragile and conflict-affected countries without active IDA portfolios, additional resources to bridge the gap towards reconstruction may come from, for example, the State and Peace Building Fund, although in these situations the World Bank may also be constrained by its more limited engagement (see Box 3.6).

Box 3.5. World Bank trust funds in Indonesia

Trust funds are an integral part of the World Bank Group's support to Indonesia, where over 26 country-specific trust funds and 24 global and regional trust funds co-exist. The trust fund portfolio includes both country-specific multi-donor trust funds (USD 891 million) and single-donor trust funds (USD 237 million)

These trust fund arrangements generate 231 grant activities that must be prepared, monitored, and supervised by both the Bank and the government. In addition, the majority of trust funds (recipient-executed) require a legal agreement between the government and the World Bank. This is an additional burden on both the World Bank's country-level infrastructure and on the Ministry of Planning/Finance

Some of the large multi-donor trust funds include programmes to respond to natural disasters and conflicts (Aceh, Java Reconstruction Fund), and partnerships to support poverty reduction efforts, basic service delivery (including education), decentralization, public financial management, and trade and investment. There are also some recent and planned contributions for climate change (e.g. in forestry and geothermal), including support from the Climate Investment Funds

Some of the features of the trust fund program in Indonesia:

- Indonesian institutions – both governmental and non governmental – implement a large majority of the trust-funded work in Indonesia, which is in line with the World Bank's strategy to invest in Indonesian institutions. The government uses its own budgeting system for Recipient-Executed Trust Funds whenever sectoral or line ministries implement activities.
- The World Bank conducts regular reviews with the government of Indonesia of the trust fund portfolio, as part of the Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR), to ensure that results are being achieved and are consistent with the Country Partnership Strategy
- Governing bodies of large trust fund programmes (such as the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh) include representatives of the Ministry of Planning, other donors, and multilateral organisations (including the World Bank). NGOs and civil society are also involved as non voting members

Source: The World Bank's Vice Presidency on Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships, 2010

Box 3.6. The World Bank's State and Peacebuilding Fund

The State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) of the World Bank, supported by the Netherlands, Norway and Australia, was established in 2008 to replace the Post-Conflict and Low-Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) Funds

Its purpose is to:

1. support measures to improve governance and institutional performance in countries emerging from, in, or at risk of sliding into crisis or arrears
2. support the reconstruction and development of countries prone to, in, or emerging from conflict

Support is given to conflict-affected states for stabilisation efforts. Reconstruction efforts primarily take place in countries with either no or minimal IDA portfolios. SPF funding complements World Bank financing and provides support to countries in arrears for small and urgent activities not easily funded under regular Bank credit or grant operations. The SPF also supports two countries in arrears: Zimbabwe and Somalia

As of March 2010, over half of the amounts of approved SPF projects were for Africa (USD 30.5 million). Overall, some of the largest approved projects (USD 5 million) were for Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, and Zimbabwe. To date, the Netherlands, Australia and Norway have contributed USD 19 million to the SPF

Source: The World Bank, 2010

In this way, trust funds also serve to provide “blend” financing terms when they inject concessional financing into IBRD countries or change the credit/grant mix in IDA countries, somewhat complicating the World Bank disbursement picture. Specific cases such as transitional, non-creditworthy (or even non-member) post-conflict situations also require tailor-made grants and finance.

UN and World Bank trust fund collaboration

Both UN and World Bank multi-donor trust funds operate in most fragile, conflict-affected, and transition states. Where they appear to attract funding from the same donors and respond to similar demands, it is tempting to ask why a single funding channel is not the preferred option. In some cases, competing demands may not be satisfied by a single channel or institution, as discussed in the example of Afghanistan in Box 3.7.

One of the recommendations from the “Good Humanitarian Donorship”, a commissioned review of humanitarian financing instruments, is that donors should not rely exclusively on any single funding modality. Nonetheless, dual administrative systems can add complexity and, sometimes, delay, as has been amply documented in the case of Southern Sudan where eight different pooled mechanisms were created to fund largely overlapping recovery priorities (OECD, 2010d). It is, therefore, important for donors to discuss how to make arrangements compatible with further calls for alignment, harmonisation, and predictability.

Box 3.7. UNDP and World Bank multi-donor trust funds

The division of labour between the trust funds of the World Bank and the UN on the ground is not always obvious. In some cases, both organisations fund similar activities. In the case of Afghanistan, hindsight provides some insight into the complementary efforts of World Bank and UN trust funds, even if their action was not as clearly defined or as evident as when they were first established.

In the beginning of 2002, the Afghan Interim Authority did not have the domestic resources to pay civil servants or offer basic social services. Because UNDP already had a strong presence in Afghanistan, it was quickly able to provide short-term funding to the most important measures for re-establishing the civil service (recruitment, payment of salaries of teachers and other civil servants, winterisation of government buildings, procurement of office equipment, vehicles for ministers) by setting up the Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF).

The AIAF lasted for a period of six months, until arrangements for longer-term budget support and reconstruction were in place. At the same time, donors endorsed the concept of an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) to be administered by the World Bank. By May 2002 the ARTF had begun operating under two windows to continue funding recurrent costs, to invest in infrastructure, and to provide budget support in the context of Afghanistan's temporary National Development Framework.

Since World Bank-administered funds cannot finance security-related activities, which are critical for any successful, durable implementation of ARTF activities, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was established by UNDP. The LOTFA operates in parallel to the ARTF to ensure the remuneration of police staff and to support the rehabilitation and operationalisation of police facilities in close co-ordination with the Ministries of the Interior and Finance. Both the ARTF and the LOTFA continue to operate today.

Source: OECD, 2010d

At the end of 2008, a number of UN Funds and Programmes and Specialised Agencies⁸ and the World Bank developed and agreed on an instrument (including the Fiduciary Principles Accord) to facilitate the two-way transfer of funds for crisis and post-crisis situations. Funds could be transferred from a World Bank-administered trust fund to a UN organisation or from a UNDG trust fund to the World Bank. This arrangement enables the recipient to apply its own regulations, rules and procedures – including those relating to procurement, audit, and programme support costs – when managing these funds.

Main findings

- UNDP non-core funding is used for the same thematic areas as its core funding. Funding to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office helps align donors and UN agencies at a country-level, *e.g.* through the One UN funds.
- World Bank non-core flows help diversify its portfolio to countries where loan instruments are unavailable – *e.g.* due to arrears or because recipient countries are non-members.

Notes

1. All numbers cited are based on DAC members' reports to the Creditor Reporting System.
2. With the exception of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (Window 1), which is eligible to receive multilateral ODA.
3. Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Canada, Spain, and Switzerland. (*Source*: UNDP)
4. Does not include the United States, which chose to be removed from the VISC.
5. For 2009 and 2010, the UNDG approved Malawi, Papua New Guinea, Bhutan, Kiribati, Samoa, Botswana, Lesotho, Comoros, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyzstan and Montenegro.
6. The major funds in this category include the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), The Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Carbon Funds, and the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm).
7. In parallel, commitments show a strong growth in the share of *general* education, from 5% in 1990-4 to 32% in 2005-9, and in support to secondary education, from 9% to 17% over the same period (Cambridge Education *et al.*, 2009, page 36).
8. WHO, ILO, UNESCO, FAO, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, UN-Habitat and UNOPS.

Chapter 4

Development perspectives for a post-Copenhagen climate funding architecture

This chapter examines the funding mechanisms and governance arrangements used to deliver financial resources to address climate change. The focus is on the institutional framework, rather than the resources themselves. This paper reviews the various levers and components of existing funds, focusing on public, and primarily multilateral, funds. This chapter's aim is to map the type of configurations that could best meet developing countries' requirements to adapt to and to mitigate the effects of climate change.

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Copenhagen accord

Paragraph 8 of the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord promises developing countries:

"scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access ... to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation ... adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention."

Developed countries committed to provide new and additional resources approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-12 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. In the longer term, they committed to a goal of mobilising USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to meet the needs of developing countries. This funding would come from a wide variety of sources – public and private, bilateral and multilateral – which would include alternative sources of finance. A UN High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing was established to examine the potential sources of revenue towards meeting the goal. The resources will probably be delivered via multiple channels like the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, funds established under the Kyoto Protocol, and other multilateral, bilateral, and regional channels.

Mitigation and adaptation

Greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation is a global public good – its reduction in one region of the world benefits all by reducing the worldwide GHG concentrations that cause climate change. The direct benefits of adaptation action are mainly local or regional, even if the indirect effects of climate change can cross borders (see Box 4.1). Adaptation is inextricably linked to development, not least because the poorest countries are the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Conversely, mitigation offers the longer-term promise of establishing new paths for sustainable development. The funds¹ required for mitigation range from USD 82 to 87 billion and for adaptation from USD 28 to 67 billion – a total range of between USD 110 and 154 billion for both mitigation and adaptation. Estimates vary widely, but are largely consistent with the Copenhagen Accord's proposed additional resources. The most recent meeting of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) argued that adaptation, mitigation and

development objectives should not be addressed in a compartmentalised fashion (United Nations, 2010). This is significant because in the past compartmentalised investments have led to ineffective or even counter-productive results.

Box 4.1. Mitigation and adaptation

Mitigation

In the context of climate change, human intervention to reduce greenhouse gas sources or improve carbon sinks. Examples include using fossil fuels more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation, switching to solar energy or wind power, improving the insulation of buildings, and expanding forests and other carbon sinks to absorb greater amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

Adaptation

Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. Examples include (i) shore protection (e.g. dikes, sea walls, beach nourishment), which can prevent sea level rise from inundating low-lying coastal areas, and (ii) farmers planting more climate-resilient crops.

Source: UNFCCC website, 2010

Sources of funding

Many mitigation and adaptation needs will be funded through domestic sources, which will involve many millions of purely private transactions. The following equation (which considers external public assistance as the balancing item) gives a sense of how external public resource requirements would be determined in developing countries:

$$\text{Total needs} - \text{All private (domestic and foreign) resources} - \text{Public domestic resources} = \text{External public resources required}$$

Private international flows will include FDI and flows stimulated by cap-and-trade schemes.² Public domestic revenues will account for some funding of climate change needs, depending on country context. The balance is the gap that could be filled by external public flows. To provide some comparison or context, total gross ODA, excluding debt relief, was equal to USD 130 billion in 2009 and has grown in real terms by some 4% per annum since 2005 (OECD, 2010c).

Even if private finance, including carbon market finance, can in the long term generate the incremental investment necessary, it is not likely to do so in the short term. Attracting public (i.e. tax-generated) finance will be critical to establishing the regulatory framework necessary to attract private finance. The implementation of countries' national development and climate change strategies will serve as a key signal and lever to attract such private flows as debt guarantees and other incentive structures.

A list of potential new funding sources is included for information in Annex C.

Additionality and the use of ODA in relation to climate change

Key post-Copenhagen processes, including the COP16 in Mexico, will need to find robust mechanisms for measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) mitigation support and actions undertaken (and for monitoring, reviewing, and reporting for adaptation investment). Currently, the DAC's "Rio marker" for climate change mitigation and the recently approved new marker for adaptation provide the only systematic way for DAC members to identify public finance flows that serve clearly defined adaptation or mitigation objectives. If resources are available and stakeholders agree, markers could also apply to non-concessional financing from international financial institutions and form a useful basis for wider tracking of non-DAC and even private flows. However, the markers are not a sufficient basis from which to pinpoint the volume of spending going to these objectives compared to other development activities.

The question of climate change finance considered as additional to DAC or, indeed, global ODA ("additionality"), cannot be resolved by adopting markers to identify climate flows. Markers show which components of country assistance portfolios are, at least in part, dual-purpose, serving development and mitigation and/or adaptation. Markers do not, however, apportion amounts within each programme to each objective. The high intrinsic-purpose overlap of both adaptation and mitigation with development makes any such allocation difficult. Even if it was technically feasible to distinguish between adaptation and development actions, for example, it would be a challenging task for the DAC to decide on attribution guidelines for different types of programmes so as to approximate the accounting by volume between "climate" and "non-climate" activities. For this accounting process to be seen as objective, it would moreover have to draw in a broad range of expertise from partner countries and other stakeholders involved post-Copenhagen.

Even if a system were developed to separate climate from non-climate ODA within a single project, it would not necessarily be sufficient for monitoring international commitments. For example, some might consider that the Copenhagen Accord allows the full value of relevant mitigation and adaptation projects to be counted, whereas others might insist that only the "climate-specific" share, or the incremental cost for "climate-proofing" an activity, should qualify. Moreover, does "new and additional" mean additional to future ODA levels already committed to but not yet reached, or additional only to current levels? Such issues must also be seen in a wider political setting that goes well beyond the membership of the DAC.

Integration with country-level strategies


Country-level experience clearly shows that developing country ownership and use of existing country systems are key elements for the effective implementation of programmes. This section offers some guidance as to how flows can effectively support developing countries to pursue low carbon and climate-resilient development pathways. The European Commission argues that resources and support must be "effectively governed and channelled towards explicit mitigating activities and action ...backed by comprehensive national governance and strategies" (European Commission, 2009).

Integrating climate change efforts at country level

Drawing on the domestic action of four countries (Bangladesh, Mexico, Ghana, Indonesia) on climate change, this section highlights the factors that contribute to effective country-level action on climate change. While there is no blueprint or even proven best practice, a range of country-specific, country-driven approaches is emerging.

In Bangladesh, the National Climate Change Strategy and associated Action Plan (2008) are linked to the 2008-11 Poverty Reduction Strategy. This cross-sectoral approach engages all aspects of planning, investment, and decision-making, and applies them to the challenges of climate change. The Action Plan covers 37 government programmes in six thematic areas – food security, social protection, disaster management, mitigation/low carbon development, and capacity development. A multi-donor trust fund co-ordinates external resources and blends these with domestic resources to implement the national climate change strategy. Figure 4.1 illustrates these relationships.

Figure 4.1 Institutional framework for climate change in Bangladesh



Source: ENVIRONET Secretariat, 2010

In Ghana, there is a strong focus on *defining targets* and *measuring results* for climate change and monitoring progress towards these. The Performance Assessment Frameworks of the sectors engaged in implementing climate change actions serve to track progress, facilitating monitoring and evaluation of specific activities. National budget allocations are fully integrated in the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) of the sectors involved.

Indonesia, like Bangladesh, has established the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund that allows international funds to be delivered across a range of sectors and in line with the national budget, thus using country systems. As international finance for climate change is scaled up in the future, it will be important to use and strengthen partners' *public financial*

management systems so that they can absorb larger amounts of funding and enhance their climate change efforts.

In Mexico, all 32 states are preparing a State Climate Change Strategy, as are the major cities. Decentralised planning complements national planning. It ensures broad-based ownership and a focus on local priorities – an example of vertical integration across all levels of government.

Sustained *capacity development* was found to be necessary in all four countries – not just for those officials working directly on climate change, but also for those engaged in sectors affected by climate change and those involved in public financial management, monitoring, and reporting. A country's capacity to address climate change and make the most of any opportunities it offers (through, for example, the carbon market) is dependent on skills from across government, the private sector, and civil society.

One key indicator of the initial success of the strategies employed in the countries examined may be that they have attracted both domestic and international financial resources to implement climate change actions.³ What emerges is that genuine country ownership of relevant plans and strategies, regardless of the form chosen, is essential to successful funding and implementation (Sharma, 2009). Tailoring the planning process to a country's needs and institutions, rather than using a standardised approach, can increase ownership and ensure that plans are translated into appropriate action.

It is too early to evaluate the impact of these approaches on reducing emissions and increasing climate resilience. Key challenges persist, including the need to develop a national strategy with broad ownership across a wide range of stakeholders and to maintain a focus on local priorities that also takes into account the longer-term implications of climate change. In addition, mechanisms that direct domestic and international financial resources towards the implementation of climate change actions need to be established. Such mechanisms will need to be able to absorb and manage the scaled-up resources expected post-2012 and to provide robust monitoring and consistent reporting.

Lessons Learned from Global Funds in other sectors

Global funds are defined as large multi-country funds that contain a significant element of earmarked funding for specific objectives with thematic, sectoral, or sub-sectoral coverage. In health, global funds were created by donors to focus on achieving the results that significant resource transfers were deemed to have failed to produce. As a result, new funds, financed by private donors and governments, were established to address specific goals. Examples include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI. As global funds have grown in number and size, so has the scale of the specific interventions they support in a given country proportionately to the overall funding received by that country (World Bank, 2008).

The multiplicity and diversity of funding sources to address climate change are similar to those for health care. The experience of global funds in the health sector⁴ may therefore be useful in informing future discussions. There is a useful body of work to draw upon since the OECD selected health as a tracer sector for examining aid effectiveness.⁵ Overall levels of health funding increased at a rate of 14% per year from 2000 to 2007 from USD 5.5 billion to USD 13.5 billion.⁶ This helped to scale up investments to achieve health outcomes. Given that the estimated scale of funding for climate change is expected to be even larger than for health, much can be learned from the health experience.

The global health fund experience suggests that funds for specialised purposes – energy efficiency, renewables, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), technology transfer, capacity building, etc. – can be effective in the short term. In the longer term, however, they must be integrated into the development strategies of partner countries if they are to be sustainable. The bulk of the increase in health spending benefited global funds as well as similarly earmarked bilateral funding instruments. Consequently, the situation also presents challenges for partner countries since the number, diversity, and relative inflexibility of aid channels have increased in parallel, thereby putting a greater administrative burden on all concerned, particularly on partner countries where human resources are likely to be more limited.

Aid effectiveness principles


Climate-related funding will often be only one component of the total donor resources in a partner country. Harmonising the differing requirements and procedures with other funding sources is, therefore, likely to be complex. In the presence of multiple funding mechanisms, each with its own administrative and reporting requirements, the resulting workload overburdens partner countries' administrative capacity (Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2009). Multiple funding sources for adaptation, mitigation, and REDD+ already exist. In this context, it appears that the health experience is fated to be repeated unless efforts are made to consolidate the multiple funding sources.

The high volume of funding from global funds for health has delayed questions of predictability and sustainability that are implicitly a key part of the development effectiveness debate. Global funds are typically proposal-based and conditional on results, which makes the predictability and sustainability of access to funding challenging for two reasons. First, access to global funding can be unpredictable from one year to the next if a proposal competes for limited funds with another party whose proposal is more compelling. Second, if results need to be demonstrated, how is it possible to ensure that a multi-year project is not "switched off" just when it is most needed? Can continued success in proposals to global funds be sufficiently relied upon by countries which are awarded funds for them to factor such success into their medium-term planning? Given the global health fund experience, it would seem that new proposal-based systems should be avoided since they cannot be relied upon in the long term and because they usually require complex appraisal mechanisms with high transaction costs for partner countries. On the other hand, both GAVI and the Global Fund are now able to provide more sustainable and predictable funding because of donors' commitments to innovative financing mechanisms such as the IFFIm and UNITAID.

When national development or climate plans are prioritised and integrated into a country's planning and budgeting processes, national stakeholders can effectively lead and steer efforts to mitigate and address the negative effects of climate change. OECD policy guidance (OECD, 2009c) proposes the use of a climate lens to examine the risks arising from climate variability, the vulnerabilities and opportunities associated with new policies, plans or projects, and suggestions as to how to adapt existing policies and plans to address those risks and opportunities.

To sum up, arguments for creating parallel new funds simply because existing funds have not yet delivered, or because the financial gaps for funding climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are so wide, are not sufficiently convincing.⁷ Instead, it might be worth starting with an analysis of the functions and purposes of the new arrangement envisaged and seeing whether existing institutions can fulfil those functions and fit the

Figure 4.2 Existing multilateral climate change funds



Source: DAC Secretariat design based on data from Climate Funds Update, 2010

purposes (Muller, 2009). Other solutions and configurations, including a “networked” approach of separating out functions and institutional responsibilities may be equally desirable and/or manageable. Whether or not assistance is delivered as ODA, the success of an institutional arrangement will be determined by whether it meets the financial needs for adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change, while improving the prospects for full national ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and overall effective management.

Current external public funding to address climate change

Developed country parties to the UNFCCC are expected to provide information on the bilateral and multilateral assistance they provide in their national communications to the UNFCCC. Due to gaps and inconsistencies in reporting approaches in the third and fourth national communications, it is not yet possible to calculate the total financial assistance provided. However, the *World Bank Development Report 2010* estimates that total resources dedicated to climate change mitigation and adaptation are currently in the range of USD 9-10 billion per year: USD 8-9 billion for mitigation and USD 1 billion for adaptation.⁸ Much of this financing is on non-concessional or market terms.

Bilateral ODA for climate change mitigation over recent years amounts to USD 5.2 billion, as identified by the Rio marker for climate change mitigation (see Annex C for more information on the Rio marker). Adaptation activities are not yet separately identifiable in DAC statistics, but DAC members agreed on a statistical marker for identifying bilateral and multilateral projects targeting climate change adaptation that would be applied to 2010 data.

DAC statistics identify only multilateral climate change mitigation and adaptation outflows for the EU Institutions and World Bank Group. The multilateral outflows account for a significant proportion of total public resources since public climate change flows consist of a growing share of funding from multilateral agencies and global funds. Concessional

Table 4.1 Funds disbursed for climate change to 2010

LDC Fund	October 2002	Adaptation	111.9	(1) Support for National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs); (2) project proposals on the basis of NAPAs.	GEF Secretariat & Council review, coordinating with Convention secretariat	GEF
Special Climate Change Fund	October 2002	Adaptation	91.2	Project proposals concerning risk reduction strategies, adaptation measures and capacity building	GEF Secretariat & Council review, coordinating with Convention secretariat	GEF
MDG Achievement Fund	March 2007	Adaptation & Mitigation	85.5	Programme proposals from UN country teams on basis of national strategies	Technical subcommittee reviews proposals from eligible countries	UNDP
GEF Trust Fund – Climate Change focal area	1994	Adaptation & Mitigation	2 600.0	Projects for mitigation and adaptation, including support for national communications	GEF Secretariat & Council review	IBRD

Note: Annex C maps countries receiving disbursements for adaptation and mitigation from these five funds.

Source: DAC Secretariat based on data from Climate Funds Update, 2010.

IDA commitments for climate change stood at USD 334 million in 2008 and trust fund disbursements at USD 44 million (Steckhan, 2009). Of course, these figures yield only a partial overview of the total resources from multilateral development banks.

Existing climate change funds

The existing institutional climate change framework consists of the financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC, the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol, and bilateral, multilateral, and regional flows of public and private funds. As the landscape in Table 5.1 illustrates, many climate change funds in existence today are outside the UNFCCC.

Today, cumulative total disbursements by the global funds for climate change amount to USD 2.9 billion (Table 4.1), or about USD 246 million per year.⁹ The figures do not include the recent disbursements of the Adaptation Fund, about USD 6 million as of January 2010. Clearly disbursements from global funds to date fall well short of the demonstrated need.

Funds under the UNFCCC

Three funds were established under the UNFCCC: the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) – both managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – and the Adaptation Fund.

The LDC Fund. In the first phase of the LDC Fund, LDCs were granted support to develop National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). The second phase involved their submitting NAPA projects for funding. An evaluation of the LDC Fund concluded that disbursement of funds for priority projects was insignificant compared to LDCs' adaptation needs (DANIDA and GEF, 2009). The evaluation recommended that a climate change adaptation planning cycle where Ministries of Finance and Planning play a key role needs to be initiated in order to provide a way of co-ordinating the investment of funds available from other sources. It also suggested that the present institutional arrangements and delivery mechanisms of the LDC Fund should be reviewed to provide sufficient funding to implement NAPA programmes rather than individual projects.

The SCCF. It was established to support longer term implementation of adaptation actions in non-Annex I parties. These projects must be in line with strategies set out in national communications or NAPAs. Priority areas include water, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, integrated coastal zone management, and disaster risk management and prevention.

The Adaptation Fund. It was established under the Kyoto Protocol to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in the developing countries that are parties to the Protocol, especially those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Qualified developing country institutions can receive funds directly from the Adaptation Fund. Management of the Adaptation Fund is subject to the authority and guidance of the COP. The GEF acts as the secretariat and the World Bank as the trustee of the Adaptation Fund Board, both on an interim basis. Today, the Adaptation Fund's main source of revenue is 2% of the certified emission reductions (CERs) issued for Clean Development Mechanism projects, although the first voluntary contributions from Spain and Germany were also received in 2010. As of January 2010, USD 5.95 million had been disbursed. The first four projects of the Adaptation Fund were approved in June 2010.

Other climate funds

The GEF. In addition to being the financial mechanism for the LDC Fund and the SCCF, the GEF also oversees the **Strategic Priority on Adaptation** and the **GEF Trust Fund**. The Strategic Priority on Adaptation was a three-year pilot programme designed to show how adaptation planning and assessment could be practically translated into full-scale projects. The GEF Trust Fund has disbursed the vast majority of climate funds to date, around USD 2.6 billion (cumulative total). The GEF uses implementing agencies, such as UNDP, UNEP, and IBRD (the World Bank), for the projects it funds. Some developing countries believe this delays decisions, increases costs, and adds conditions that could otherwise be avoided by funds operating on a “direct access” principle, whereby approved implementing entities at the country level can access funds directly for approved projects and programmes.

The UNDP. It acts as the Administrative Agent on behalf of UNEP and the FAO for the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD), a multi-donor trust fund, as well as for the **MDG Achievement Fund**. The MDG Achievement Fund covers eight thematic areas, among them environment and climate change, and resources are allocated based on UN country teams’ proposals and countries’ national strategies and climate change plans. Both funds are administered by the UNDP MDTF Office as an inter-agency UN resource.

The 2005 G-8 Gleneagles Communiqué on Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development gave the World Bank a key role in “creating a new framework for clean energy and development, including investment and financing”.¹⁰ This was reaffirmed at the September 2009 G-20 summit in Pittsburgh.¹¹ The **Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)** were created in 2008 and established at the World Bank. The CIFs comprise two funds, the **Clean Technology Fund** to support investment in low-carbon technologies and the **Strategic Climate Fund** to test innovative approaches to climate change mitigation. The **Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)** falls under the umbrella of the Strategic Climate Fund. Under the PPCR, resources are initially allocated to nine countries and two regions chosen by a steering committee. These funds are implemented jointly by the regional development banks and the World Bank. The **Forest Carbon Partnership Facility** was also established at the World Bank (independently of the CIFs) to support countries preparing REDD strategies and to remunerate countries with verifiable reductions in emissions.

A multilateral fund not shown in Figure 4.2 is the **Congo Basin Forest Fund**. It was established in 2008 at the African Development Bank with an initial commitment of USD 200 million to slow deforestation in the Congo Basin. The European Commission has also established the **Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)**, to which it has granted EUR 286 million to support developing countries in adapting to the effects of climate change and mitigating its future impact.

In spite of a number of substantial commitments and efforts to put fiduciary and management structures in place, actual disbursements from the funds mentioned above have taken time. The commitments and pledges to the World Bank’s CIFs are likely to result in large climate financing disbursements in the next few years. Even if these potentially substantial volumes aim to respond fully to needs, some developing countries are sceptical about delivery mechanisms “outside” the UNFCCC, since they may have less influence over their governance and implementation.

Future work

The future funding architecture for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change is complex. New climate change funds will begin to disburse resources, existing channels will disburse a higher volume of funding, and new funding networks may evolve. Further studies could look more closely at the intersection and convergence of the mandates of existing funds for adaptation and mitigation in order to maximise synergies and reduce duplication. It will also be important to learn lessons from developing countries that are well advanced in the incorporation of climate change adaptation and mitigation in their planning and resource mobilisation efforts (*e.g.* Bangladesh). This will be valuable for South-South co-operation among developing countries and will provide useful insights into the aid effectiveness agenda for climate change.

Within the next few years, as the reporting of climate change flows improves (and, in particular, with the introduction of the DAC adaptation markers for ODA flows), more analysis on the distribution of commitments and disbursements will be possible. This should be complemented by more in-depth partner-country case studies into the realities of climate change financing on the ground and how best to promote transparency between developed and developing countries in each stage of the funding cycle. In addition to increasing countries' absorptive capacities, it will also be important for developing their capacity to report on support received, actions taken and outcomes achieved.

Main findings

- The ideal climate fund model will provide flexible external resources to support intrinsically integrated interventions anchored in a country's climate or national development strategy.
- New, complex, proposal-based systems should be avoided as they usually require complex appraisal systems with high transaction costs for partner countries.
- Instead of creating new funding mechanisms, it may be equally desirable for donors to examine existing functions and determine whether existing institutions can perform them through a "networked" approach in which each institution fulfils an institutional responsibility.
- Total public resources currently dedicated to climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries are estimated at roughly USD 10 billion per year. To date, existing climate change funds have disbursed a yearly average of only USD 246 million.
- As parties to the UNFCCC discuss the additionality question, it will be important to apply and improve OECD members' reporting using the markers for climate change mitigation and adaptation as rapidly as possible.

Questions for future policy discussion

- How might monitoring "new and additional" funding for climate change be envisaged?

Notes

1. For the purposes of this paper, the estimates of the annual funding that will be needed in 2030 are those of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the international environmental treaty aimed at stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
2. Collier, Conway, and Venables (2008) argue that if each person was endowed with the same emission rights, the financial flows to Africa resulting from sales of carbon permits might be of comparable size to its current aid receipts (p. 349).
3. Emphasis on both. National strategies motivated solely to attract external funding are rarely successful, as discussed in more detail below.
4. A number of global funds have been established to increase flows to address global health challenges such as HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases such as TB. Global funds active in the health sector include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and TB, and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), also administering the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm).
5. Aid Effectiveness Portal, www.aideffectiveness.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=65.
6. OECD Creditor Reporting System.
7. Paragraph 19(c) of the Accra Agenda for Action states: "As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level."
8. In Chapter 6 of the World Bank Development Report, "Generating the funding needed for mitigation and adaptation", Corfee-Morlot *et al.* estimate an upper-bound for mitigation-specific support to developing countries of around USD 53 billion in 2007 if GEF and CDM flows are included. (The figure could be lower depending if CDM flows are accounted for differently).
9. Secretariat estimates.
10. Paragraph 11(b).
11. G-20 Leaders' Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit: www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.

Chapter 5

Developments in the multilateral system in 2009-10

This chapter consists of three sections. The first summarises ongoing reforms at the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the UN system, the European Commission and the multilateral development banks (MDBs). The second section describes how multilateral agencies responded to the global economic crisis and the third covers issues of resource mobilisation and replenishments in 2009-10.

Recent challenges, in particular the global financial and economic crisis, have required multilateral agencies to take centre stage. New policy forums, such as the G20, were created or upgraded in order to manage and co-ordinate the crisis response. Reforming multilateral agencies so that they can better meet the new challenges was a key part of this endeavour. This chapter reviews and summarises reforms that are taking place at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other multilateral bodies. It focuses on the role of multilateral agencies in the context of the global economic crisis, on their delivery of global public goods, and on their resource mobilisation efforts.

This chapter consists of three sections. The first summarises ongoing reforms at the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the UN system, the European Commission and the multilateral development banks (MDBs). The second section describes how multilateral agencies responded to the global economic crisis and the third covers issues of resource mobilisation and replenishments in 2009-10.

Ongoing reforms

All multilateral agencies covered in this report have established specific reform programs to meet one or more of the following objectives: (i) to become more effective and efficient, applicable to all agencies; (ii) to ensure greater policy coherence for development, as in the case of EU Institutions; (iii) to reduce fragmentation, particularly as it affects the UN system; and (iv) to achieve governance and voting structures more closely in line with their memberships, a challenge faced by the Bretton Woods Institutions in particular.

April 2010 Development Committee outcomes

The Development Committee communiqué of 25 April 2010 recognised the critical role of both the support from the IMF (almost USD 175 billion) and from the World Bank Group (over USD 100 billion) since the start of the crisis. The Development Committee endorsed an increase in the voting power of developing¹ and transition IBRD members by 3.13% in order to give them greater voice and participation. When added to the 1.46% increase under the first phase of adjustment, the Development Committee's endorsement boosted the developing and transition country voice to 47.19% (World Bank, 2010a). This realignment is the basis for the current selective capital increase. The next shareholding review in 2015 will establish a roadmap for a dynamic formula for lasting realignment of voting powers.

World Bank Group reforms

As noted above, the World Bank Group (WBG) has been pursuing programmes of external and internal reforms to enable the institution to become more efficient, effective, and accountable. At the request of the World Bank President, Mr. Ernesto Zedillo, the former Mexican President, led a commission to look beyond the issue of voice and participation, review the institution's governance, and identify the urgent needs for modernisation to better equip the WBG for confronting future global challenges. The World Bank Board has not endorsed all of the Zedillo recommendations, particularly those relating to the Bank's governance and management reports (see Box 5.1).

Box 5.1. Recommendations of the Zedillo Commission Report

The Zedillo Commission Report recommends core changes in the structure and role of the board and the relationship between the Board and the President. Released in October 2009, the report made five key recommendations to be considered as a bundle in which each element is essential to the other:

1. enhance the voice and participation of developing countries with a view toward achieving an even split between developed and developing countries,
2. restructure the WBG's governing bodies by raising the political level of the Executive Board and delegating authority over financing operations to management,
3. reform the leadership selection process by opening it to all qualified candidates, regardless of their nationality,
4. strengthen management accountability; and
5. strengthen the WBG's resource base and seek how best to recapitalise the institution.

The WBG has also taken significant concrete steps to reform internally. These internal reforms revolve around three broad categories:

1. modernising and enhancing the effectiveness of the Bank's financial and non-financial instruments to tailor them to client needs, improve the speed of delivery, and demonstrate results on the ground
2. enhancing service delivery through changes in the way the Bank is organised, including improvements to the matrix and an enhanced field presence, coupled with a greater devolution of responsibility and accountability
3. supporting more effective services and better delivery of services through changes in policies, infrastructure and the incentives system

Under the first category, a risk-based Investment Lending (IL) model is now used to differentiate projects and their processing requirements according to the risks they present. This allows for simpler procedures in low-risk settings (and more devolution to country level), as well as enhanced supervision and implementation support for more complex projects. The Bank's new disclosure policy (effective as of 1 July 2010) makes information on the preparation of lending operations, the formulation of Bank policies and strategies, and Board proceedings available to the public.

IMF reforms: Securing global financial stability

To enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy, the Fund has initiated a process designed to realign members' voting power. In 2008, the Manuel Committee (named after its chair, Minister Trevor Manuel of South Africa) was asked to address the larger question of the adequacy of the Fund's institutional framework (Box 5.2). The report, issued in March 2009, came to the conclusion that the lack of an explicit mandate to oversee global financial stability in all of its dimensions – financial sector, domestic macroeconomic policies, and currency arrangements – has reduced the effectiveness of Fund surveillance. At the same time, because of the Fund's ability to respond effectively to the crisis, its popularity grew by the end of 2009, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Box 5.2. Recommendations of the Manuel Committee's Report

The Manuel Committee recommended a series of governance reform measures which should be agreed as a single package:

- accelerate the quota revision process, eliminate the practice of appointed chairs to reflect current economic realities, and elevate the Board's role from operational decisions to giving advice on strategic issues and to supervision and oversight
- expand the Fund's surveillance mandate by giving it greater authority
- lower the voting threshold on critical decisions from 85% to 70-75% and extend double majorities to a wider range of decisions, thus ensuring that key decisions command the support of the majority of members
- introduce an open, transparent, merit-based system for the appointment of the Managing Director and Deputy Managing Directors

Additional recommendations included augmenting the Fund's available financial resources and enhancing its expertise and role in macroeconomic co-ordination, financial, and capital account issues.

UN reforms: Implementing the Delivering as One Initiative

The Secretary-General launched the United Nations system's current effort to become more coherent, effective, and relevant in February 2006. Delivering as One, the genesis of which was described in detail in last year's DAC Report on Multilateral Aid, has been implemented on a pilot basis in eight countries. In addition to the One UN programmes, the UN is currently focusing on four other areas of the system-wide coherence process: funding, governance, gender, and the harmonisation of business practices. In December 2009, the UN Secretary General issued a report with proposals and options for broader governance reforms to improve the effectiveness of the UN Development Group, the main elements of which are summarised in Box 5.3.

A number of important assessments, including the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) and the stocktaking of the eight country-based One UN programmes, have identified some important funding issues (UN Secretariat, 2009):

- The fragmented nature of the funding architecture of UN operational activities for development.

- High transaction costs, which are undermining the effectiveness of UN development co-operation at country level. The growth in single-donor non-core funding is an important factor in increasing transaction costs for UN agencies.
- The rapidly declining share of core resources – less than 30% of overall contributions in recent years – encourages supply-driven approaches and undermines the principle of country leadership and ownership.
- The introduction of multi-year funding frameworks and strategic plans has advanced the predictability of funding to some UN entities, helped to define result indicators, reduced transaction costs, and helped to focus activities on high-priority areas.

Evidence from the evaluation of the eight pilot countries indicates that partner country governments are exercising increased national leadership over UN programmes and assuming a stronger role in steering UN agencies to support national development priorities. The exercise has already helped to align UN programmes and funding more closely with national priorities. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund approach to funding One UN programmes has proven to be attractive for donors thanks to the streamlined process and to the improved cost efficiency achieved through the joint one-stop-shop agreement with all UN agencies. It has also given the UN agencies incentives to co-ordinate, plan and implement together. Many challenges remain, however. Foremost among them is the difficulty in raising predictable resources, since donors are still financing UN agencies and projects directly.

Box 5.3. Proposals for the further improvement of UN system-wide coherence related to operational activities for development

1. Strengthen functional coherence between UN-wide governing bodies, namely the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Executive Boards of the Funds and Programmes, as well as the governing bodies of the Specialised Agencies
2. Strengthen financial reporting on operational activities for development
3. Create a central repository on operational activities for development
4. Undertake the independent evaluation of lessons learned from “Delivering as One” programme country pilots
5. Enhance harmonisation of business practices within the United Nations development system

Source: United Nations, 2009

Reforms of the multilateral development banks (MDBs)

To scale up the effectiveness of the institution and the development impact of its operations, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has pushed for reform in four key areas:

1. human resource management
2. operational business processes
3. decentralisation and operationalisation of its field offices (FOs)
4. budget reforms

The most recent budget framework helps to ensure that resource allocations are in line with the Medium Term Strategy (2008-12). It also reinforces management's accountability for delivery and results by linking programme deliverables to key performance indicators (KPIs). The Bank continued its activities in the area of knowledge management and development, which the Medium-Term Strategy identified as a key complement to its lending activities. To this end, the Bank approved the Knowledge Management and Development Strategy (KMDS) in July 2008 to promote synergies between operations and knowledge management with the overarching goal of consolidating the Bank's role as the premier knowledge institution for Africa and a leading agent for change in pursuit of sustainable socioeconomic development.

The **Asian Development Bank's** (AsDB) Strategy 2020 recognises five core specialisations that reflect its comparative strengths and its clients' needs: (i) infrastructure; (ii) environment, including climate change; (iii) regional co-operation and integration; (iv) financial sector development; and (v) education. In translating its results framework into operational terms, the AsDB has set out to monitor outcomes at regional and country levels, operational effectiveness, and development effectiveness (which includes the measurement of efficient use of internal resources and the implementation of reforms). The 2008 Development Effectiveness Review suggested that the AsDB is improving its overall development effectiveness and that the majority of performance indicators are on track to meet targets. AsDB is implementing a number of time-bound remedial actions to strengthen project performance reporting, knowledge creation and sharing, co-financing, gender mainstreaming through operations, and gender equality within the organisation.

IMF and World Bank collaboration

More consistent collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF was in large part prompted by the rapid succession of global crises beginning in 2008. The 2007 external review of Bank-IMF collaboration (the "Malan Report") led to a Joint Management Action Plan (JMAP) to further enhance the way the two institutions work together on the basis of existing "good-practice approaches".

The March 2010 review of the JMAP suggests that it has played a supporting, rather than central, role in this closer collaboration and future focus should be directed towards:

- providing incentives for joint country-team consultations
- making greater use of cross-institutional feedback in assessing performance
- strengthening staff mobility between the institutions
- enhancing clarity on information sharing
- improving awareness of organisational structures

The recent crisis showed how important it is for both institutions to collaborate closely in providing financial assistance and policy advice. For example, both the IMF and the World Bank give advice on fiscal issues, but their roles in supporting partner countries are determined by their respective mandates: the IMF focuses on the aggregate fiscal policy stance consistent with overall macroeconomic stability, as well as providing technical assistance to strengthen overall fiscal positions; and the Bank advises on the composition and effectiveness of spending.

In August 2009, the IMF approved new guidelines on debt limits. Debt limits seek to prevent the build-up of unsustainable debts, while allowing for adequate external

financing. The new framework, which became effective in December 2009 (IMF) and April 2010 (World Bank), moves away from a single design for debt limits (or, to use the usual terminology, concessionality requirements) towards a menu of options. This menu approach takes better account of the diversity of situations faced by low-income countries (LICs) with regard to their debt vulnerabilities – as informed by debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) under the low-income country debt sustainability framework (DSF) – and their “capacity” (both macroeconomic and public financial management capacity).²

Under the new framework, a country with relatively high debt vulnerabilities should adopt tighter concessionality requirements. Conversely, if debt vulnerabilities are relatively low, looser requirements can be considered. Similarly, the higher a country’s management capacity, the better a country will be able to implement and benefit from more flexible, but also more technically demanding, approaches to concessionality requirements. Each of the two factors, namely debt vulnerabilities and capacity, can therefore take two values: “lower” and “higher”. Thus, this framework results in four different types of concessionality requirements (Table 5.1). Unless debt sustainability is a serious concern (“higher” value) and capacity is limited (“lower” value), the applicable concessionality requirements normally allow for non-concessional borrowing and thereby provide more flexibility. For the most advanced LICs, concessionality requirements might be removed altogether.

Table 5.1. **Debt sustainability framework for LICs**

		Extent of debt vulnerabilities	
		Lower	Higher
Capacity	Lower	Minimum concessionality requirement based on the previous debt-by-debt approach, but with added flexibility on nonconcessional external debt (e.g., higher and untied nonzero limits, if consistent with maintenance of low debt vulnerabilities)	Maintain minimum concessionality requirement based on previous debt-by-debt approach, likely higher than 35 percent, with limited or no room for nonconcessional borrowing
	Higher	Minimum average concessionality requirement applied to external or total public borrowing; for most advanced LICs, no concessionality requirements and overall nominal debt limit if needed	Overall limit on the present value of external or total public debt; for most advanced LICs, ceilings on nominal external or total public debt

Source: International Monetary Fund, 2010

The IMF and the World Bank also reviewed the Debt Sustainability Framework in August 2009 with a view to enhancing its flexibility. The review recognised the impact of public investment on growth and the importance of remittances as a source of external financing. It also addressed the risk of small changes in assessments of a country’s policy and institutional capacity leading to more adverse debt distress ratings, and seeks to clarify the appropriate concept of state-owned enterprise debt for the purpose of debt sustainability assessments. Modifications in all of these areas impact favourably on assessments of LICs’ capacity to borrow.

Box 5.6 illustrates how UN agencies and international financial institutions are working together to initiate and implement programmes in response to the global food crisis.

Box 5.4. Global food crisis initiatives

- In April 2008, the UN Secretary General established the **High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis** (HLTF) with the primary aim of promoting a comprehensive, unified response. In July 2008, the Task Force produced the joint Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA).
- In May 2008, the WBG set up the **Global Food Crisis Response Program** (GFRP) to support implementation of the CFA. The GFRP provides a framework for the Bank to co-ordinate its own contributions in partnership with other multilateral organisations and donor agencies. It is designed to support governments in immediate- and medium-term responses to shortfalls in domestic food availability combined with rising international food prices. The program was increased to USD 2 billion in April 2009. The GFRP subsequently benefitted from additional funding from Australia, the Russian Federation, and the European Commission.
- Responding to a request from the G20 Summit, the World Bank set up the **Global Agriculture and Food Security Program** (GAFSP) in January 2010. The GAFSP is a multilateral trust fund designed to operationalise the commitments to agriculture and food security in poor countries made by the G8 at L' Aquila in July 2009. There, donors pledged to contribute USD 22 billion to an Agricultural and Food Security Initiative (AFSI).
 - Two windows will be created under the GAFSP to hold targeted donor contributions. The public sector window will be available for supervising entities including the World Bank, other MDBs, IFAD, FAO, and WFP which will manage projects and disburse funds. The private sector window will be managed by IFC.
 - Funding under this program is eligible to IDA countries and, where warranted, to IDA blend countries. The GAFSP Trust Fund, expected to reach between USD 1 and 1.5 billion, has been agreed to by Canada, Spain and the United States with additional contributions expected from other donors.

How have multilateral agencies responded to the global economic crisis?

The World Bank, regional development banks, and the EU all moved rapidly to offer crisis-related finance from within existing concessional envelopes. The IMF implemented G20 calls to issue new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), overhauled its concessional lending framework, and scaled up its concessional finance. Multilateral agencies were able to respond quickly and flexibly due to the resources entrusted to them by member states.

IMF

The London G20 Summit agreed to support a package of measures to increase the crisis response role of the IMF described in Box 5.5, all of which will require agreement under the IMF's governance procedures.

Box 5.5. The IMF's response to the crisis

Scaling up financial assistance

- Since September 2008, the IMF has provided more than USD 170 billion in **new lending commitments**. Concessional lending commitments tripled in 2009 to USD 3.8 billion.
- The IMF's **lending capacity has also substantially increased**. Contributions from several IMF member countries initially boosted loan resources by **USD 250 billion**, followed by an agreement for a further USD 500 billion under a renewed, expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).³ The IMF's concessional lending capacity has been doubled to USD 17 billion through 2014, which includes a concessional lending capacity of up to USD 8 billion in 2009-10. This will require additional subsidy resources of USD 2.8 billion to bridge the gap between market interest rates and lower concessional rates charged to LIC borrowers, part of which will come from the sales of IMF gold.
- Following a call by the G20 Heads of State and the IMFC in April 2009, the IMF implemented **new allocations of SDRs** equivalent to USD 283 billion in August-September 2009. Of those allocations, some USD 18 billion went to low-income countries. **This was meant to help liquidity-constrained countries address the fallout from the global crisis by limiting the need for adjustment through contradictory policies in the face of deflation risks.**
- The IMF has granted **interest relief**, with zero payments on outstanding IMF concessional loans to the end of 2011 in order to help LICs cope with the crisis. Thereafter, it expects to implement permanently higher concessionality of Fund financial support.

More flexible lending instruments

- A new form of financial support – the flexible credit line – was introduced for strongly performing economies, providing a high level of upfront access to IMF resources with no ongoing policy conditions.
- To make its financial support more flexible and more closely tailored to the diversity of low-income countries, a new **Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT)** was established with three new lending windows:
 1. The Extended Credit Facility (ECF) replaces the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and is the Fund's main tool for providing support to LICs with protracted balance of payment problems. It allows higher levels of access, more concessional financing terms, more flexible programme design features, as well as a streamlined and more sharply focused conditionality.
 2. The Standby Credit Facility (SCF) replaces the Exogenous Shocks Facility's (ESF) high access component for countries that face short-term balance of payments problems from time to time, allows for higher access, and can also be used on a precautionary basis to provide insurance.
 3. The Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) provides rapid financial assistance to LICs facing an urgent balance of payments need without the need for programme-based conditionality.
- Recent reforms abolished "hard" structural conditionality in all IMF-supported programmes, putting a greater focus on objectives rather than specific actions and deadlines.
- Together with a review of the flexibility of the **Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF)** described in greater detail in Table 5.1, debt limits applied under Fund programmes have been made more flexible (relating them systematically to countries' DSAs and debt management capacity). This could create more flexibility for the strongest LICs to borrow at lower levels of concessionality while pursuing sound macroeconomic policies.

World Bank Group

The WBG designed a number of initiatives to mobilise more resources, both public and private to protect the poorest and stimulate private sector activities (see Box 5.6). Among the initiatives, a total of USD 20.7 billion was provided for infrastructure, a sector critical for rapid recovery and job creation. Similarly, overall agricultural lending by the WBG will

Box 5.6. The World Bank Group's response to the crisis

Scaling up financial assistance

- Overall, the World Bank Group's new commitments increased by 54% in fiscal year 2009 (FY09) over the previous year to reach a record high of USD 60 billion
- **IBRD's lending almost tripled** to a record USD 32.9 billion from USD 13.5 billion in 2008. In 2010, IBRD lending is projected to exceed USD 40 billion. The IBRD is developing an approach to expand the use of its resources for specific projects in IDA countries based on the IBRD Enclave Framework for loans and/or partial risk guarantees.
- **IDA commitments reached a record level of USD 14 billion** in FY09, 25% higher than a year earlier, and further increased to USD 14.5 billion in FY10. IDA disbursements were also significant at USD 9.2 billion in FY09 and USD 11.5 billion in FY10.
- Up to USD 2 billion of IDA15 resources will be provided under the **IDA Fast-Track Facility**, which has accelerated processing and approval procedures, and provides for a greater degree of front-loading of IDA resources (up to 50% of country allocations). As of March 2010, USD 1.5 billion had been committed.

Targeted Initiatives

- The **Global Food Crisis Response Program** (GFRP), with commitments of USD 1.2 billion and disbursements of USD 870 million in over 30 countries in FY09 (see Box 5.4).
- The **Rapid Social Response** (RSR), designed to support safety nets and other social protection programs. It totalled USD 4.3 billion in FY09, funded primarily from IBRD and IDA resources and contributions to a multi-donor trust fund.
- The **Infrastructure Recovery and Assets Platform** (INFRA), a co-ordinated, multi-donor effort to help developing countries invest in their infrastructure sectors as economic drivers in the face of the current global crisis.

Supporting Private Sector Activities

- Co-financing innovations by the IBRD and the **expanded use of guarantees, insurance instruments**, and risk management products by both the IBRD and MIGA support private sector activities.
- The IFC committed USD 7 billion in financing through targeted initiatives in FY09. This in turn mobilised an additional USD 11 billion of funding from partners under IFC management or parallel arrangements.
 - On trade, the IFC expanded its Global Trade Finance Program to USD 3 billion in trade guarantees and launched the Global Trade Liquidity Program (GTLF), which has already supported USD 3 billion in trade to date, benefitting mostly African countries.
 - On infrastructure, the IFC launched the Infrastructure Crisis Facility (ICF) to help viable, privately funded, or PPP projects that face financial distress as a result of the crisis.
 - On microfinance, the IFC launched the Microfinance Enhancement Facility (MEF) to help microfinance institutions primarily with debt financing.
 - On bank capitalisation, the IFC Capitalisation Fund (USD 3 billion in debt and equity) is designed to strengthen the capital base of banks in emerging markets.

increase to USD 12 billion over the next two years, up from USD 4 billion in 2008. This is critical not least because the World Bank's earlier scaling-back of its engagements (both financial and policy) in infrastructure and agriculture in the 1990s (World Bank, 2007b) is widely considered to have been short-sighted. Investments in safety nets and other social protection programmes in health and education are also projected to reach USD 12 billion over next two years.⁴

IDA Crisis Response Window

At the Mid-Term Review of the fifteenth IDA replenishment cycle (IDA15) that took place in late November 2009, IDA deputies endorsed the creation of a dedicated Pilot Crisis Response Window (CRW) within the IDA to provide additional funding for the protection of core spending. The Pilot CRW, established for the remaining half of IDA15 (January 2010 to June 2011), will help protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure, and agriculture. The USD 1.6 billion IDA15 CRW will be funded through a redeployment of internal IDA resources and new voluntary donor contributions. CRW country allocations are designed to complement IDA's performance-based system (PBA), and provide additional financial support to those non-oil exporting IDA-only countries with the greatest crisis-related financing needs, and the least capacity to raise funds from other sources.

IDA deputies endorsed moving forward with the preparation of a proposal for a permanent CRW to respond to "exceptional" crises caused by exogenous shocks. This was further detailed at the Second IDA16 Replenishment meeting that took place in Bamako in June 2010. The permanent CRW would respond to major natural disasters or to severe economic crises. Participants recognised that the CRW would need to combine a rules-based approach with informed judgment, given difficulties with predicting crises, and requested further work on the criteria for economic crisis, including coordination with the IMF, triggers, and country eligibility. Participants agreed that the CRW be capped at 5% of the total IDA16 replenishment resources, but expressed a range of views on the mix of *ex-ante* and *ex-post* financing (World Bank, 2010b).

Regional development banks

The **African Development Bank** took steps to accelerate resource transfers to its member countries by frontloading its allocations, speeding up disbursements, and restructuring portfolios. In addition, the AfDB Group adopted the Bank's Response to the Economic Impact of the Financial Crisis in March 2009. It comprises: (i) a USD 1.5 billion Emergency Liquidity Facility, and (ii) a USD 1 billion Trade Finance Initiative consisting of two phases. The first phase supports trade finance by African banks and the second phase is a contribution to the IFC-led Global Trade Facility Programme, again for African trade finance. The 2009 Joint Action Plan to support Africa's financial systems and lending to the private sector (small and medium enterprises and infrastructure) was agreed by eight international financial institutions, including the AfDB Group and the WBG. This initiative is expected to increase their commitment by at least USD 15 billion over the next 2-3 years.

The **Asian Development Bank** crisis-related assistance, framed under its long-term 2008-20 strategic framework is expected to increase by more than USD 10 billion in 2009-10, bringing total AsDB assistance for these two years to around USD 32 billion (AsDB, 2009), compared to about USD 22 billion in 2007-8. (Assistance includes

project investments, quickly disbursed policy-based loans, guarantees, and new initiatives designed to address specific crisis needs.) The increase in lending comprises loans for trade finance, counter-cyclical support for fiscal spending, and infrastructure investment. AsDB will also expand its crisis-related support through grants for policy analysis and capacity building. Given severe resource constraints faced by low-income countries, the AsDB approved an additional liquidity of USD 400 million to AsDF-only countries. AsDF borrowers are also allowed to frontload their entire 2009-10 biennial allocation. The AsDB is working closely with the ASEAN Secretariat to establish a credit guarantee and investment mechanism as a trust fund to provide its members access to the Asian bond market for additional funding.

To boost lending in the short-term, the **Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)** eliminated ceilings on its policy-based lending authority. Approvals programmed for later years were brought forward. In October 2008, the IDB created a fast-disbursing USD 6 billion emergency facility to support commercial lending. The funds are provided to governments which, in turn, make the funds available to commercial banks. These financial institutions can then use the resources to finance lending to companies. The Bank's Trade Finance Facilitation Program (TFFP) increased its funds to USD 1 billion from USD 400 million and the credit line now supports non-dollar denominated trade finance transactions. The IDB increased approvals of loans, credit guarantees and grants to USD 9.6 billion in the first nine months of 2009 – a rise of 77% compared to the same period a year earlier. The increased lending has been accompanied by record disbursements. In the first nine months of 2009, the IDB disbursed USD 6.5 billion to the region, 63% more than in the same period the previous year.

European Commission

The European Commission is frontloading EUR 3 billion, or 72% of its projected budget support, to African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) nations to protect social spending. In August 2009, the Commission set up an *ad hoc* mechanism, the EU Vulnerability FLEX (V-FLEX) instrument, to assist ACP countries in response to the economic crisis with funding of up to EUR 500 million. The Commission approved the first package of financing decisions, a total of EUR 215 million, in December 2009. V-FLEX works preemptively on forecasts of fiscal losses and other economic and social vulnerability criteria to ease the impact of the crisis. For the first tranche of EUR 215 million, all amounts are paid in the form of budget support to enable partner countries to maintain their level of public spending in priority areas, including social sectors, without jeopardising their macroeconomic stability. Most of this funding is expected to be disbursed rapidly and complement assistance from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other regional development banks.

In addition to V-FLEX, the European Commission reinforced and reshaped its EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, so increasing grant capital, together with bilateral funds from EU Member States, to a total of EUR 500 million by 2010. This move has enabled it to mobilise an additional EUR 2.5 billion in loans.

Lessons of the crisis for international financial institutions and regional development banks

Multilateral institutions have drawn many lessons from the recent crisis. The IMF has deliberated extensively on macroeconomic⁶ and financial policies and regulations in line with the Manuel Report's recommendations. First, surveillance must be sharpened to focus on systemic risks and spillover effects, including those risks related to macro-financial issues. Second, in order to restore confidence, lending for crisis response must provide members with access to large, up-front disbursements, using instruments tailored to the strength of countries' policies. And, third, the IMF must continue to study and assess the credibility and feasibility of various policy options to promote the long-term stability and proper functioning of the international monetary system.

In the months ahead, the Fund will consider various ideas to further strengthen its crisis prevention toolkit. This will include making improvements to existing instruments, creating a new precautionary credit line to serve a broader group of members, and a new multi-country swap/credit line. Work in this area includes understanding the origins and behaviour of capital flows and developing a toolkit to manage volatility, as well as work related to the supply of reserve assets.

While more time will necessarily be needed to draw up a comprehensive list of lessons from the global economic crisis, the WBG has identified areas that call for action and rethinking. First, there is a need for broader reforms to improve financial system stability and soundness (relying on a broader and more representative Financial Stability Board and an expanded IMF role). Second, there is recognition of the importance of safety nets as effective policy responses. Third, there is a need to reassess the role of government. And, fourth, the approach to a broad range of policy issues, ranging from public-private partnerships to exchange rate regimes and capital account openness, needs to be reconsidered.

On the basis of its global and cross-sectoral presence and knowledge, financial management expertise, leadership in global public goods, and its catalytic and convening powers, the WBG sees its comparative advantage in the post-crisis era shaped by five interrelated priorities:

1. target the poor and the vulnerable with a focus on the "bottom billion" of Africa and South Asia, expanding the provision of basic needs and targeted social safety nets
2. create opportunities for growth, centred on agriculture and food security, infrastructure, investment climate, and private sector involvement, and on engagement in critical public finance issues such as effective use of public resources and public financial management
3. provide appropriate knowledge and policy expertise to developing countries
4. support the global public goods agenda – pressing global challenges such as climate change and communicable diseases
5. strengthen governance and fight corruption both at country and global and regional levels

Resource mobilisation: Capital increase and replenishments

The year 2010 requires donors to make simultaneous decisions on the replenishment and recapitalisation of major concessional funds and multilateral development banks. Donors are increasingly looking for innovative ways to provide predictable funding to funds, even under budget constraints. One such example is highlighted in Box 5.7.

Box 5.7. DFID core funding to the GAVI Alliance: Long-term funding mechanism

Analysis commissioned by GAVI (McElligot, 2009) suggests that predictable funding could increase immunisation outcomes by at least 10%, compared to the same funding provided on a non-predictable basis. If all GAVI donors provided long-term funding, this could potentially result in an additional 230 000 lives saved from 2009 to 2015 (if GAVI spends the forecast total of USD 8.1 billion over this period).

The UK's Department for International Development will provide predictable funding to GAVI through a 10-year pledge formulated with a rolling three-year-ahead binding element. Within the overall 10-year framework, they will issue a series of binding promissory notes. In the first year DFID will issue a promissory note for the first three years. Each subsequent year (from year 2) they will extend the promissory note commitments so that these always cover the next three years ahead. In this way, the overall funding pledge would gradually become a binding commitment. The decision to issue each promissory note would be subject to GAVI demonstrating performance against a mutually agreed long-term results-based framework linked to GAVI's key performance indicators and business plan.

The objective of DFID's support is to provide a long-term commitment using a mechanism that (i) gives GAVI increased confidence for planning long-term funding (up to 10 years) to countries, and (ii) enables GAVI to make binding commitments to countries up to three years ahead on the strength of our commitment (and without having to hold a cash balance to cover the obligation).

Source: The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)

The year 2010 calls for the recapitalisation, or general capital increase of the Inter-American Development Bank, the IBRD, and the African Development Bank. While the loans they leverage are not concessional, shareholder contributions to their equity do. The DAC share of the costs will vary depending on the relevant shareholder bases indicated in the coefficient column in Table 5.2. Based on published estimates of equity shortfalls 5-6 years out and straight-line reconstitution, general capital increases alone could produce additional ODA annual claims for DAC donors' paid-in capital of about USD 879 million a year from 2014 (depending on the adjusted IBRD shareholder formula).

Concurrent decisions on the replenishment of all major concessional funds are taking place in 2010. To indicate the order of magnitude, previous replenishments were: IDA (USD 42 billion over three years); the AfDF (USD 8.9 billion over three years); GEF (USD 4.2 billion over four years); and the Global Fund (USD 9.7 billion over three years). Obviously real needs and inflation have generally increased and absorptive capacity is also rising, so the above replenishment figures may be considered floor estimates. Table 5.2 indicates estimated minimum calls on DAC members for recapitalisation and replenishments over the next nine years.

Further information on all general capital increases and replenishments can be found in Annex D of this report.

Table 5.2. DAC share of calls for recapitalisation and replenishment

(in USD millions)	DAC coefficient	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
General capital increases		-	465	465	465	879	879	414	414	414
IBRD - GCI*	59%	-	-	-	-	414	414	414	414	414
IDB - 9th GCI	50%		169	169	169	169	169	-	-	-
AfDB - 6th GCI	37%		296	296	296	296	296			
Replenishments		4 542	7 390	18 286	14 890	10 896	-	-	-	-
IDA-16	78%	-	-	10 896	10 896	10 896	-	-	-	-
AfDF-12	96%	-	2 848	2 848	2 848	-	-	-	-	-
Global Fund	92%	3 596	3 596	3 596	-	-	-	-	-	-
GEF-5	89%	946	946	946	946	-	-	-	-	-
Total		4 542	7 855	18 751	15 155	11 775	879	414	414	414

* Based on the current shareholder formula for the general capital increase

Note: Amounts have been adjusted to reflect the DAC share.

Source: 2010 DAC Secretariat estimates based on World Bank, Global Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, GEF share of subscriptions and replenishment documents DAC.

Main findings

- The multilateral development banks are moving ahead with reforms towards a more representative governance structure. Internal reforms also aim to provide more flexible, better adapted instruments for their clients. (Paragraphs 175-178 and 182-184)
- The year 2010 requires donors to make simultaneous decisions on the replenishment and recapitalisation of major concessional funds and multilateral development banks. (Paragraph 206-208)

Notes

1. In the World Bank's most recent definition (2008), which is broader than those used by other international organisations, developing countries are defined as those with gross national income per capita below USD 11 905, which covers all low- and middle-income countries.
2. See page 7 in "Debt Limits in Fund-Supported Programs, IMF 2009.
3. Quota subscriptions from member countries are the IMF's main source of financing. It can, however, supplement its resources through borrowing if current resources fall short of member countries' financing needs. The IMF currently has in place a number of bilateral loan and note purchase agreements, and it has two standing borrowing arrangements: the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).
4. These amounts for agriculture and safety nets are IDA or IBRD loans (the Bank's regular resources) and do not include trust fund disbursements.

5. An IBRD USD 2 billion loan with deferred drawdown option, together with standby commitments from Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan and Australia, has allowed Indonesia to raise USD 12 billion of private funds in 2009 under difficult market conditions.
6. Most noteworthy are recent reflections by IMF staff about the need to rethink macroeconomic policy, including combining monetary policy and regulatory tools and the desirability of a higher inflation target (around 4% compared to 2%, which has been the norm adopted by central banks in developed economies), to give more room to expansionary monetary policy through lower interest rates. With inflation at 2%, the margin for nominal interest reductions is limited. Another stream of work at the IMF concerns capital account liberalisation.

Chapter 6

Multilateral strategies and evaluation in 2009-10

The first section of this chapter looks at DAC members' multilateral aid strategies. More than half of DAC members now have a multilateral aid strategy, though they differ in nature and scope. Some are broad political statements to guide multilateral aid allocation, while others define specific priorities and implementation processes. No country has a fixed allocation formula across its entire multilateral portfolio. Countries often also have separate partnership agreements with their most important multilateral partners. In determining multilateral allocations, the effectiveness of multilateral institutions is one of the key considerations. The second section looks at current multilateral evaluation processes in this context.

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DAC members' multilateral strategies

Multilateral aid allocations in 2008 were typically made in parallel by two (or sometimes more) different ministries. Ministries of Finance tend to lead on policy dialogue and contributions to the international financial institutions, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs decide on contributions to UN agencies and regional organisations. Aid allocations to EU Institutions may also be decided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but not necessarily by the same department responsible for UN allocations. Allocation decisions appear to be made in a decentralised manner – often independently from each other within the same government. This makes the discussion on division of labour between and bilateral and multilateral donors all the more difficult. For each peer review, the DAC Secretariat routinely consults with nine multilateral aid agencies in order to gain a clearer understanding of each Member's contributions to, and engagement with, these agencies. In an attempt to create a co-ordinated allocation process, many countries have established an overall "multilateral strategy". Last year's report highlighted Sweden and Switzerland as examples of countries with new multilateral strategies. Belgium, Portugal, Finland, and the Netherlands have recently adopted new multilateral strategies.

Belgium

In November 2008, the Minister of Development Co-operation announced a new multilateral strategy to focus its multilateral aid, avoid the creation of new funds, and increase the share of core, as opposed to non-core (earmarked), aid. In 2008, Belgium focused its multilateral aid exclusively on 21 multilateral entities.¹ Beginning in 2009, earmarked aid to multilateral agencies funded by the Directorate General for Development Co-operation was converted to core funding. (Belgium's DGDC is responsible for 55-65% of the country's ODA.) Belgian officials now expect to devote more time and effort to policy dialogue at the Executive Body level. In this way, the government anticipates extending strong support to results-based management and reporting, as well as to strengthening monitoring and evaluation functions within the organisations it funds. Article 23 of the new draft law on development co-operation submitted to Parliament in April 2010 states that voluntary

multilateral contributions are directed to the core, non-earmarked budget of partner organisations, with the possible exception of delegated co-operation (Belgian Foreign Ministry, 2009; OECD, 2010f). Belgium became a formal member of the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) in February 2010.

Portugal

The Government of Portugal adopted the *Estratégia Portuguesa de Cooperação Multilateral* in 2009. The strategy identifies three guiding principles for allocating multilateral support: (i) MDGs and aid effectiveness; (ii) co-ordination, coherence and complementarity; and (iii) policy coherence for development. It aims to strengthen Portugal's capacity to influence multilateral organisations' policies by promoting increased coherence between the different actors in the Portuguese administration responsible for multilateral co-operation (Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Portuguese embassies and diplomatic missions, and line ministries) as well as between multilateral and bilateral co-operation. The strategy recommends maintaining the overall ratio between bilateral and multilateral ODA, but recognises the importance of multilateral ODA as an instrument to: (i) leverage total Portuguese ODA, including ODA allocated to programmes and projects following a multi-bi approach; (ii) increase Portuguese ODA predictability; and (iii) finance global public goods.

Finland

Finland's policy for multilateral development co-operation focuses on the eradication of poverty and achievement of the MDGs. It considers the United Nations as its leading multilateral partner in achieving these. The guiding principles of multilateral co-operation include coherence, complementarity, and effectiveness. In terms of coherence, Finland supports the UN reform process and stresses the importance of decentralising operations and decision-making to country level. Complementarity between bilateral, multilateral, and EU co-operation is emphasised. Thematic and regional priorities are determined on the basis of the development needs of a particular region or country and the mandate of the multilateral organisation through which Finland chooses to implement these priorities. The Nordic group of countries forms an important reference group for multilateral co-operation, and Finland uses its influence in governing bodies to promote the effective use of its multilateral aid. Themes that cut across bilateral and multilateral co-operation include the rights of women and girls, strengthening the rights of marginalised and vulnerable groups, and combating HIV/AIDS (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009).

Netherlands

The Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation presented the Multilateral Strategy to Parliament in April 2009. Four priorities for multilateral engagement were: (i) growth and equity; (ii) fragile states; (iii) gender and sexual and reproductive health rights; and (iv) climate change and renewable energy. The government will step up its multilateral engagement, both in terms of funding and policy dialogue for four reasons. First, meeting the MDGs and safeguarding global public goods can only be realised through effective international co-operation. Second, increased fragmentation of aid programmes means governments have incurred higher transaction costs, and closer co-ordination can alleviate at least some of these costs. Third, the legitimacy and specialised nature of multilateral

organisations enables them to address certain issues – e.g. setting standards and regulations, advising countries on reproductive health policies, and macroeconomic policy – more easily than some bilateral agencies. Finally, the Netherlands sees multilateral ODA as a means to influence the multilateral system as a whole. The most relevant and best-performing institutions will be rewarded more systematically than before with additional ODA contributions and less earmarking.

Spain

Spain's Multilateral Strategy has two objectives: (i) the eradication of poverty, and (ii) the achievement of MDGs. In order to implement its strategy, Spain identified the United Nations as one of the most important channels for multilateral co-operation. For this reason, the country is actively involved in the UN System Wide Coherence process and is a strong proponent of the Delivering as One initiative. Since 2006, when Spain started increasing its multilateral ODA, the goals of Spanish multilateral cooperation have become more ambitious. These include focusing on aid and development effectiveness, increasing multilateral commitments selectively, promoting policy coherence, and playing a more active role in international forums. To focus on and improve the quality of relations between Spain and the multilateral organisations to which it belongs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has signed Strategic Framework Agreements. These Strategic Agreements consider aid effectiveness principles such as the predictability of funding, mutual accountability, and the further alignment of Spain's cooperation priorities with the organisations it funds. In 2009, Spain signed two strategic agreements with UNDP and UNICEF. It will sign two more in 2010 with UNFPA and UNIFEM.

United Kingdom

In 2008-9, the UK developed institutional strategies that linked the release of voluntary core funding to some UN agencies with the achievement of targets contained in Performance Frameworks. This move is described in further detail in Box 6.1.

Box 6.1. Performance funding in the UN: The UK's approach

The United Kingdom has developed institutional strategies including Performance Frameworks with some UN agencies to link performance to the UK's voluntary core funding. First, a "base-line core" is allocated based on overall performance, followed by a "bonus core" for progress made against a sub-set of high priority targets. For example, in 2009, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) provided UNDP, UNFPA, WHO and UNAIDS with GBP 104 million of un-earmarked core funding that was released following satisfactory progress against the Performance Framework targets. Of this, GBP 6.5 million was bonus un-earmarked core funding awarded for progress against targets for UN reform and improved delivery. In this way, UK core funding is contingent on agency performance, improving direct accountability to the UK tax payer. In some cases where agencies' own targets are not sufficiently robust to be included in the Performance Frameworks, DFID has developed new targets in collaboration with the agencies.

Source: The UK's Department for International Development.

Evaluation of multilateral organisations

Given that DAC members cite many positive reasons for increased multilateral engagement, why is the multilateral share of ODA flat and even eroding?

For reasons of domestic accountability DAC members continue to report a need for better evidence of multilateral impacts and effectiveness – a need made possibly more pressing by the large number of major replenishment negotiations held simultaneously and discussed in the previous chapter. They also see an increasing need to justify multilateral contributions – over which they have less direct oversight – to a sceptical public and may therefore require more comprehensive proof of the impact of multilateral organisations in developing countries. How multilateral organisations report this information back to donors, and how they in turn represent them domestically, may influence domestic constituents' perception of these organisations as much as the evidence available. The reality of today's world does not seem to coincide with that in which Milner concluded that in times

Box 6.2. MOPAN and the DAC's Evaluation Network

Various assessment tools and approaches such as peer reviews of multilaterals' evaluation functions, multi-donor evaluations of multilaterals' programmes and initiatives, assessments by MOPAN, and reports from multilaterals themselves, all contribute information on multilateral effectiveness. However, taken individually, they may not fully satisfy the performance information needs of stakeholders such as bilateral funders.

Sixteen DAC members³ also belong to the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). This "common approach" is an annual assessment built on four dimensions of organisational effectiveness, namely:

- 1 strategic management (corporate governance, corporate and other strategies)
- 2 operational management (use of performance information, financial resource management, human resource management, portfolio management)
- 3 relationship management (ownership, alignment, harmonisation)
- 4 knowledge management (performance monitoring and evaluation, performance reporting, application of lessons learned)

Donors (MOPAN member representatives) at headquarters and at country level, and ministry and NGO representatives in the selected developing countries respond to the survey of the multilateral organisations assessed in those countries. An important aspect of the MOPAN process is dialogue with the multilateral organisations about the findings. In 2010, MOPAN will survey the Asian Development Bank, WHO, UNEPA, and IFAD in ten partner countries. The 2009 survey examined the World Bank, UNDP, the African Development Bank and UNICEF in nine partner countries. This year's survey will also take into consideration a review of documents published by each of these organisations.

The DAC Evaluation Network is developing an approach, led by Canada, on how to jointly assess the effectiveness of individual multilateral partners by bringing together evaluators, multilateral policy department staff, and representatives from multilateral organisations and MOPAN. The approach will draw on existing data and information, such as the different reviews and reports in order to avoid duplication of work, evaluation fatigue, and to lessen the burden placed on multilaterals for information. In short, the assumption is that when organisational effectiveness, as surveyed by MOPAN, is deemed adequate by donors, meta-evaluations will provide additional information on development effectiveness. If the MOPAN survey or the new approach developed cannot shed enough light on the effectiveness of a particular multilateral, a more important joint evaluation of that multilateral may be considered in order to acquire further information on development effectiveness. The approach is seen as an interim solution as, in the long run, the approach should lead to improved results reporting on development effectiveness by the multilaterals themselves.

of “aid scepticism” the public believed multilateral organisations were more efficient and preferable to bilateral assistance (Milner, 2006).²

As discussed in the last multilateral aid report, reporting by multilateral agencies would ideally be sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy bilateral donor information requirements and would make separate donor-driven assessments unnecessary. The multilateral development banks’ Common Performance Assessment System (COMPAS) is a joint effort to improve the reporting of results. The latest report (2008) records progress towards harmonisation in the area of evaluation, but also identifies greater scope for the harmonisation of monitoring development results.

A shift towards self-reporting by multilaterals would be a way to apply the Paris Declaration Principles of “ownership” and “alignment” to their funding. Until self-reporting is deemed adequate, however, collective assessments intended to lead to the full harmonisation of monitoring instruments for multilaterals are at least an improvement over a proliferation of single-donor assessment efforts. Such harmonised efforts include the Multilateral Organisations’ Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), and the work of the DAC’s Evaluation Network. The latter is involved in peer reviewing organisations’ evaluation capacities. It is also developing an approach to jointly assessing the development effectiveness of multilateral partners by combining elements of MOPAN assessments with reviews of organisations’ own evaluations of development results at country level (see Box 6.2).

Main findings

- In the longer term, self-assessments by multilateral agencies should be sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy bilateral donor information requirements and to make separate bilateral evaluations and/or assessments unnecessary.
- Until self-reporting is deemed adequate, collective assessments designed to achieve the full harmonisation of monitoring instruments for multilaterals are encouraged as an improvement over multiple single-donor assessment efforts.

Questions for future policy discussions

- Future efforts by the DAC’s Evaluation Network and MOPAN aim to combine surveys of multilateral effectiveness with better impact reporting by the multilaterals themselves. Is this the right mix?
- Bilateral donors have reported an inability to demonstrate multilateral effectiveness. Is this primarily due to underlying multilateral performance problems, lack of robust data, or communication gaps?

Notes

1. UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNCDF, UNEP, OHCHR, OCHA, UNRWA, UNAIDS, FAO, WHO, ILO, the World Bank, CGIAR, IOM, ICRC, the Global Fund, WFP.
2. In “Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems”, Milner argues that donor governments use foreign aid to advance their own interests, while the general public are more interested in addressing the needs of recipient countries or – perhaps more likely – are reluctant to give their tax dollars to when they have a difficult time monitoring the government. On the other hand, multilateral organisations are seen as providing more needs-based aid and cannot easily be controlled by just one donor. Therefore, when people are more sceptical about aid, the government finds that it is in its interest to give more.
3. Members as of April 2010 include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

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
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
Annex A

Figure A.1 **Gross multilateral ODA of DAC members**
Three-year annual average (2006-8), constant 2008 USD



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Figure A.2 **DAC multilateral ODA to EU Institutions as % of gross ODA**
Three-year annual average (2006-8), constant 2008 USD (excluding debt relief)



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Table A.1 **Non-DAC ODA**

Three year annual average (2006-08), USD million in constant 2008 USD (excluding debt relief)

Non-DAC Donor	Total ODA	Bilateral ODA	Multilateral ODA	Multilateral as share of gross ODA (%)
Cyprus ^a	35	20	15	42
Czech Republic	216	95	121	56
Estonia	18	4	15	80
Hungary	139	54	85	61
Latvia	17	2	15	87
Lithuania	42	16	26	61
Poland	406	149	257	63
Romania ^b	123	27	96	78
Slovak Republic	83	36	47	56
Slovenia	58	24	34	59
<i>EU 10 total (excl. Malta)</i>	<i>1 137</i>	<i>427</i>	<i>710</i>	<i>62</i>
Chinese Taipei	488	464	24	5
Iceland	41	30	11	27
Israel ^c	119	102	17	14
Korea ^d	641	460	180	28
Liechtenstein	14	13	1	10
Thailand	111	101	10	9
Turkey	770	703	67	9
<i>Non-DAC (excl. Kuwait, Saudi, UAE)</i>	<i>3 321</i>	<i>2 300</i>	<i>1 020</i>	<i>31</i>
Kuwait	570	568	1	0
Saudi Arabia	3 481	3 449	33	1
United Arab Emirates	368	368	-	-

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010

- a. Footnote by the European Union, Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document under the heading "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus" issue.

- b. Romania started reporting to the DAC in 2008. Therefore, the data above includes just one year of reporting.
- c. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
- d. Korea acceded to the DAC on 25 November 2009.

Table A.2 **DAC countries' burden sharing of global multilateral agencies over the five-year period 2004-08**
(In constant 2008 USD million)



	Multilateral ODA 2004-2008	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA	EU Institutions	IDA	UN funds and programmes ^a	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			15	23	23	21	18	22
Non-EU members	44 962	28%	n.a.	45%	41%	44%	37%	62%
Australia	1 772	1%	n.a.	2%	1%	1%	n.a.	7%
Canada	5 673	4%	n.a.	5%	5%	5%	7%	6%
Japan	15 057	9%	n.a.	16%	11%	5%	9%	34%
New Zealand	322	0%	n.a.	0%	0%	0%	n.a.	1%
Norway	4 932	3%	n.a.	2%	13%	2%	6%	1%
Switzerland	2 309	1%	n.a.	3%	3%	0%	3%	1%
United States	14 899	9%	n.a.	17%	7%	30%	11%	13%
EU members	115 529	72%	100%	54%	59%	56%	62%	35%
Austria	2 318	1%	2%	1%	1%	n.a.	2%	1%
Belgium	4 037	3%	4%	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Denmark	4 933	3%	2%	1%	8%	2%	2%	1%
Finland	2 083	1%	2%	1%	3%	0%	1%	0%
France	20 556	13%	20%	7%	3%	18%	13%	5%
Germany	21 306	13%	22%	13%	3%	7%	10%	6%
Greece	1 390	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	n.a.	n.a.
Ireland	1 756	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	n.a.	1%
Italy	13 678	8%	13%	4%	3%	9%	6%	6%
Luxembourg	562	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	n.a.	1%
Netherlands	8 609	5%	5%	3%	12%	4%	4%	3%
Portugal	1 089	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Spain	8 967	6%	8%	4%	3%	4%	5%	4%
Sweden	6 466	4%	3%	3%	12%	4%	5%	2%
United Kingdom	17 780	11%	15%	12%	8%	7%	10%	5%
DAC Total excl. Korea	160 491	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%	97%
Korea	938	1%	n.a.	1%	0%	n.a.	1%	3%

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010

a Includes UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP and UNRWA. Excludes Specialised Agencies and UNCTAD, UNDCP, UNEP, UNIFEM, UNV, UNCDF and UN-Habitat for which core contributions are not disaggregated in the DAC database

Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding-off



Figure A.3. Distribution of aid by sector

2008 bilateral ODA by sector (not including Korea)Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2008 prices)**Total bilateral ODA = USD 88 billion****2008 multilateral outflows by sector**Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(In constant 2008 prices)**Total multilateral outflows = USD 31 billion**

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.

Note: EU Institutions are included in multilateral outflows. Data on multilateral outflows are incomplete. Approximately 23 major multilateral organisations report their outflows.

Figure A.4. Distribution of aid by partner country income

2008 bilateral ODA (not including Korea)Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(Constant 2008 prices)**Total bilateral ODA = USD 88 billion****2008 multilateral outflows**Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(Constant 2008 prices)**Total multilateral outflows = USD 31 billion**

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2010.


Note: EU Institutions are included in multilateral outflows. Data on multilateral outflows are incomplete. Approximately 23 major multilateral organisations report their outflows to the DAC.

Figure A.5 Distribution of aid by conflict/fragility status

2008 bilateral ODA


Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(Constant 2008 prices)

Total allocated bilateral ODA = USD 69 billion

**2008 multilateral outflows**

Gross disbursements, excluding debt relief
(Constant 2008 prices)

Total allocated multilateral outflows = USD 29 billion



Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System, 2010


Note: Total allocated bilateral ODA does not include ODA or outflows to “unallocated or unspecified” recipients. EU Institutions are included in multilateral outflows. Data on multilateral outflows are incomplete. Approximately 23 major multilateral organisations report their outflows to the DAC.

Table A.3. **DAC gross multilateral ODA**

Three-year annual average (2006-8) disbursements, USD million in constant 2008 prices

DAC country	EU Institutions	The World Bank Group	UN funds and programmes	Other UN	Regional dev. banks	The Global Fund	Other multilateral agencies	Multilateral ODA, total
Australia	-	175	22	41	71	22	42	372
Austria	286	120	17	24	31	-	18	496
Belgium	502	175	35	31	45	16	35	839
Canada	-	451	144	128	241	119	148	1 231
Denmark	265	148	255	114	65	30	94	971
Finland	195	48	91	46	35	2	36	453
France	2 398	560	102	157	243	383	424	4 278
Germany	2 663	1 004	89	195	275	174	134	4 535
Greece	226	47	3	13	15	0	14	318
Ireland	144	78	89	45	14	19	19	409
Italy	1 642	291	88	202	127	183	102	2 644
Japan	-	1 433	189	435	534	118	354	3 063
Luxembourg	34	21	19	33	9	3	6	126
Netherlands	588	207	396	164	85	98	97	1 636
New Zealand	-	11	20	13	7	-	19	68
Norway	-	153	399	155	105	59	85	955
Portugal	155	25	4	8	27	3	7	229
Spain	1 027	318	142	146	161	114	127	2 035
Sweden	329	237	436	159	124	101	66	1 452
Switzerland	-	189	104	45	64	6	67	476
United Kingdom	1 886	1 023	275	257	296	156	140	4 023
United States	-	946	235	445	245	644	301	2 817
Total DAC	12 340	7 662	3 152	2 856	2 809	2 272	2 336	33 427
Korea	-	51	7	35	74	-	12	180
Share of total multilateral ODA (%)	37	23	9	9	8	7	7	100

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Figure A 6. **DAC multilateral ODA allocations (1989-2008) grouped by five year averages**

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

Table A.4 2008 concentration ratios of multilateral and bilateral donors in low-income countries

DAC donors and major multilateral agencies	Number of "significant" relationships	Number of "non-significant" relationships	Total relationships (number of partner countries)	Concentration ratio ("broad" definition)
	A	B	(A+B)	(A) / (A+B)
CarDB	1	0	1	100%
EBRD	3	0	3	100%
IDB Sp.Fund	1	0	1	100%
EC	57	4	61	93%
IDA	48	4	52	92%
A/DF	29	4	33	88%
UNDP	49	7	56	88%
IMF (SAF,ESAF,PRGF)	20	3	23	87%
Germany	38	9	47	81%
United States	43	11	54	80%
AsDF	15	4	19	79%
Global Fund	41	11	52	79%
Austria	11	3	14	79%
Japan	43	12	55	78%
United Kingdom	29	9	38	76%
UNICEF	42	14	56	75%
UNAIDS	34	12	46	74%
UNFPA	41	15	56	73%
New Zealand	13	5	18	72%
Portugal	7	3	10	70%
Nordic Dev.Fund	11	5	16	69%
Ireland	13	6	19	68%
Netherlands	21	10	31	68%
Sweden	21	12	33	64%
IFAD	26	16	42	62%
Arab Agencies	28	18	46	61%
UNTA	37	24	61	61%
GAVI	31	22	53	58%
France	27	22	49	55%
Switzerland	19	16	35	54%
Denmark	17	18	35	49%
Australia	14	15	29	48%
Canada	24	26	50	48%
GEF	10	11	21	48%
Luxembourg	10	12	22	45%
Belgium	14	17	31	45%
Finland	15	19	34	44%
Norway	17	25	42	40%
Spain	17	26	43	40%
Korea	11	23	34	32%
Greece	2	5	7	29%
Italy	12	31	43	28%
Montreal Protocol	0	1	1	0%
UNRWA	0	0	0	n.a.
Multilateral	524	175	699	75%
Bilateral	438	335	773	57%
Total	962	510	1472	65%

Source: 2009 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Fragmentation and Concentration of Aid across Countries, OECD 2009

Table A.5. **DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five-year period 2004-8**

(In constant 2008 USD million)

	Multilateral ODA 2004-2008	Donor's share of global multilateral ODA	EU institutions	IDA	UN funds and programmes**	Global Fund	AfDB	AsDB	% allocated to largest six multilateral clusters
<i>Number of DAC donors</i>			15	23	23	21	18	22	
Non-EU members	44 962	28%	n.a.	34%	15%	8%	6%	7%	72%
Australia	1 772	1%	n.a.	42%	7%	5%	n.a.	20%	74%
Canada	5 673	4%	n.a.	32%	13%	8%	8%	6%	69%
Japan	15 057	8%	n.a.	36%	12%	3%	5%	12%	67%
New Zealand	322	0%	n.a.	16%	26%	1%	n.a.	11%	52%
Norway	4 832	3%	n.a.	16%	45%	4%	9%	1%	75%
Switzerland	2 309	1%	n.a.	40%	23%	1%	10%	3%	77%
United States	14 889	8%	n.a.	38%	8%	19%	5%	5%	75%
EU members	115 529	72%	51%	16%	8%	5%	4%	2%	88%
Austria	2 318	1%	60%	20%	4%	n.a.	5%	2%	91%
Belgium	4 037	3%	58%	21%	4%	2%	4%	1%	91%
Denmark	4 933	3%	26%	10%	26%	3%	3%	1%	71%
Finland	2 083	1%	44%	11%	22%	0%	5%	1%	83%
France	20 556	13%	58%	12%	2%	8%	4%	1%	86%
Germany	21 306	13%	61%	21%	2%	3%	4%	1%	92%
Greece	1 390	1%	77%	11%	1%	0%	n.a.	n.a.	89%
Ireland	1 756	1%	38%	16%	22%	3%	n.a.	2%	82%
Italy	13 678	8%	58%	11%	3%	6%	3%	2%	84%
Luxembourg	562	0%	26%	8%	15%	2%	n.a.	10%	66%
Netherlands	8 609	5%	32%	13%	23%	4%	4%	2%	79%
Portugal	1 089	1%	70%	10%	2%	1%	6%	3%	93%
Spain	8 967	6%	55%	14%	5%	4%	4%	2%	85%
Sweden	6 466	4%	23%	17%	31%	6%	6%	1%	84%
United Kingdom	17 780	11%	46%	22%	8%	4%	4%	1%	88%
DAC Total excl. Korea	160 491	89%	37%	21%	10%	6%	4%	3%	82%
Korea	838	1%	n.a.	32%	4%	n.a.	7%	17%	61%

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics, 2010.

* Includes UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, WFP and UNRWA. Excludes Specialised Agencies and UNCTAD, UNDCP, UNEP, UNIFEM, UNV, UNCDF and UN-Habitat for which core contributions are not disaggregated in the DAC database.

Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding-off.

Table A.6 **DAC gross multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA disbursements**

2006-2008, USD million in constant 2008 prices

	2006	2007	2008
Total core multilateral aid			
DAC Countries	32 547	32 455	35 305
DAC Countries (excluding to EU institutions)	20 864	20 158	22 266
EU Institutions	656	331	324
Korea	100	177	263
Total non-core multilateral aid*			
DAC Countries	12 000	11 466	14 195
DAC Countries (excluding to EU institutions)	11 952	11 435	14 056
EU Institutions	1 906	1 524	1 807
Korea	6	17	33
Total use of the multilateral system			
DAC Countries	44 547	43 851	49 500
DAC Countries (excluding to EU institutions)	32 826	31 592	36 321
EU Institutions	2 562	1 855	2 130
Korea	107	194	296
Core as share of total use of the multilateral system (%)			
DAC Countries	73	74	71
DAC Countries (excluding to EU institutions)	64	64	61
EU Institutions	26	18	15
Korea	94	91	89
Non-core as share of total use of multilateral system (%)			
DAC Countries	27	26	29
DAC Countries (excluding to EU institutions)	36	36	39
EU Institutions	74	82	85
Korea	6	9	11
Total use of multilateral system as % of total ODA			
DAC Countries	41	39	40
EU Institutions	20	15	14
Korea	23	31	36
Total non-core as % of total ODA			
DAC Countries	11	10	11
EU Institutions	15	12	12
Korea	1	3	4

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System

* Non-core data for 2006 are commitments, not disbursements.

Annex B

Methodology Note: Data on non-core multilateral aid can be found in the Creditor Reporting System database. Non-core multilateral aid is reported as bilateral aid, with a multilateral agency identified in the channel code. A few donors do not provide detailed channel codes beyond the overall multilateral code of 40000. For this reason, an attempt was made to examine the channel names of bilateral ODA flows in order to gain a more accurate picture of 2008 non-core multilateral disbursements for this report. As a result, queries of the Creditor Reporter System may yield slight discrepancies with the tables presented in Annex B.

Table B.1 2008 DAC gross multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA disbursements

USD million in constant 2008 prices (excluding debt relief)

Donor	Total bilateral aid	(A)	of which: channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core)	(B)	Total core multilateral aid	(C)	Total use of the multilateral system	(B+C)	Core multilateral as share of total ODA (%)	(C/(A+C))	Core and non-core as share of total ODA (%)	(B+C)/(A+C)	Core as share of total use of the multilateral system (%)	(C/(B+C))
Australia	2 361		563		337		900		13		33		37	
Austria	508		80		480		560		49		57		86	
Belgium	1 378		180		1 010		1 189		42		50		85	
Canada	3 263		814		1 428		2 243		30		48		84	
Denmark	1 765		98		975		1 073		36		39		91	
Finland	691		200		473		673		41		58		70	
France	6 875		45		4 643		4 687		41		41		99	
Germany	7 753		348		4 918		5 267		39		42		93	
Greece	312		23		391		414		56		59		94	
Ireland	931		215		397		613		30		46		85	
Italy	1 174		276		3 022		3 299		72		79		92	
Japan	11 892		1 085		2 756		3 841		19		26		72	
Luxembourg	279		57		136		193		33		47		71	
Netherlands	5 366		1 132		1 793		2 925		25		41		61	
New Zealand	278		47		70		117		20		34		60	
Norway	2 993		983		928		1 911		24		49		49	
Portugal	379		31		247		278		39		44		89	
Spain	4 724		1 913		2 085		3 978		30		59		52	
Sweden	3 145		726		1 589		2 315		34		49		69	
Switzerland	1 463		209		487		696		25		36		70	
United Kingdom	7 260		1 554		4 167		5 721		36		50		73	
United States	24 430		3 614		2 992		6 606		11		24		45	
Total DAC	89 020		14 195		35 305		49 500		28		40		71	
Korea	568		33		263		296		32		36		89	
EU Institutions*	14 655		1 807		324		2 130		2		14		15	

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics (columns A & C) and Creditor Reporting System (column B)

* The DAC is currently looking into the nature of EU Institutions' multilateral aid and how this should be classified, in particular to UN agencies, funds and programmes and to multilateral development banks.

Table B.2 2008 DAC gross multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA disbursements (excluding to and through EU Institutions)
USD million in constant 2008 prices (excluding debt relief)

Donor	Total bilateral aid (A)	of which: channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core) excl. through EU Institutions (B)	Total core multilateral aid excl. to EU Institutions (C)	Total use of the multilateral system, excluding to and through EU Institutions (B+C)	Core multilateral excl. to EU Institutions as share of total ODA excl. to EU Institutions (%)	Core and non-core excl. to EU Institutions as share of total ODA excl. EU Institutions (%)	Core excl. to EU Institutions as share of total use of the multilateral system excl. to EU Institutions (%)
Australia	2 351	563	337	900	13	33	37
Austria	492	64	187	251	27	36	74
Belgium	1 363	165	460	626	25	34	74
Canada	3 263	814	1 428	2 243	30	48	64
Denmark	1 765	98	704	803	29	32	88
Finland	682	191	261	453	27	48	58
France	6 675	45	2 115	2 159	24	25	98
Germany	7 753	349	2 106	2 455	21	25	86
Greece	300	11	152	164	33	35	93
Ireland	931	215	242	458	21	39	53
Italy	1 174	276	1 309	1 586	53	64	83
Japan	11 892	1 085	2 756	3 841	19	26	72
Luxembourg	278	57	101	158	27	42	64
Netherlands	5 344	1 111	1 163	2 274	18	35	51
New Zealand	278	47	70	117	20	34	60
Norway	2 990	979	928	1 907	24	49	49
Portugal	378	30	86	115	18	25	74
Spain	4 688	1 876	1 029	2 905	18	50	35
Sweden	3 127	708	1 219	1 927	28	44	63
Switzerland	1 463	209	487	696	25	36	70
United Kingdom	7 253	1 547	2 134	3 681	23	39	58
United States	24 430	3 614	2 992	6 606	11	24	45
Total DAC	88 681	14 056	22 266	36 321	20	33	61
Korea	568	33	263	296	32	36	89
EU Institutions*	14 655	1 807	324	2 130	2	14	15

Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics (columns A & C) and Creditor Reporting System (column B)

* The DAC is currently looking into the nature of EU Institutions' multilateral aid and how this should be classified, in particular to UN agencies, funds and programmes and to multilateral development banks


Australia

Table B 3 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

World Bank Group	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
UN funds & programmes*	41	235
of which:		
WFP	-	104
UNDP	10	56
UNICEF	12	47
UNHCR	7	15
UNRWA	7	10
UNFPA	5	3
Other UN	55	47
of which:		
WHO	24	12
Regional development banks	34	42
Other multilaterals	61	25
Total	337	563

Figure B 1 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

Table B 4 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

Australia	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	146
Country/region specific	416
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	135
Middle East	45
North & Central America	0.02
North of Sahara	0.2
Oceania	56
South & Central Asia	143
South of Sahara	37
South America	-
Europe	-
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	162
Economic infrastructure and services	49
Production sectors	19
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	88
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	83
Humanitarian aid	162
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	214
Other	156


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Austria

Table B 5 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	283	16
World Bank Group	122	23
UN funds & programmes*	20	13
of which:		
UNDP	9	4
UNRWA	1	4
WFP	6	2
UNHCR	1	2
UNICEF	2	1
UNFPA	2	1
Other UN of which:	22	9
ILO	0.5	1
Regional development banks	9	5
Other multilaterals	14	14
Total	480	80

Figure B 2. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 6 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Austria
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	15
Country/region specific	85
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	1
Middle East	6
North & Central America	3
North of Sahara	1
Oceania	24
South & Central Asia	13
South of Sahara	15
South America	0.1
Europe	1
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	25
Economic infrastructure and services	27
Production sectors	7
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	12
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	1
Humanitarian aid	9
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	9
Other	24

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries


Belgium

Table B.7 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

EU institutions	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	549	14
UN funds & programmes*	275	8
of which:	40	84
WFP	1	30
UNDP	20	24
UNHCR	5	15
UNICEF	5	10
UNRWA	5	5
UNFPA	4	1
Other UN	38	56
of which:		
FAO	3	14
WHO	4	7
ILO	1	6
IFAD	5	6
Regional development banks	43	-
Other multilaterals	64	17
Total	1010	180

Figure B.3 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

Table B.8 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

Belgium	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	34 19%
Country/region specific	146 81%
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	3 2%
Middle East	25 17%
North & Central America	0 0.3%
North of Sahara	1 0.7%
Oceania	1 0.9%
South & Central Asia	12 8%
South of Sahara	100 68%
South America	3 2%
Europe	0.04 0.03%
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	59 33%
Economic infrastructure and services	8 4%
Production sectors	18 10%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	25 14%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	0.002 0.001%
Humanitarian aid	70 39%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	97 79%
Other	26 21%

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC numbers' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Table B.9 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	689	138
UN funds & programmes*	130	505
WFP	18	251
UNDP	53	122
UNICEF	17	89
UNHCR	13	27
UNRWA	14	10
UNFPA	16	8
Other UN	99	112
of which:		
WHO	-	23
FAO	7	6
ILO	2	1
Regional development banks	286	10
Other multilaterals	225	50
Total	1428	814

Figure B.4 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)




Table B.10 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Canada
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	33
Country/region specific	782
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	53
Middle East	47
North & Central America	71
North of Sahara	1
Oceania	4
South & Central Asia	202
South of Sahara	369
South America	37
Europe	-
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	424
Economic infrastructure and services	37
Production sectors	18
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	4
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	85
Humanitarian aid	246
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	516
Other	161


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Denmark

Table B 11 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	271	0.1
World Bank Group	183	2
UN funds & programmes*	233	74
of which:		
UNHCR	28	27
UNICEF	35	22
WFP	38	14
UNDP	74	5
UNFPA	45	4
UNRWA	14	2
Other UN	113	11
of which:		
FAO	2	0.3
Regional development banks	44	-
Other multilaterals	130	11
Total	975	98

Figure B 5 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 12 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Denmark	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	17	17%
Country/region specific	81	83%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	4	5%
Middle East	9	11%
North & Central America	0.3	0.4%
North of Sahara	0.0002	0.0002%
Oceania	-	0%
South & Central Asia	20	24%
South of Sahara	48	59%
South America	1	1%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	31	31%
Economic infrastructure and services	0.4	0.4%
Production sectors	1	1%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	5	5%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	-	0%
Humanitarian aid	61	62%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	55	83%
Other	11	17%

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC numbers' reporting: UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

European Union Institutions

Table B.13. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	95	278
UN funds & programmes* of which:		
UNDP	-	314
WFP	-	314
UNHCR	-	120
UNRWA	95	85
UNICEF	-	82
UNFPA	-	16
Other UN of which:	2	476
FAO	1	79
Regional development banks	-	65
Other multilaterals	226	57
Total	324	1807

Figure B.6 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)




Table B.14. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	EU Institutions
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	150
Country/region specific	1 656
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	146
Middle East	156
North & Central America	24
North of Sahara	48
Oceania	82
South & Central Asia	472
South of Sahara	691
South America	32
Europe	4
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	579
Economic infrastructure and services	52
Production sectors	80
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	131
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	147
Humanitarian aid	818
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	815
Other	602


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Finland

Table B.15. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

EU institutions	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	211	9
UN funds & programmes*	36	35
of which:	92	61
WFP	9	19
UNHCR	10	15
UNDP	25	10
UNICEF	22	8
UNFPA	23	7
UNRWA	4	2
Other UN	40	54
of which:		
WHO	2	9
IFAD	-	3
FAO	2	1
ILO	0.3	1
Regional development banks	47	9
Other multilaterals	46	33
Total	473	200

Figure B.7. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.16. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Finland	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	77	38%
Country/region specific	123	61%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	14	11%
Middle East	10	8%
North & Central America	3	2%
North of Sahara	0.4	0.4%
Oceania	0.1	0.1%
South & Central Asia	41	33%
South of Sahara	46	37%
South America	8	6%
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	84	32%
Economic infrastructure and services	4	2%
Production sectors	32	16%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	33	17%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	0	0%
Humanitarian aid	66	33%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	52	64%
Other	29	36%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

France

Table B.17 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	2628	-
World Bank Group	540	-
UN funds & programmes*	102	37
of which:		
WFP	5	32
UNRWA	9	4
UNICEF	18	1
Other UN of which:	172	7
ILO	4	4
FAO	16	3
Regional development banks	244	-
Other multilaterals	1056	-
Total	4643	45

Figure B.8 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.18 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	France
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	-
Country/region specific	45
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	-
Middle East	8
North & Central America	4
North of Sahara	-
Oceania	-
South & Central Asia	6
South of Sahara	27
South America	-
Europe	-
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	4
Economic infrastructure and services	-
Production sectors	-
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	-
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	41
Humanitarian aid	-
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	40
Other	1


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Germany

Table B 19 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	2813	9
World Bank Group	1136	15
UN funds & programmes*	93	131
of which:		
WFP	-	80
UNDP	41	35
UNHCR	8	11
UNRWA	10	2
UNFPA	26	2
UNICEF	8	1
Other UN	202	66
of which:		
FAO	21	14
WHO	31	10
ILO	4	8
UNESCO	14	1
Regional development banks	270	-
Other multilaterals	405	128
Total	4918	349

Figure B.9 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 20 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Germany	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	99	28%
Country/region specific	250	72%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	12	5%
Middle East	22	9%
North & Central America	1	0.5%
North of Sahara	16	7%
Oceania	1	1%
South & Central Asia	101	40%
South of Sahara	91	36%
South America	6	2%
Europe	0.2	0.1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	111	32%
Economic infrastructure and services	35	10%
Production sectors	31	9%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	23	7%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	33	10%
Humanitarian aid	115	33%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	140	65%
Other	75	35%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Greece

Table B 21. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	239	-
World Bank Group	80	0.3
UN funds & programmes*	2	17
of which:		
WFP	-	10
UNDP	1	5
UNHCR	1	1
UNICEF	0.3	1
Other UN	13	4
of which:		
FAO	1	1
WHO	2	1
UNESCO	1	0.2
Regional development banks	-	-
Other multilaterals	58	2
Total	391	23

Figure B 10. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 22. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Greece	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	5	20%
Country/region specific	18	80%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	1	8%
Middle East	2	9%
North & Central America	1	3.6%
North of Sahara	0.1	0.3%
Oceania	0.1	0.4%
South & Central Asia	4	20%
South of Sahara	11	59%
South America	-	0%
Europe	0.01	0.1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	7	31%
Economic infrastructure and services	0.1	1%
Production sectors	3	11%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	-	0%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	6	26%
Humanitarian aid	7	31%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	9	61%
Other	6	39%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Ireland

Table B.23. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

EU institutions	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	165	0.03
UN funds & programmes* of which:	46	31
UNDP	32	35
WFP	14	22
UNICEF	24	15
UNHCR	18	12
UNFPA	8	3
Other UN of which:	31	81
WHO	2	13
ILO	0.3	5
FAO	1	4
UNESCO	0.4	1
Regional development banks	11	-
Other multilaterals	53	16
Total	397	215

Figure B.11. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.24. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Ireland
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	59
Country/region specific	156
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	28
Middle East	3
North & Central America	1
North of Sahara	-
Oceania	3
South & Central Asia	13
South of Sahara	109
South America	-
Europe	-
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	82
Economic infrastructure and services	3
Production sectors	14
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	2
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	1
Humanitarian aid	114
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	81
Other	32


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Italy

Table B.25. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	1713	-
World Bank Group	645	50
UN funds & programmes* of which:	58	95
WFP	32	45
UNDP	8	28
UNICEF	5	16
UNHCR	9	4
UNRWA	-	2
UNFPA	3	1
Other UN of which:	152	31
FAO	57	7
WHO	25	4
ILO	-	2
UNESCO	11	1
Regional development banks	339	2
Other multilaterals	116	99
Total	3022	276

Figure B.12. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.26. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Italy	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	5	2%
Country/region specific	271	98%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	7	3%
Middle East	67	25%
North & Central America	6	2%
North of Sahara	12	5%
Oceania	2	1%
South & Central Asia	77	28%
South of Sahara	81	30%
South America	19	7%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	115	42%
Economic infrastructure and services	3	1%
Production sectors	24	9%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	66	24%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	38	14%
Humanitarian aid	31	11%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	168	70%
Other	72	30%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Japan

Table B 27. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	1251	0.3
UN funds & programmes*	147	615
of which:		
WFP	10	191
UNDP	73	165
UNICEF	23	135
UNHCR	10	107
UNRWA	-	9
UNFPA	31	8
Other UN	434	62
of which:		
UNESCO	26	14
FAO	41	7
ILO	9	2
WHO	41	1
Regional development banks	581	290
Other multilaterals	343	118
Total	2756	1055

Figure B 13. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 28. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Japan	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	3	0%
Country/region specific	1 082	100%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	21	2%
Middle East	52	5%
North & Central America	8	1%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Oceania	79	7%
South & Central Asia	168	16%
South of Sahara	753	70%
South America	1	0.1%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	210	19%
Economic infrastructure and services	290	27%
Production sectors	98	9%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	92	9%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	166	15%
Humanitarian aid	228	21%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	483	86%
Other	83	14%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Korea

Table B 29 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	79	2
UN funds & programmes*	9	9
of which:		
UNDP	4	4
WFP	0.1	2
UNICEF	3	2
UNFPA	0.1	1
UNHCR	2	0.4
Other UN	37	13
of which:		
WHO	8	2
ILO	1	1
UNESCO	3	1
FAO	3	1
IFAD	1	0.3
Regional development banks	126	0.2
Other multilaterals	12	10
Total	263	33

Figure B 14 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 30 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Korea	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	13	40%
Country/region specific	20	60%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	11	57%
Middle East	0.2	1%
North & Central America	0.03	0.1%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Oceania	0.3	1%
South & Central Asia	1	6%
South of Sahara	7	33%
South America	0.3	1.3%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	12	36%
Economic infrastructure and services	5	14%
Production sectors	2	6%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	8	23%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	2	5%
Humanitarian aid	6	17%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	4	79%
Other	1	21%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Luxembourg

Table B 31. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	35	0.2
World Bank Group	16	1
UN funds & programmes*	36	44
of which:		
UNDP	12	12
UNFPA	7	11
WFP	4	9
UNHCR	3	8
UNICEF	7	3
UNRWA	3	2
Other UN	33	10
of which:		
FAO	0.2	3
ILO	1	2
WHO	12	2
IFAD	1	0.2
Regional development banks	2	-
Other multilaterals	15	1
Total	136	57

Figure B 15 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 32. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Luxembourg	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	2	3%
Country/region specific	55	97%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	10	18%
Middle East	2	3%
North & Central America	3	6%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Oceania	0.2	0.4%
South & Central Asia	7	12%
South of Sahara	33	60%
South America	1	1%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	29	51%
Economic infrastructure and services	1	1%
Production sectors	4	7%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	0.4	1%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	3	5%
Humanitarian aid	20	36%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	16	32%
Other	35	68%

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Netherlands

Table B 33. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	630	21
World Bank Group	316	325
UN funds & programmes*	408	387
of which:		
UNDP	133	175
UNICEF	50	124
UNFPA	44	44
WFP	58	25
UNHCR	61	10
UNRWA	22	9
Other UN of which:	167	276
FAO	6	21
WHO	30	18
UNESCO	2	9
ILO	11	6
IFAD	25	1
Regional development banks	0.4	38
Other multilaterals	272	85
Total	1783	1132

Figure B 16. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)




Table B 34. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Netherlands	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	328	29%
Country/region specific	804	71%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	135	17%
Middle East	49	6%
North & Central America	17	2%
North of Sahara	3	0.4%
Oceania	8	1%
South & Central Asia	164	20%
South of Sahara	406	50%
South America	16	2%
Europe	7	1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	603	53%
Economic infrastructure and services	38	3%
Production sectors	38	3%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	64	6%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	71	6%
Humanitarian aid	317	28%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	499	66%
Other	258	34%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

New Zealand

Table B.35 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	13	8
UN funds & programmes*	18	20
of which:		
UNDP	6	10
WFP	5	5
UNICEF	3	3
UNHCR	-	1
UNFPA	3	1
Other UN	17	9
of which:		
UNESCO	0.4	3
WHO	2	2
FAO	1	1
ILO	0.1	1
Regional development banks	6	0.4
Other multilaterals	16	9
Total	70	47

Figure B.17 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.36 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	New Zealand	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	2	5%
Country/region specific	44	95%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	16	35%
Middle East	1	3%
North & Central America	0.1	0.2%
North of Sahara	0.1	0.3%
Oceania	16	36%
South & Central Asia	4	10%
South of Sahara	5	11%
South America	2	4%
Europe	-	0.1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	23	50%
Economic infrastructure and services	2	4%
Production sectors	6	12%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	3	7%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	2	5%
Humanitarian aid	10	22%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	12	46%
Other	14	54%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Norway

Table B 37 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

EU institutions	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	147	274
UN funds & programmes* of which:	360	364
UNDP	138	172
UNICEF	70	139
WFP	23	23
UNFPA	58	14
UNHCR	42	9
UNRWA	26	7
Other UN of which:	148	198
WHO	40	21
FAO	2	21
ILO	0.3	14
IFAD	12	5
Regional development banks	97	44
Other multilaterals	176	99
Total	928	983

Figure B 18. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 38. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

		Norway	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified		448	46%
Country/region specific		534	54%
REGIONS			
Far East Asia		32	6%
Middle East		76	14%
North & Central America		13	2.5%
North of Sahara		0.04	0.01%
Oceania		8	1%
South & Central Asia		152	29%
South of Sahara		241	45%
South America		11	2%
Europe		0.40	0%
SECTORS			
Social infrastructure and services		440	45%
Economic infrastructure and services		44	5%
Production sectors		73	7%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting		175	18%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance		58	6%
Humanitarian aid		193	20%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**			
Fragile		338	74%
Other		119	26%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC numbers' reporting: UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Portugal

Table B.39. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	160	1
World Bank Group	41	1
UN funds & programmes*	4	3
of which:		
UNDP	2	3
UNRWA	-	0.1
UNHCR	2	0.1
Other UN	7	25
of which:		
ILO	0.3	1
Regional development banks	24	-
Other multilaterals	11	0.4
Total	247	31

Figure B.19. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.40. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Portugal	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	1	4%
Country/region specific	30	96%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	18	62%
Middle East	0.1	0.3%
North & Central America	0.2	0.6%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Oceania	1	3%
South & Central Asia	3	12%
South of Sahara	7	22%
South America	-	0%
Europe	-	0%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	29	95%
Economic infrastructure and services	0.1	0.3%
Production sectors	-	0%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	1	2%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	-	0%
Humanitarian aid	1	3%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	23	82%
Other	5	18%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting: UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Spain

Table B 41. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	1037	37
World Bank Group	342	210
UN funds & programmes* of which:	149	696
UNDP	61	414
UNICEF	26	109
WFP	15	106
UNFPA	20	33
UNHCR	15	20
UNRWA	12	14
Other UN of which:	118	296
FAO	6	60
UNESCO	4	18
ILO	1	12
IFAD	7	5
Regional development banks	183	462
Other multilaterals	237	213
Total	2065	1913

Figure B 20 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 42. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Spain	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	337	18%
Country/region specific	1 575	82%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	128	8%
Middle East	94	6%
North & Central America	109	7%
North of Sahara	24	2%
Oceania	23	1%
South & Central Asia	82	5%
South of Sahara	442	28%
South America	672	43%
Europe	2	0.1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	1 106	58%
Economic infrastructure and services	52	3%
Production sectors	84	3%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	142	7%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	78	4%
Humanitarian aid	471	25%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	353	50%
Other	353	50%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Sweden

Table B.43. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	370	18
World Bank Group	320	116
UN funds & programmes*	429	243
of which:		
UNDP	108	97
UNICEF	69	90
UNRWA	41	25
UNHCR	84	18
WFP	67	8
UNFPA	60	5
Other UN	185	192
of which:		
FAO	3	30
WHO	3	24
UNESCO	2	5
ILO	1	3
Regional development banks	97	0.4
Other multilaterals	188	156
Total	1589	726

Figure B.21. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.44. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Sweden	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	180	22%
Country/region specific	586	78%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	59	10%
Middle East	37	6%
North & Central America	27	5%
North of Sahara	-	0%
Oceania	13	2%
South & Central Asia	149	26%
South of Sahara	256	45%
South America	20	4%
Europe	6	1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	384	50%
Economic infrastructure and services	36	5%
Production sectors	30	4%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	82	11%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	0.3	0.04%
Humanitarian aid	214	30%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	292	61%
Other	187	38%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

Switzerland

Table B.45 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	-	0.4
World Bank Group	186	49
UN funds & programmes*	107	81
of which:		
WFP	2	43
UNDP	49	17
UNHCR	11	12
UNICEF	18	4
UNRWA	14	4
UNFPA	13	0.3
Other UN of which:	51	45
FAO	3	5
WHO	10	4
ILO	1	2
UNESCO	2	0.4
IFAD	6	0.05
Regional development banks	59	2
Other multilaterals	85	32
Total	487	209

Figure B.22 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B.46 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	Switzerland	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	63	30%
Country/region specific	146	70%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	15	11%
Middle East	11	8%
North & Central America	9	6.5%
North of Sahara	3	2%
Oceania	6	4%
South & Central Asia	46	32%
South of Sahara	46	31%
South America	8	5%
Europe	1	1%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	55	26%
Economic infrastructure and services	34	16%
Production sectors	25	12%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	20	10%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	0.2	0.1%
Humanitarian aid	75	36%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	64	52%
Other	59	48%


* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

United Kingdom

Table B 47. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
EU institutions	2034	7
World Bank Group	1072	674
UN funds & programmes*	268	640
of which:		
UNDP	156	314
UNICEF	38	175
WFP	5	109
UNFPA	0	24
UNHCR	36	18
Other UN	201	165
of which:		
WHO	42	38
IFAD	28	10
FAO	6	5
ILO	6	1.3
UNESCO	10	0.5
Regional development banks	304	54
Other multilaterals	287	15
Total	4167	1554

Figure B 23. 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)Table B 48. 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	United Kingdom
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	293
Country/region specific	1 261
REGIONS	
Far East Asia	132
Middle East	95
North & Central America	15
North of Sahara	-
Oceania	0.4
South & Central Asia	398
South of Sahara	583
South America	1
Europe	-
SECTORS	
Social infrastructure and services	906
Economic infrastructure and services	86
Production sectors	76
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	43
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	32
Humanitarian aid	411
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**	
Fragile	839
Other	328

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category.

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries.

United States

Table B.49 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)

	Core contributions	Non-core contributions
World Bank Group	848	223
UN funds & programmes*	225	2 716
of which:		
WFP	-	1 768
UNHCR	-	509
UNICEF	128	199
UNRWA	-	185
UNDP	97	55
Other UN	487	308
of which:		
WHO	77	155
ILO	11	44
UNESCO	20	3
Regional development banks	241	-
Other multilaterals	1 210	368
Total	2 992	3 614

Figure B.24 2008 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA
(Gross disbursements in 2008 USD million)




Table B.50 2008 non-core multilateral ODA by region,
sector and fragility status
(In 2008 USD million)

	United States	
Bilateral, unallocated/unspecified	487	14%
Country/region specific	3 118	86%
REGIONS		
Far East Asia	125	4%
Middle East	483	15%
North & Central America	71	2%
North of Sahara	23	0.7%
Oceania	21	1%
South & Central Asia	533	17%
South of Sahara	1 775	57%
South America	86	3%
Europe	1	0.04%
SECTORS		
Social infrastructure and services	783	21%
Economic infrastructure and services	49	1%
Production sectors	68	2%
Multi-sector/cross-cutting	46	1%
Commodity aid/general programme assistance	16	0.4%
Humanitarian aid	2 673	74%
FRAGILE/CONFLICT**		
Fragile	2 103	83%
Other	435	17%

* Contributions to six UN Funds and Programmes are separately identifiable in DAC members' reporting. UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP, UNHCR and UNFPA. Other UN Funds and Programmes are aggregated into the "Other UN" category

** Based only on aid allocated to specific countries

Annex C

Table C.1. Potential source of climate change funding

Option	Estimated annual revenue (In USD billion)	Specific to mitigation, adaptation or technology	Under the Convention	Defined contribution	Go through government budget
Increasing the scale of existing mechanisms					
The GEF Trust Fund	Currently 0.25	N	Y	Y	Y
SCCF and LDCF	Currently 0.10	A	Y	N	Y
The CDM and other possible crediting mechanisms	Currently 3-10	M	Y	N	N
The Adaptation Fund	0.50-2	A	Y	N	N
New Bilateral and Multilateral Funds					
Coal Earth Initiative	2	N	N	N	Y
International Climate Protection Initiative	0.15	N	N	Y	Y
Clean Investment Fund	1-2	N	N	N	Y
Proposals funded by defined contributions from developed countries					
Convention Adaptation Fund, Technology Fund, and Insurance Mechanism		N	Y	Y	Y
Adaptation Fund and Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund	170	N	Y	Y	Y
Efficiency Penny	20	M	N	Y	Y
Proposals funded by contributions from developed and developing countries					
World Climate Change Fund	10	N	Y	Y	Y
Multilateral Adaptation Fund	18	A	Y	Y	Y
More stringent commitments by developed countries					
Auction of Assigned Amount Units	5	A	Y	Y	N
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions		M	Y	N	N
Other sources of funds					
Extension of the 2% levy on CDM to other market mechanisms	0.5 or 5	N	Y	Y	N
International air travel adaptation levy	13	A	N	Y	N
International maritime emission reduction scheme	3	N	N	Y	N
Auction of allowances for international aviation and marine emissions	20 to 40	N	N	N	N
Funds to invest foreign exchange reserves	Fund of up to 200	M	N	N	N
Access to renewables programmes in developed countries	0.5	M	N	N	N
Tobin Tax	15 to 20	N	N	Y	N
Donated special drawing rights (SDRs)	18	N	N	N	N
Debt-for-clean-energy swap		M	N	N	Y

Source: Hautes (2008). "Negotiations on Additional Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change in Developing Countries," UNDP New York, July, Table 6, p. 35

Note: A = Adaptation, M = Mitigation, N = No, and Y = Yes

Proposals for climate change funding

Chinese proposal for 0.5%-1% of GDP

Developed countries should annually provide funding to support action by developing countries to address climate change. The Chinese proposal of between 0.5% and 1% of GDP would generate between USD 185 and USD 402 billion per annum.

Mexican multilateral climate change fund

Contributions would be determined by a formula based on current GHG emissions, population, and gross domestic product. Developed-country withdrawals from the Fund would be limited to contributors. The Fund would aim to mobilise no less than USD 10 billion per annum. The poorest countries would have a quota of revenue from the fund at their disposal without being expected to contribute.

Carbon auction levy

Auction a percentage of annual emission allowances for climate change activities.

Clean development mechanism

Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the mechanism helps finance mitigation actions in developing countries through the sale of credits (CERs), each equivalent to one tonne of CO₂, for the certified emission reductions achieved. The credits issued for each project and the market price of CERs are readily available, but buyers often contract to purchase credits generated over a number of years early in the life of a project. Two percent of the share of proceeds of CERs issued for a CDM project activity goes to the **Adaptation Fund**. As of 16 September 2009, 1.13 million CERs had been sold, generating approximately USD 18.7 million in revenues.

Export credit agencies

(ECAs) typically provide loans or guarantees to facilitate exports to riskier markets.¹ Net export credits provided by, or on behalf of, OECD governments to developing countries are reported to the OECD. Long-term credits (repayment over five years or more) are reported with sector detail so it is possible to estimate the credits going to mitigation-relevant sectors. Between 2002 and 2008 an annual average of USD 16.9 billion (54% of the total) flowed to mitigation-relevant sectors. As with ODA, not all the funds intended for mitigation-relevant-sectors actually go to mitigation. For example, less than 20% of the credits for the energy sector go to “low-carbon energy technologies” including nuclear, hydro, geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and biomass.

Swiss global carbon adaptation tax proposal

Uniform global carbon tax of USD 2 per tonne of CO₂ on all fossil fuel emissions. Countries emitting less than 1.5 tonnes of CO₂ would be exempt from the tax. Expected revenues would be USD 48.5 billion per annum.

EU global climate financing mechanism

Building on the International Financing Facility, expand the global carbon market by issuing bonds to capital markets against legally binding pledges for future repayment by (donor) countries to frontload funding.

Norwegian proposal

At the international level, a small portion of “assigned amount units” could be withheld from national quota allocation and auctioned by the appropriate institution. Expected revenues would be USD 14 billion per annum.

Burden sharing mechanism

This mechanism, also known as the “Tuvalu Adaptation Blueprint”, consists of raising funds through levies on international aviation and maritime transport. Expected to raise USD 40 million from Annex II countries and USD 30 million from non-Annex I parties.

Proposals for climate change funding *(continued)*

International air travel adaptation levy

Raise funds by levying fees on international airline tickets. In this way, wealthy polluting individuals help the less well-off victims of air travel emissions. Expected to raise USD 8-10 billion per annum.

International maritime emission reduction schemes

A global levy on marine fuel bunkers to achieve GHG emission reductions in the maritime industry. The levy would use the global average price of carbon and could raise USD 9 billion annually if applied worldwide.

Source: UNEFCCC website, Muller (2008),³ and Climate Funds Update (www.climatefundsupdate.org)

Rio markers for climate change

When developed countries signed the three Rio Conventions in 1992, they agreed to support developing countries in implementing them. For the purposes of this report, monitoring data relative to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is the most relevant. Since 1998, the DAC has monitored aid targeting the objectives of the Rio Conventions by integrating the “Rio markers” into its Creditor Reporting System (CRS).


At the end of 2009, the World Bank started reporting its multilateral outflows using the Rio climate change markers. Other multilateral institutions (with the exception of EU Institutions) do not use the markers, but may choose to do so in the future. Other multilateral donors do not report data using the Rio markers. As with all policy markers, the Rio markers are not applicable to general budget support, which, by definition, is not allocated by sector. To date, Japan and Germany have combined accounts for the majority of flows marked for climate change. While adaptation activities are not yet separately identifiable in DAC statistics, members are working on a statistical marker to identify investments targeting climate change adaptation.

Figure C.1 shows trends in climate change aid from DAC members (including the EU Institutions) and the World Bank outflows. In 2008, total activities marked for climate change amounted to USD 7.7 billion, representing about 10.5% of total ODA that year. Given the relatively recent introduction of the climate change marker, however, it is difficult to determine trends at this early stage.

In practice, there are some limitations to the climate change marker because it is applicable only to mitigation.³ It is not applied to adaptation flows, which are efforts to adapt as a result of climate change, not an effort to change it. The DAC Secretariat is currently deciding how to implement the newly agreed adaptation marker. In addition, multilateral agencies (apart from EU Institutions and the World Bank) do not use the marker when they report their flows to the DAC.

The Rio markers underwent a long pilot phase and reporting is still incomplete. Three members (Norway, Luxembourg and the United States) did not use climate change markers in their reports to the CRS over the period 2005-8. Furthermore, care should be taken in comparing data across countries since each member could understand and apply the Rio marker, which is why this report does not include Rio marker information in cross-country comparisons. Nonetheless, marker data do give a better estimate of the policy objectives of aid, even if it does not allow for an automatic quantification of these flows.


Figure C.1 The use of the Rio climate change markers



Source: OECD DAC aggregate statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2009

Note: Does not include data for 1998 to 2001 from a special pilot study in 2002, which would increase the amounts from 1999-2001. Does not include data from Korea, which recorded USD 205 million for mitigation in 2008, or the World Bank (IDA), which for the years above disbursed USD 244 million marked for climate change mitigation.

Figure C.2 Shares by region in 2006-8 of Rio marker ODA
(In 2007 USD million)



Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2009


OECD climate change flows by destination and sector

ODA marked for climate change mitigation has tended to go to the Far East (e.g. China, Indonesia) or South and Central Asia (India), followed by sub-Saharan Africa and Europe (Turkey) and an equal share for North Africa. This is more or less in line with the mitigation disbursements from existing funds illustrated in the maps on the next two pages, which have gone primarily to middle-income countries.

Sector distribution of flows marked for climate change

Flows marked for climate change mitigation are mainly coded for the sectors of energy, transport, and environment multi-sector codes. This is logical considering the focus on climate change mitigation, and the objective of reducing sources of GHG by switching to more renewable energy sources, using fuels more efficiently, and enhancing sinks to remove more carbon dioxide from the air. (The environment multi-sector code could reasonably be expected to include some of these cross-cutting carbon capture or storage elements).


Figure C 3 The distribution of the climate change marker by sector, 2006-08 average
(In 2007 USD million)



Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System, 2009

Where climate change flows have gone so far:

Adaptation



Total disbursements for adaptation – USD 255.3 million

Disbursements for adaptation based on data from the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA), the LDC Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the MDG-Fund, and the GEF Trust Fund. Figures for countries refer to number of projects / programmes funded.

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat based on data from Climate Funds Update (climatefundsupdate.org)

Mitigation



Total disbursements for mitigation = USD 2.4 billion

Disbursements for mitigation based on data from the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA), the LDC Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the MDG-Fund, and the GEF Trust Fund. Numbers on countries refer to number of projects / programmes funded

Source: OECD DAC Secretariat based on data from Climate Funds Update (climatefundsupdate.org)

Notes

1. Corfee-Morlot, J., B. Guay and K.M. Larsen (2009), *Financing Mitigation Support: Towards a Framework for Measurement, Reporting and Verification*, Section 3.1.4, p. 21, OECD/IEA, Paris.
2. Müller, B. (2008), "International adaptation finance: the need for an innovative strategic approach", Background Policy Paper for the Climate Strategies Project on Post-2012 Policy Framework, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, UK.
3. While the Rio marker on climate change refers primarily to mitigation, examples of typical activities included in the definition could also be considered adaptation, making it all the more ambiguous for reporters to determine just what to include in this category.

Annex D

2010 general capital increases and replenishments

IBRD capital adequacy review

Looking beyond the crisis, the World Bank predicts that demands for IBRD lending will continue to increase in order to address the increasing numbers of new poor in middle-income countries, to support the global public goods agenda, and to respond to future crises. To begin expanding its financial capacity, the IBRD has already adopted measures to stretch the use of its existing capital to support lending. At the same time, the IBRD has been actively working with relevant shareholders to release their national currency paid-in capital.¹ The IBRD also instituted a 20-base-point general loan price increase which is projected to enhance IBRD's end-FY19 usable equity by about USD 2 billion under the expected scenario. Following these efforts, a remaining gap in IBRD's equity capital base of between USD 4.8 and 6.3 billion by FY19 is projected. The potential actions to fill this gap are a Selective Capital Increase (SCI), a General Capital Increase (GCI), and a further price increase for long maturity loans. At the 2009 Annual Meetings, the Development Committee asked for an updated review, including for the WBG's general capital increase needs. At the 2010 spring meeting of the Development Committee, members endorsed a GCI for IBRD of USD 58.4 billion, of which 6%, or USD 3.5 billion, would be paid-in capital.

IFC capital adequacy review

The financial crisis has adversely affected IFC's profitability and tightened its capital position. A two-step approach is being considered to address IFC's capital constraint. In the interim period, shareholders would provide early support to IFC's growth strategy through what is known as "hybrid capital".² It would then be replaced by additional paid-in capital from IFC's shareholders as the next step. It is estimated that a capital increase in the range of USD 1.8 billion to USD 2.4 billion would enable IFC to grow the investment portfolio to between USD 47 and 49 billion over the next few years without jeopardising its AAA rating. The most recent Development Committee meeting (in April 2010) endorsed a package to enhance IFC's financial capacity, including consideration of a long-term hybrid instrument to shareholders, subject to the Board's review of terms and conditions, and earnings retention.³

IDA16 replenishment

IDA deputies met in Bamako on 15-18 June 2010 for the second meeting on the IDA16 replenishment. Most participants supported the focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries, gender, crisis response, and climate change as special themes, but stressed that these should be framed in the broader context of achieving development results. In

the recently concluded IDA15 Mid-Term Review, it was reported that during the first 15 months of IDA15 (July 2008 to October 2009), IDA commitments reached a record level of USD 16.9 billion, a 50% increase over the comparable period in IDA14. Given IDA's fixed resource envelope for a replenishment period, this strong delivery came about primarily through countries front-loading their assistance. The result will be lower levels of resources during the rest of the IDA15 period.

Participants reiterated strong support for the proposed focus on development results in IDA16. In this context, participants welcomed the further strengthening of the IDA Results Measurement System and encouraged management to explore additional ways of assessing IDA performance, while maintaining country ownership and accountability. Participants supported the ongoing internal reform agenda, and some urged the World Bank to accelerate the implementation of investment-lending reform during IDA16, including steps to support an increase in the use of country systems. Participants welcomed the realism of the proposed financing scenarios, and several welcomed the internal resource mobilisation efforts, including IBRD transfers. The next IDA16 replenishment meeting will take place at the time of the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings.⁴

African Development Bank: Sixth general capital increase

A committee of governors representing the African Development Bank's shareholders endorsed and accepted a tripling of the Bank's capital resources from USD 33 billion to USD 99 billion at the annual meetings in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire on 27 May 2010. Of the USD 66 billion increase, 6% or USD 4 billion is required as paid-in capital from shareholders. The last General Capital Increase (GCI) took place in 1998, and the Bank's medium term strategy (2008-2012) had not envisaged a new GCI until at least 2013. Nonetheless, the impact of the global economic crisis on Africa has heightened demand for measures to mitigate its effects and, at the current rate, 90% of the Bank's risk capital would be exhausted by 2012.

African Development Fund

At its annual meetings in Dakar, Senegal, in May 2009, the AfDB Board of Governors passed a resolution to initiate discussions on the Bank's general capital increase (GCI) and the replenishment of its concessional window, the African Development Fund. The AfDF is replenished every three years by 26 donor countries. The most recent replenishment of the AfDF (the 11th replenishment, ADF-11) for its 2008-10 operations was concluded in December 2007 at a record level of USD 8.9 billion. The Fund's core strategic priorities under ADF-11 include infrastructure, governance, support for fragile states and regional integration. At the ADF-11 Mid-Term Review (MTR), held in October 2009, there was strong support for consolidation and strengthening of current strategic priorities as a prime focus for the ADF-12 cycle due to begin in January 2011. In addition there were calls for the AfDF to integrate food security and climate change as cross-cutting issues. Deputies also emphasised the need for the Bank to continue building its delivery capacity, with a particular focus on high quality, decentralisation, human resources development, and aid effectiveness. The replenishment for ADF-12 will be concluded by September 2010.

Inter-American Development Bank: Ninth general capital increase

In the 15 years since the Eighth General Increase in the Resources of the Bank (IDB-8), the IDB has become the main source of development finance for the Latin American and Caribbean region, with loan approvals of USD 108.6 billion. The Fund for Special Operations provided USD 6.6 billion in concessional lending to the region's poorest countries, making it the main source of multilateral concessional lending. From 2007 onwards, and more recently with efforts to alleviate the impact of the global economic crisis, lending has increased sharply and prompted a review of the Bank's own capital needs. In October 2009, the Board of Governors agreed to move ahead with the final review of the need for a general capital increase of Ordinary Capital and replenishment of the Fund for Special Operations. On 22 March 2010 at their annual meeting, IDB's Board of Governors initiated the process for the Ninth General Capital Increase (GCI-9) to increase the Bank's ordinary capital by USD 70 billion – the largest expansion of resources in the Bank's history. They also agreed to provide an unprecedented package of financial support to Haiti, and to replenish the Fund for Special Operations, which finances operations in the region's poorest nations.

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: Replenishment in 2010

Created in 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was originally funded through (mostly annual) individual contributions from close to 50 countries, as well as private foundations, corporations, and individuals. As programs were scaled up in more than 140 countries, the need for sustained and predictable support grew substantially, which led to a decision by the Board of the Global Fund to introduce a funding model based on periodic replenishments. To date, two replenishments have taken place: the first for the period 2006-7 and the second for 2008-10. Since the inception of the Global Fund, public, private and non-government donors have jointly pledged a total of USD 22.1 billion covering the period 2001-15 (although at this stage most donors have only pledged through 2010). The Board of the Global Fund endorsed the decision to launch a third replenishment covering 2011-13. The pledging conference for the 3rd replenishment took place in October 2010 in New York, where donors made a USD 11.7 billion commitment to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for the years 2011-2013.

Though significant, total voluntary pledges represent only part of the USD 40-90 billion that experts estimate is needed from all sources each year from 2010-15 to prevent and treat HIV, TB and malaria effectively on a global scale.⁵ Efforts are underway to bring in more funding from the private sector and through innovative finance mechanisms. To fund ongoing programmes, without launching new rounds, it is estimated the Global Fund needs USD 8.2 billion. The Global Fund's management is striving to achieve efficiency gains of 10% as mandated by its Board. Since 2009, a new framework for the Global Fund's 2009 key performance indicators allows for a comprehensive assessment of its performance across four dimensions: operational performance; grant performance; effectiveness (whether its aid is effective in achieving development results, strengthening health systems, and promoting value for money); and impact.

Global Environment Facility: GEF-5 replenishment in 2010

Established in 1991, the GEF is today the largest funder of projects to improve the global environment. The GEF serves as the funding mechanism for the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). In addition, it provides support for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. As a result, the GEF provides grants to developing countries and transition economies to support projects in several interrelated areas covering biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants.

There was strong support for the replenishment of GEF-5 at the recent Copenhagen COP15 meeting and from the NGO community. Negotiations for GEF-5 for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2014 (FY11-FY14) were completed in May 2010. The targeted replenishment level of USD 4.2 billion represents a 34% increase over GEF-4 levels, providing for modest increases in all focus areas. On the basis on the *Final GEF-5 Programming Document*, the climate change portion will probably be around USD 1.4 billion over four years, almost all for mitigation.

Notes

1. Under the Articles of the IBRD, members need to only contribute 10% of their paid-in capital in USD, which can be freely used by the IBRD in its operations. The remaining 90% can be paid-in in the national currency of the subscribing member. Of the total unreleased national currency paid-in capital of USD 2 billion, the IBRD has thus far obtained indications for the release of USD 0.5 billion.
2. Through raising low or non-interest bearing subordinated loans from shareholders, potentially with contingent pay-in and redemption triggers tied to IFC capital adequacy, as a near-term alternative to a capital increase
3. World Bank (2010), "Development Committee Communiqué", World Bank, Washington, DC, 25 April.
4. World Bank (2010), "Chairperson's Summary: IDA Deputies' Meeting, Bamako, Mali, June 16-19, 2010".
5. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2010), p. 5.

Annex E

List of International Organisations
Official contributions to which may be reported in whole or in part as ODA

Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
40000	40000		MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS		
41000	41000		UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, FUNDS AND COMMISSIONS		
	41101	UNCCD	Convention to Combat Desertification	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41102	DILCO-EA	Desert Locust Control Organisation for Eastern Africa	100	Production sectors
	41103	ECA	Economic Commission for Africa	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41104	ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41105	ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41106	ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41107	IAEA-TCF	International Atomic Energy Agency (Contributions to Technical Cooperation Fund Only)	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	41108	IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	100	Production sectors
	41109	INSTRAW	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41110	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41111	UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	41112	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	100	Production sectors
	41114	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41116	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41118	UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41119	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41120	UN Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Programme	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41121	UNHCR	United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	100	Humanitarian aid
	41122	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41123	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation	100	Production sectors
	41124	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41125	UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41126	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41127	UNOCHA	United Nations Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	100	Humanitarian aid
	41128	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	100	Social infrastructure and services

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Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
41000 (cont.)	41129	UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41130	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	100	Humanitarian aid
	41131	UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41132	UNSCN	United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41133	UNISA	United Nations Special Initiative on Africa	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41134	UNU	United Nations University (including Endowment Fund)	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41135	UNV	United Nations Volunteers	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41136	UNVFD	United Nations Voluntary Fund on Disability	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41137	UNVFTC	United Nations Voluntary Fund for Technical Co-operation in the Field of Human Rights	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41138	UNVFT	United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41140	WFP	World Food Programme	100	Commodity aid and general programme assistance
	41141	PBF Window 2	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Window Two, Restricted Contributions Only)	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41142	UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund	100	Social infrastructure and services
	41143	WHO-CVCA	World Health Organisation - core voluntary contributions account	100	Social infrastructure and services
41300	41300		OTHER UN (Core Contributions Reportable in Part)		
	41301	FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation	51	Production sectors
	41302	ILO	International Labour Organisation	15	Social infrastructure and services
	41303	ITU	International Telecommunications Union	18	Economic infrastructure and services
	41304	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	44	Social infrastructure and services
	41305	UN	United Nations	12	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	41306	UPU	Universal Postal Union	16	Economic infrastructure and services
	41307	WHO-Assessed	World Health Organisation - assessed contributions	76	Social infrastructure and services
	41308	WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation	3	Social infrastructure and services
	41309	WMO	World Meteorological Organisation	4	Social infrastructure and services
	41310	UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (excluding UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF)	7	Social infrastructure and services
	41311	PBF Window 1	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (Window One, Flexible Contributions Only)	80	Social infrastructure and services
	41312	IAEA-Assessed	International Atomic Energy Agency - assessed contributions	33	Economic infrastructure and services
	41313	OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (extrabudgetary contributions only)	64	Social infrastructure and services
	41314	UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (extrabudgetary contributions only)	80	Social infrastructure and services

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Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
42000	42000		EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS		
	42001	EC	European Commission - Development Share of Budget	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	42003	EDF	European Commission - European Development Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	42004	EIB	European Investment Bank (interest subsidies only)	100	Social infrastructure and services
	42005	FEMIP	Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Trust Fund	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	42006	GEEREF	Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund	100	Economic infrastructure and services
43000	43000		INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND		
	43001	IMF-PRGF Trust	International Monetary Fund - Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Trust	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	43002	IMF-PRGF-HIPC Trust	International Monetary Fund - Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative Trust (includes HIPC, PRGF and PRGF-HIPC sub-accounts)	100	Action related to debt
	43003	IMF-ENDA	International Monetary Fund - Subsidization of IMF Emergency Assistance for Natural Disasters	100	Humanitarian aid
44000	44000		WORLD BANK GROUP		
	44001	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	44002	IDA	International Development Association	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	44003	IDA-HIPC	International Development Association - Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative Trust Fund	100	Action related to debt
	44004	IFC	International Finance Corporation	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	44005	MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	44006	AMCs	Advance Market Commitments	100	Social infrastructure and services
	44007	IDA-MDRI	International Development Association - Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative	100	Action related to debt
45000	45000		WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION		
	45001	WTO-ITC	World Trade Organisation - International Trade Centre	100	Production sectors
	45002	WTO-ACWL	World Trade Organisation - Advisory Centre on WTO Law	100	Production sectors
	45003	WTO-DDAGTF	World Trade Organisation - Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund	100	Production sectors
46000	46000		REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS		
	46001	ASF	African Solidarity Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46002	Afr DB	African Development Bank	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46003	Afr DF	African Development Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46004	AsDB	Asian Development Bank	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46005	AsDF	Asian Development Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46006	BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank	61	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46007	CABEI	Central American Bank for Economic Integration	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46008	CAF	Andean Development Corporation	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46009	CDB	Caribbean Development Bank	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46012	IDB	Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-American Investment Corporation and Multilateral Investment Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	46013	IDB Sp.F	Inter-American Development Fund for Special Operations	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting

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47000	47000		OTHER MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS		
	47001	ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation	100	
	47002	APO	Asian Productivity Organisation	100	
	47003	ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations: Economic Co-operation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47004	ASEAN (CF)	ASEAN Cultural Fund	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47005	AU	African Union (excluding peacekeeping facilities)	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47008	AVRDC	World Vegetable Centre	100	Production sectors
	47009	CAMES	African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47010	CAPAM	Commonwealth Agency for Public Administration and Management	100	
	47011	CARICOM	Caribbean Community Secretariat	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47012	CAREC	Caribbean Epidemiology Centre	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47013	CF	Commonwealth Foundation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47014	CFTC	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation	100	
	47015	CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	100	Production sectors
	47016	CI	Commonwealth Institute	100	
	47017	CIAT	International Centre for Tropical Agriculture	100	Production sectors
	47018	CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research	100	Production sectors
	47019	CIHEAM	International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies	100	Production sectors
	47020	CIMMYT	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre	100	Production sectors
	47021	CIP	International Potato Centre	100	Production sectors
	47022	CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47023	CLAS	Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47024	CMDF	Commonwealth Media Development Fund	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47025	COL	Commonwealth of Learning	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47026	CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries	100	
	47027	CP	Colombo Plan	100	
	47028	CPTM	Commonwealth Partnership for Technical Management	100	
	47029	SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club	100	
	47030	CSC	Commonwealth Scientific Council	100	
	47031	CSSO	Commonwealth Small States Office	100	
	47032	CTIAF	Commonwealth Trade and Investment Access Facility	100	Production sectors
	47033	CYP	Commonwealth Youth Programme	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47034	ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47035	ENDA	Environmental Development Action in the Third World	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47036	EPPO	European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation	100	Production sectors
	47037	EROPA	Eastern-Regional Organisation of Public Administration	100	Social infrastructure and services

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Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
47000 (cont.)	47038	FASTPED	INTERPOL Fund for Aid and Technical Assistance to Developing Countries	100	
	47040	FFA	Forum Fisheries Agency	100	Production sectors
	47041	FFTC	Food and Fertilizer Technology Centre	100	Production sectors
	47042	FIT	Foundation for International Training	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47043		Global Crop Diversity Trust	100	Production sectors
	47044	GEF	Global Environment Facility	96	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47045	Global Fund	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47046	OIF	International Organisation of the Francophonie	100	
	47047	IAI	International African Institute	100	
	47048	IAII	Inter-American Indian Institute	100	
	47049	IBE	International Bureau of Education - International Educational Reporting System (IERS)	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47050	ICAC	International Cotton Advisory Committee	100	Production sectors
	47051	ICARDA	International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas	100	Production sectors
	47053	ICDDR,B	Centre for Health and Population Research	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47054	ICIPE	International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology	100	Production sectors
	47055	ICRA	International Centre for Development Oriented Research in Agriculture	100	Production sectors
	47056	ICRAF	World AgroForestry Centre	100	Production sectors
	47057	ICRISAT	International Crop Research for Semi-Arid Tropics	100	Production sectors
	47058	IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47059	IDLO	International Development Law Organisation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47060	IIC	International Institute for Cotton	100	Production sectors
	47061	IICA	Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture	100	Production sectors
	47062	IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	100	Production sectors
	47063	ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute	100	Production sectors
	47064	INBAR	International Network for Bamboo and Rattan	100	Production sectors
	47065	IOC	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47066	IOM	International Organisation for Migration	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47067	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47068	APFIC	Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission	100	Production sectors
	47069		Biodiversity International	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47070	IRRI	International Rice Research Institute	100	Production sectors
	47071	ISTA	International Seed Testing Association	100	Production sectors
	47073	ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organisation	100	Production sectors
	47074	IVI	International Vaccine Institute	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47075	IWMI	International Water Management Institute	100	Social infrastructure and services

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Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
47000 (cont.)	47076	JSCA	Justice Studies Centre of the Americas	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47077	MRC	Mekong River Commission	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47078	Montreal Protocol	Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47079	OAS	Organisation of American States	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47080	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Contributions to special funds for Technical Co-operation Activities Only)	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47081	OECD-Dev Centre	OECD Development Centre	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47082	OECs	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47083	PAHO	Pan-American Health Organisation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47084	PAIGH	Pan-American Institute of Geography and History	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47085	PARCA	Pan-American Railway Congress Association	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47086	PIDG	Private Infrastructure Development Group	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47087	PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47088	RN	Relief Net	100	Humanitarian aid
	47089	SADC	Southern African Development Community	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47090	SATCC	Southern African Transport and Communications Commission	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47091	SCAAP	(Colombo Plan) Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme	100	
	47092	SEAFDC	South East Asian Fisheries Development Centre	100	Production sectors
	47093	SEAMEO	South East Asian Ministers of Education	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47094	SOPAC	South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission	100	
	47095	SPBEA	South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47096	SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47097	SPREP	Pacific Regional Environment Programme	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47098	UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples' Organisation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47099	USP	University of the South Pacific	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47100	WAMU	West African Monetary Union	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47101	WARDA	Africa Rice Centre	100	Production sectors
	47102	WCO-Fellowship Prog.	World Customs Organisation Fellowship Programme	100	Production sectors
	47103	WMU	World Maritime University	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47104	WorldFish Centre	WorldFish Centre	100	Production sectors
	47105	CFC	Common Fund for Commodities	100	Economic infrastructure and services

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Channel category code	Channel code	Acronym (ENG)	Full name (English)	Coefficient for core contributions	Overall sector category
47000 (cont.)	47106	DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47107	IFFIm	International Finance Facility for Immunisation	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47108	MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47109	APEC ASF	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Support Fund (except contributions tied to counter-terrorism activities)	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47110	BSEC	Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	78	
	47111		Adaptation Fund	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47112	CEI-Climate Fund	Central European Initiative - Special Fund for Climate and Environmental Protection	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47113	CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47116	IF	Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries	100	Production sectors
	47117	NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47118	CREFAF	Regional Organisation for the Strengthening of Supreme Audit Institutions of Francophone Sub-Saharan Countries	100	
	47119	OSS	Sahara and Sahel Observatory	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47120	SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	100	Multi-sector / cross-cutting
	47121	UCLGA	United Cities and Local Governments of Africa	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47122	GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47123	GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	100	Social infrastructure and services
	47125	ETC	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - Early Transition Countries Initiative	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47126		European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - Western Balkans Trust Fund	100	Economic infrastructure and services
	47127	OLADE	Latin-American Energy Organisation	100	Economic infrastructure and services

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Multilateral Aid 2010

CONTENTS

- Chapter 1. General trends in the multilateral system and their policy implications
- Chapter 2. Non core funding of multilaterals
- Chapter 3. Non core funding of UNDP and the World Bank
- Chapter 4. Development perspectives for a post-Copenhagen climate funding architecture
- Chapter 5. Developments in the Multilateral System in 2009-10
- Chapter 6. Multilateral strategies and evaluation in 2009-10

Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2011), *Multilateral Aid 2010*, OECD Publishing
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264046993-en>

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